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ABSTRACT 
 
H. ODERA ORUKA AND THE RIGHT TO A HUMAN MINIMUM:  
A SAGACIOUS QUEST FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE 
 
 
 
By 
Mburu Kamau Michael  
May 2018 
 
Dissertation Supervised by Professor Ronald Polansky 
  
This dissertation primarily aims at making contribution to the advancement of philosophy 
from the practical point of view. It does so by analytically and critically studying H. Odera Oruka 
(1944-1995), arguably one of the finest 20th century African philosophers. Thus, it identifies, 
expounds, and critiques Oruka’s philosophical cum ethical commitment by situating him within 
various philosophical discourses touching such important global issues as justice, human rights, 
duty, ecology, and politics. It specifically advances Oruka’s argument for the right to a human 
minimum, showing how that ethical principle can be applicable in addressing such traumatic 
human conditions as inequality, poverty, inhumanness and ecological degradation. It also attempts 
to borrow and apply some ethical values from Africa – such as ubuntu (or humanness) - so as to 
clarify and philosophically defend the possibility of ensuring justice at the global level.  
Key words: Odera Oruka, sagacity, right, duty, human minimum, ecology, global justice, ubuntu. 
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CHAPTER 1 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Statement of the Problem 
Philosophy can be etymologically defined as “love of wisdom”. That means philosophy, at 
least from the practical point of view, is inevitably tied with issues of justice; where justice means 
ensuring both egalitarian and ecological fairness. This is because wisdom or sagacity - the object 
of philosophy - is a human quality that enables one to utilize knowledge of his or her tradition and 
modernity for the purpose of making reasonable, mature, and objective judgments about life, 
human relations, and the environment (Oruka 1991, 40). Thus, philosophy so defined as “love of 
wisdom” is supposed to confer insight, knowledge, and ethical inspiration so that we humans are 
able to relate “healthily” not only with each other but also with our environment. Philosophy, in 
other words, ought to make us not only knowledgeable and critical but also reasonable and mature, 
and hence ethically responsible as moral agents. 
Unfortunately, that has not always been the case. Despite various ideologies prompted by 
the rise in clamour for justice at the global level, socio-economic inequality and hence poverty – 
the bedrock of human misery - remains a thorny issue. The scary gap between the rich and the 
poor (be they individual persons or nation-states) sadly continues escalating as the few rich and 
strong mercilessly exploit world resources to the detriment of majority of the poor and vulnerable. 
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), for instance, 
the richest 10% of the world population earns 9.6 times the income of the poorest 10% combined 
(Reuben 2015). Further reports indicate that between 2015 - 2017, over 800 million people in the 
world were living in abject poverty, earning less than $ 2.00 per day (Roser & Ortiz-Ospina 2018). 
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But such pathetic situation is, no doubt, a real threat to the security and quality of human life. It is 
a grave form of injustice to humanity that needs to be addressed with urgency. 
Indeed, socio-economic deprivation (often caused by greed), among other forms of human 
peril, is an “evil” that cannot be ignored; it is a real threat to both humanity and the entire universe. 
It adversely affects people’s rationality, creativity and ability to function as moral agents, thereby 
jeopardizing human dignity1 and integrity. It also threatens global security and harmonious co-
existence with Nature. Thus, we urgently need a philosophy that would address a rather difficult 
but legitimate question: what do we fundamentally need as humans to eradicate poverty in the 
world, thereby enhance people’s rationality, creativity, and ability to function as moral agents? 
This is a question in search of the human minimum; it forms the basis of my study.  
There are some other important questions that may inevitably come to mind if one were to 
critically reflect upon the issue of poverty vis-à-vis the desire to have justice at the global level. 
First, is it ethically justifiable for some few people to exuberantly exploit world resources, and 
hence “suffocate” in luxurious affluence while millions of others languish in abject poverty? Put 
differently, is the “world order” fair to the global poor? Third, what ought to be done to alleviate 
this dire situation (socio-economic exploitation and hence poverty), thereby ensuring decent living 
and hence possibility of “happiness” to the majority if not everyone?  
Now these and other intriguing questions, to me, seem to boil down to one fundamental 
ethical concern: don’t we (humans) have any duty to ensure that every human being in the world, 
                                                          
1 I use the term “dignity” here and throughout the project to denote that special “inner worth” associated 
with human species by virtue of them being rational, and hence having capacity to function as moral 
agents. It is that condition under which humans ought to be treated as an end in itself rather than means 
(cf. Kant 4:435). Thus, it is the basis of valuing human life; it is also the basis of respect, entitlement or 
rights, and empowerment of an individual person. 
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by virtue of being human, has at least the right to basic human needs met? That concern, in my 
view, would set the stage for the possibility of having justice at the global level. 
1.2. Hypothesis  
In response to the above questions, this project seeks to advance a hypothesis that the right 
to a human minimum, an ethical principle Odera Oruka ingeniously crafted, is the basic necessary 
(though not sufficient) means to ensuring a genuine practice of justice at the global level. Adhering 
to the ethical principle of human minimum, in other words, is what we would fundamentally need 
at the global level to reduce socio-economic inequality, eradicate poverty, and so enhance people’s 
rationality, creativity, and ability to function as moral agents. I will elaborate what constitutes the 
right to a human minimum, and demonstrate why it should never be denied to any member of the 
human species if we are to develop a much more “humanised” global society, i.e., a society in 
which one would feel more secured, dignified, taken care of, and motivated to act as an ethically 
responsible being irrespective of one’s domicile.  
I further intend to show how the ethical principle of human minimum elicits what we might 
call “correlative global duty” that binds every capable moral agent. My argument with Oruka will 
be grounded on one basic sagacity that demand of us humans (who presumably are rational beings) 
to be ethically responsible to the wellbeing of each other our geographical, racial, gender, or any 
other sectarian affiliations notwithstanding. But that sagacity also prompts us to take good care of 
our environment, even as we pursue what we think is justifiably due to us (as our rights). And that, 
to me, would hopefully lead us toward a much better concept of global justice: one that does not 
only emphasize egalitarian fairness in human relations but also ecological fairness with Nature. 
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1.3. Commitment to Practical Philosophy 
Henry Odera Oruka (1944-1995) is arguably one of the finest Africa philosophers in the 
twentieth century. Born and raised in the Western part of Kenya before undertaking graduate 
studies in Sweden and the United States, Oruka rose academically to earn for himself international 
repute. As a critical thinker, astute scholar, proficient author and a distinguished don, Odera Oruka 
was committed to making African philosophy a topic for global philosophical inquiry. He took 
this as a first step toward seeking justice for his people. Like other contemporary African 
philosophers – such as Hountondji, Wiredu, Masolo, Mudimbe, Gyekeye, Appiah, etc., Oruka’s 
work has also opened new ways of philosophizing in modern Africa beyond the polemical question 
of the nature and the content of African philosophy.  
Odera Oruka is, no doubt, well known for his Sage Philosophy; a project that almost single-
handedly turned the University of Nairobi where he was based into a hub of “philosophic sagacity”, 
a globally recognized school of thought. But, unfortunately less known (though in my view most 
important) is Oruka’s practical philosophy, especially his ethical thought. He believed that any 
philosophy worthy of its name ought to be sagacious, meaning it ought to be practically relevant 
to the wellbeing of humanity and the environment. Hence, at the heart of his practical philosophy 
was ethics, which he regards as a philosophical inquiry into the moral language and principles that 
govern or ought to govern the conduct of human beings (who are supposedly moral agents) as well 
as determine their role, value and dignity in a society (Oruka 1990b, 3). 
1.4. Background to the Project 
Odera Oruka’s proficiency in writing surprises many. At the time of his untimely death (he 
was hit by a lorry in one of the streets of Nairobi aged 51years old), Oruka had published at least 
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six books and co-authored three. In addition, he wrote over fifty academic essays, many of which 
have been published in local and international newspapers, journals, and books. His writings, most 
of which are quite enticing to read, were mainly focused on such practical topics as sagacity, ethics, 
justice, humanism, liberty, politics, economics, eco-philosophy, etc.2  
Now out of the six books he authored, Oruka is arguably best known for Sage Philosophy 
(1990/91), a book many consider to be his most epic contribution to philosophy. It continues to 
draw interesting academic discussions from scholars not only in Africa but also in America, 
Europe, and Asia. As Graness aptly points out, Sage Philosophy has “opened a new perspective 
on the Eurocentric history of philosophy and African history as such”, leading to “a new discussion 
about the origins of philosophical thinking”. It is therefore “an important contribution to the 
reconstruction of the history of world philosophy” (Graness and Kresse 1997, 247). Indeed, several 
dissertations and many academic papers have been written and published on Sage Philosophy.  
There is, however, another book by Professor Oruka that I consider invaluably resourceful 
not only to my project but also to anyone committed to the issue of global justice, i.e., to advancing 
socio-economic fairness to humanity without jeopardizing the environment. This work entitled 
Practical Philosophy: In Search for an Ethical Minimum was published posthumously in 1997, 
dedicated to future thinkers and those who work for justice and a better environment (Oruka 1997, 
x). It is a collection of some of Oruka’s essays that had been previously published over a span of 
twenty years: probably from 1976 to 1995.  
As we learn from the introduction, these were the essays Oruka himself had selected and 
was critically revising in view of publishing them as a book before his untimely death. And in my 
                                                          
2 For a complete bibliography of Oruka’s works, see Graness and Kresse 1997, 261-65. 
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view, these were essays that Oruka thought would fittingly define his philosophy as a sagacious 
inquiry into human predicaments. He seems to have envisioned a kind of philosophy that would 
be more relevantly attuned to not only enlightening the mind of his audience, but also provide 
practical possible solutions that would help improve the socio-economic wellbeing of humanity as 
such without causing havoc to the environment. 
1.5. Significance of the Project 
Oruka’s Practical Philosophy is divided into four parts, namely, i) The Issue of Truth and 
Truth in Faith; ii) Values, Ideology and Praxis; iii) African Philosophy and the Problem of Culture; 
and iv), Philosophy, Ethics and the Environment. In this project, we focus mainly on the second 
and fourth parts. As Oruka aptly writes, these two parts contain “essays that purport to be critical 
of matters of ethics and values in social life and politics” (Oruka 1997, xi). They address pertinent 
issues of poverty, underdevelopment, freedom, socio-economic injustice, inhumanness, and 
environmental degradation, just to mention a few (cf. Oruka 1997 101, 106, 138, 243).  
These are, no doubt, issues of great global concern; they are important to both humanity 
and the entire world. As a philosopher with a practical inclination, Odera Oruka felt the need to 
first address these issues as a matter of urgent moral imperative so as help improve the world for 
better human existence. He likewise challenges other philosophers and thinkers to do the same. In 
one of his fascinating essays addressing the issue of global irresponsibility he writes: 
This concern [i.e., global irresponsibility] calls for philosophers to help reorganize and 
rationalize the available knowledge in order to improve human understanding and the 
welfare of mankind. And here lies the moral mission of philosophy. In our times it is more 
urgent than the concern, say, to develop new methods of solving classical metaphysical 
paradoxes (Oruka 1997, 99). 
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This project aims at responding to that moral imperative urgency by critically analysing 
some of the issues mentioned above. But that does not mean that we disregard metaphysics and 
other “classical” branches of philosophy. Rather, we simply want to develop a philosophy that is 
sagaciously concerned about humanity’s wellbeing in our quest for a global society, a society that 
is essentially both egalitarian and communitarian oriented. Such a society, we argue, must be 
inspired and guided by some ethical principles, such as the right to a human minimum.  
As we shall see, the concept of human minimum is one of the central principles in Oruka’s 
practical philosophy; it either explicitly or implicitly cuts across the issues mentioned above, 
especially as he seeks a genuine practice of justice at the global level. Indeed, it was because of 
his commitment to humanism or humanness (i.e., an ethical concern for the wellbeing of humanity 
as such and the environment) that Odera Oruka believed every human person being entitled to 
some basic needs: physical security, subsistence, and health care. These three basic needs together 
constitute what Oruka dubs the right to a human minimum. He subsequently claims that global 
society, insofar as it is as reasonable as it ought to be, has the ethical duty to ensure or facilitate 
the enjoyment of that right (the three basic needs) to every member of the human species their 
geographical, racial, gender, or any other sectarian affiliation notwithstanding. In fact, Oruka 
would further vest that ethical duty to every capable individual person within the global society. 
To get Oruka’s argument, it is perhaps important to briefly talk about ‘right’: what it is or 
ought to be. Now right can be defined as that which one is justifiably entitled to insofar as one is 
human. It is therefore “the rational basis for a justified demand” of something that is fairly due 
(Oruka 1997, 85). And the enjoyment of that something - i.e., the substance of a right in question 
- is what matters most. It is what confers the “moral worth” to a right in question. But rights are 
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not of the same status. There are those considered inherent to human existence (such as the ‘right 
to life’), and those considered rights prima facie, for instance the ‘right to freedom of speech’.  
Now with that distinction in mind, we can posit that the most basic “thing” a human being 
can justifiably demand and is entitled to enjoy insofar as one is human includes: (i) physical 
security, (ii) subsistence and (iii) health care. These three “things” are fairly necessary (though not 
sufficient) to sustain human life. Without one of them or all of them, human life becomes 
fundamentally untenable. That is why Oruka refers to the three basic necessities together as the 
right to a human minimum. It is a right that is so basic and “primitive” to sustaining human life at 
the minimum level. That means the enjoyment of its substantive elements (the three basic needs) 
every human is necessarily entitled to by virtue of them being members of the human species.  
It follows, therefore, that the right to a human minimum is the basis of all other human 
entitlements in principle empowers every human being, insofar as one is human, to make a justified 
demand for the three basic necessities so as to lead a fairly decent life worthy of a human person. 
And as an ethical principle, the human minimum is also the basis for establishing a necessary global 
duty that ought to make every human person, every capable moral agent feels ethically inspired to 
fulfil or enable others to enjoy the basic needs. Thus, as we shall see later, adhering to the demands 
of the right to a human minimum is the first most basic prerequisite for establishing global justice 
- understood not only in terms of ensuring ‘egalitarian fairness’ but also ‘ecological fairness’.  
Put differently, the right to a human minimum, as an ethical principle, can be said to confer 
a necessary global ethical duty to us humans (who presumably are the only rational beings on 
earth) to take care of each other without overexploiting the environment. That would, however, 
imply two things: (i) that we all strive to use world resources in a more responsible manner; and 
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(ii) that we all strive to share or distribute world resources more equitably for the common good. 
These two ethical values, I think, would lead us to a genuine practice of justice at the global level. 
They would, in other words, lead us toward an egalitarian global society.  
This is another crucial point that this project wishes to underscore. An egalitarian society, 
we can say, is that society governed by some objectively chosen ethical principles that treat every 
member as equal, with dignity and respect of a human person. Such principles take humankind as 
an end in itself. In other words, they dignify life in every human being by ensuring a decent 
livelihood for all. Thus, an egalitarian society always strives to improve the living conditions of 
its members regardless of their sectorial differences. To put it differently, in an egalitarian society, 
there is no room for exploitation; there is, instead, equitable opportunities for all members to work 
together to improve their socio-economic wellbeing.  
Nonetheless, that does not mean every member within an egalitarian society would have, 
say, exactly the same amount of wealth, success or prosperity. Instead, it means every member is 
equitably given the viable opportunity to realize their potentialities without some individuals or 
group having what we might call “systemic privileges” over others. It also means that those who, 
for some reasons, fail to meet their basic minimum requirements to live a decent life worth of a 
human person are given the necessary assistance to do so. That means no one would be left behind 
languishing in abject poverty, for instance, while some others “swim” in luxurious affluence. 
It is on this ground that we, following Odera Oruka’s insight, wish to propose the right to 
the human minimum as a surest means of establishing an egalitarian global society, a society that 
will ensure a genuine practice of justice (i.e., egalitarian and ecological fairness) at global level. 
Such an egalitarian global society, in my view, will also necessarily be communitarian oriented; 
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meaning, members therein would feel closely connected to and interdependent with each other, 
sharing both their anguish and prosperity as equal members of one human family, their apparent 
differences and sectorial affiliations notwithstanding.  
1.6. Justification of the Project 
I have chosen to specialize in Oruka’s ethical thought for two main reasons. First, as hinted 
above, Oruka’s Practical philosophy has not received as much scholarly coverage and recognition 
as it deserves; yet, in my own assessment, I strongly think it is perhaps the most important part of 
his philosophy in our contemporary world. Practical philosophy (as opposed to theoretical/ 
speculative philosophy), he says, “... addresses principles of ethics and the rules of their application 
in the social, political, religious and legal life of humankind” (Oruka 1997, xi). Our contemporary 
world, no doubt, requires such address. The second reason is based on the fact that Oruka’s 
Practical Philosophy seems to reflect his mature thoughts. It captures such important practical 
themes as humanism, global justice, ecology, consumerism, etc., which themes, I think, Oruka 
would have wished his philosophy to further undertake had he lived longer. 
Indeed, Oruka was convinced that philosophy has a special mission of enhancing the socio-
economic wellbeing of people without causing havoc to the environment. Philosophers, he would 
say, have a noble task of not only critically reflecting on the issues facing humanity but also most 
importantly coming up with solutions that would make life in society better in the future. Any 
philosophy worth its salt, he urges, ought to be committed into creating a humane society. Oruka’s 
famous maxim was that “philosophy must be made sagacious” (Graness and Kresse 1997, 253-
254); meaning, philosophy ought to be relevant in creating a society where everyone feels ethically 
responsible toward the wellbeing of the ‘other’, a society that privileges no one and excludes no 
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one. That would translate into a global society that is both egalitarian and communitarian oriented. 
And that, to me, is what Oruka envisioned the right to a human minimum would help us achieve.  
1.7. Methodology and the Scope 
To achieve the aforementioned objectives, this study undertakes a critical analysis of some 
crucial works of Odera Oruka. It also considers extensively other philosophical works that have a 
bearing on issues of poverty, human rights, global justice, global responsibility, ecology, among 
others. Thus, in its critical consideration of the relevant literature, the study employs the method 
of “philosophical analysis”, confining itself to both conceptual and logical analyses (Gorovitz and 
Williams, 1965, 79-81). While the former helps in the clarification of meaning of concepts as 
situations may demand, the latter involves examination of presuppositions in arguments, and how 
such presuppositions are used to justify certain positions and historical facts.3 
1.8. Précis of the Chapters 
This dissertation is divided into seven chapters. Chapter one, the current chapter, serves the 
purpose of general introduction. In chapter two, we discuss Odera Oruka’s legacy in depth, thereby 
exposing his commitment to philosophy from a practical point of view. The chapter is divided into 
three related sections. The first section explores Oruka’s biographical information, traces his 
academic achievements, and critically evaluates his life-style as a sage-philosopher.  
                                                          
3 As a cautionary remark, I wish to clarify that I do not intend to analyze Oruka’s Sage Philosophy 
project, though I may occasionally refer to it; I do not plan to conduct interviews of my own either. But 
that does not mean that I disregard or disapprove Oruka’s methodology of interviewing sages; rather, I 
only feel that that technique may not work for the topics I am dealing with. Furthermore, there are already 
dissertations and papers written and published on Sage Philosophy. In this project, therefore, I want to do 
something different: promote and publicise Odera Oruka’s ethical thought in his Practical Philosophy, the 
other side of his scholarly work that, in my view, has not been as sufficiently explored as it deserves. 
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The second section addresses the issue of what philosophy essentially is, or ought to be. Here, 
we shall ascertain why Oruka, who identifies himself within the Socratic tradition, envisioned a 
kind of philosophy that is more practical than theoretical; a philosophy that is relevantly committed 
to improvement of the welfare of humanity without jeopardising the environment. We will further 
try to explain why Oruka strongly believed that other than being committed to the issue of truth, 
genuine philosophers (and indeed every rational being) ought to be committed to and guided by 
some ethical principles that bring about global ethical duty. Oruka took that as perhaps the most 
basic and ultimate goal of philosophizing if philosophy was ever to be made “sagacious”, that is, 
if philosophy was ever to become what it etymologically is: “love of wisdom”. And in the same 
vein, the third section will attempt to show: how philosophy can be made sagacious, i.e., practically 
relevant to solve people’s problems, thereby moving from theory to praxis. 
Chapter three in turn focuses on Oruka’s incontestable commitment to defending, shaping 
and developing philosophy in Africa. As part of seeking justice for the Africans, this chapter seeks 
to publicize one of Oruka’s most distinguishable trademarks: philosophic sagacity; a trend he uses 
to help liberate philosophy in Africa from ethnological (read mythological) and racist prejudices 
from other parts of the world. In the context of his Sage philosophy project, and in response to a 
distressing question on the nature and the existence of philosophy in Africa, the chapter will try to 
argue that philosophic sagacity is no doubt one of the most outstanding philosophical trends or 
school of thoughts in Africa, just as it is also applicable elsewhere in the world.  
The chapter, therefore, calls for a genuine retrieval as well as critical reconsideration of 
traditional sagacity that would be instrumental in solving such contemporaneous issues as pride, 
greed or possessive individualism, racism, and ecological degradation, thereby helping alleviate 
socio-economic inequality and poverty in the world. Put differently, chapter three presents Oruka’s 
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approach to philosophy essentially as a practical response to one of the most intriguing issues in 
contemporary Africa: biased socio-politico-economic and intellectual deprivation/ suppression. 
And hopefully, this will in turn portray Oruka as a diligent sagacious philosopher committed to 
seeking justice not only for his people but also for humankind as such.  
In chapter four, I shift gears to discuss Oruka’s “need-based” concept of human right, thereby 
advancing a critique to the current human rights talk that appears predominantly influenced by 
modern liberal philosophy from the West.4 This is a philosophy (by such modern thinkers as John 
Locke) whose “liberty-based” idea of right tends to exhort unlimited pursuance of individual 
entitlements but at the expense of ethical duty (or responsibility) that we humans ought to have 
towards each other. It also tends to promote possessive individualism, pride and hence unnecessary 
prejudice. We shall contrast that view with Oruka’s need-based account that seems to derive from, 
or at least influenced by, philosophies in most pre-colonial Africa. 
In the same vein, chapter four seeks to debunk a commonly held fallacy that the concept of 
human right is a product of enlightenment and modern Western liberalism. Thus, apart from trying 
to derive a possible definition of human right, the chapter also seeks a possible philosophical 
justification of our thinking about rights. It also talks about the concept of human right from the 
pre-colonial African perspective that mostly tends to emphasize the actual enjoyment of human 
entitlement in relation to our (human) natural quest for justice and the common good. That means 
the idea of right is also tied to such communitarian values as solidarity, generosity, care, tolerance, 
responsibility, etc., which all help in setting “priority order” insofar as the actual enjoyment of 
                                                          
4 By the “West” here and throughout this project I mean European countries like Britain, France, Italy, 
Germany, Greece, Portugal, etc., as well as their allies in North America.  
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rights is concerned. The chapter concludes by submitting that Oruka’s “philosophy of right” ought 
to be seen as trying to inject that sagacity into the current human rights talk. 
This will usher in chapter five, whose focus is on critical analysis of Oruka’s argument for 
the right to a human minimum. Here, we shall see how Oruka develops that ethical principle, which 
he says is the most basic human right, arguing that it is not only the prerequisite for one to 
justifiably act as a moral agent but also the basis without which there cannot be actual enjoyment 
of other rights. We shall then see why, as an ethical principle, the right to a human minimum also 
elicits a correlative global duty insofar as the enjoyment of some basic human needs is concerned. 
And that duty, the chapter argues, is the rational justification for us humans having any other 
ethical duty toward each other and our environment.   
Oruka’s philosophy of the human minimum, therefore, is closely tied to issues of global justice 
(as opposed to international justice); it strives to achieve for every human being what in principle 
each one is justifiably entitled to insofar as one is a member of the human species. It helps us 
realize that as humans (i.e., as rational-socio-ethical beings), we have some basic needs that we 
are always necessarily justified to demand from each other: physical security, subsistence and 
health care. But the question is: what is the rational basis of that justified demand? Similarly, it 
would appear we have some necessary duty to fulfil or at least facilitate realization of what in 
principle everyone is entitled to – at least the basic human needs. But again, the question is: what 
is the rational basis of that necessary duty? The answer to these questions, the chapter argues, lies 
in the idea of human minimum. It is the rational basis of our justified demand of our rights. It is 
also the rational basis of our ethical duty toward the wellbeing of each other as equal members of 
the global society. It is, therefore, the basic prerequisite ethical principle of ensuring the possibility 
of practicing justice at the global level. 
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In chapter six, we seek to apply Oruka’s ethical thought to advance a discourse that would 
help ensure a genuine practice of justice at the global level. The chapter is divided into two related 
sections. The first section critically analyses the idea of justice conventionally understood in terms 
of ensuring ‘egalitarian fairness’, thereby emphasizing the need to practically de-territorialized 
justice to a global level. Here, we maintain Oruka’s position that ensuring the enjoyment of the 
right to a human minimum to the majority (if not all) in the world is the basic prerequisite for 
establishing anything akin to global justice. Thus, we’ll define global justice tentatively as ‘the 
totality of demands of justice that can reasonably be applied to both local and international human 
relations so as to establish a global society that is both egalitarian and communitarian oriented’.  
The second section focuses on Oruka’s “eco-philosophy”, a term he coined to emphasize 
on the need to further de-territorialize the concept of justice, that is, make the idea of justice as 
“global” in practice as it should be. But that would imperatively require having a different world 
view, a new ethics that would not only motivate a spirit of equitable distribution or sharing of 
world resources, but also consider the natural world (the environment) as invaluable constituent of 
the global society. Thus, in contrast to Hardin’s lifeboat ethics (1980) mentality that tends to limit 
the enjoyment of justice as ‘egalitarian fairness’, we propose Odera Oruka’s parental earth ethics, 
the heartbeat of his eco-philosophy. Oruka’s ethics, we shall see, takes an eco-centric rather than 
anthropo-centric approach to issues of global justice, thereby ensuring “ecological fairness”, which 
is a necessary prerequisite of establishing egalitarian fairness. Oruka’s parental earth ethics also 
emphasizes the “stewardship model” as opposed to “possessive-exploitative model” insofar as the 
use of world resources is concerned. Thus, it challenges us humans to be more ethically responsible 
when we use and distribute wealth and world resources. That ethics seems firmly grounded on 
Oruka’s conviction that the earth is a “commonwealth” and a common heritage for all. 
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Finally, in chapter seven (the general conclusion), we will try to critically consider Oruka’s 
commitment to practical philosophy in terms of humanism that properly defines his ethical thought 
and hence his unrelenting quest for global justice. Oruka understood humanism (or humanness as 
he would sometimes call it) as an endeavour to uphold the quality and security of human life. It 
seems to borrow much from the pre-colonial way of life in Africa where such important human 
values as solidarity, generosity, care, etc. were emphasized. It is well captured in “parental earth 
ethics” and other essays that talk about justice, human rights, politics, ecology, consumerism, etc.  
Oruka’s humanism, however, is quite unusual. It emphasizes the “intrinsic good” of every 
creature on earth. It recognizes human beings as rational cum moral agents without devaluing the 
rest of natural world. It helps us understand what it really means to be human in relation to our 
environment. It calls for an integral approach to the ecosystem, even as we humans strive to meet 
our needs, thereby seeing the entire world as a global society, a sort of “organic unit” or a “family” 
governed by principles of interdependence and ethical responsibility. It helps us realize that we 
humans are not really the masters but merely privileged members of an ecological system.  
In sum, Oruka’s humanism underscores the ethical duty that we humans have or ought to 
have towards the wellbeing of other fellow human beings as well as other creatures on earth. 
Hence, it can establish a more viable concept of justice at the global level. Cognizant of the fact 
that every being on earth is interrelated and interconnected for the common good, it enables us to 
define global justice not simply in terms of ensuring egalitarian fairness (which properly applies 
to human relations), but also “ecological fairness” that includes every creature on earth. 
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CHAPTER 2 
ORUKA’S LEGACY IN PHILOSOPHY 
One can be an expert in logical and cogent reasoning and still be an idiot on matters of life and 
human relations. Wisdom, therefore, is not philosophy and vice versa (Oruka 1991a, 40). 
 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter aims at discussing the legacy of the late Professor H. Odera Oruka, arguably one 
of the finest philosophers in Africa. It is also meant to expose, espouse, and critically evaluate his 
commitment to philosophy, particularly from a practical point of view. It is divided into three 
major sections. In the first section we explore Oruka’s biographical information, trace his academic 
achievements, and critically evaluate his life-style as a philosopher.  
The second section will investigate Oruka’s understanding of what philosophy is, or ought to 
be. Here, we shall see why, for instance, Oruka envisioned a philosophy that is more practical than 
theoretical, a philosophy that is relevantly committed to improvement of the welfare of people 
without compromising their environment. Furthermore, we will try to show why Oruka strongly 
believed that other than being committed to the issue of truth, genuine philosophers (or philosophic 
sages as he would call them) ought to have ethical duty as perhaps the most basic and ultimate 
goal of philosophising if their philosophy is ever to become sagacious, that is, if their philosophy 
is ever to become what philosophy etymologically is – “love of wisdom”.  
Indeed, as we shall see, Odera Oruka was committed to, say, fighting against global injustice. 
His practical philosophy attests to his task of philosophizing against social, political, structural, 
economic, and theoretical deprivation and suppression of the minority. It also emphasizes his point 
that philosophy is (or ought to be) tied to critical individual thinkers who in most cases ought to 
challenge the status quo in order to seek practical solutions to human and ecological problems. 
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This is what the third section will attempt to show: how philosophy can be made sagacious or 
practically relevant to solve people’s problems. Here, we aim at moving from theory to praxis. 
Thus, the chapter concludes by justifying Oruka’s commitment to practical philosophy, 
particularly his ethical thought and his unrelenting quest for justice at the global level. 
2.2. Oruka’s Historical Background 
2.2.1.  Biographical Sketch 
Henry Odera Oruka was born on June 1st. 1944 in Ugenya, Siaya County, Western part of 
Kenya. As he grew up in a large but humble family,5 Oruka showed exceptional interest in 
education. He attended Jera and Sega Boys Schools for his primary education, before proceeding 
to St. Mary’s High School Yala for his secondary and advanced level studies. Having excelled in 
high school studies, Oruka won a prestigious scholarship from Uppsala University in Sweden for 
a Bachelor of Science programme in the Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Science. He studied 
Geography, Meteorology, and Geodesy, but on his own initiative and interest, he added Philosophy 
as an optional course (Oruka 1997, 281). It was here also that Oruka met his mentor and a father-
figure – Professor Ingemar Hedenius (a philosopher and prolific author well known all over 
Scandinavia), who would become influential in shaping his philosophical trajectory.6 
                                                          
5 Odera Oruka’s father had ten wives, of whom his mother was second in rank, though Oruka was obliged 
to call any of the other nine wives “mother” according to the Luo customs. Oruka’s childhood, however, 
was not all that rosy. His biological mother died when he was barely eight, leaving behind three younger 
siblings. This made Oruka drop out of school to take care of his siblings, especially the youngest (Okoth) 
who was six months old, and whom Oruka says died almost on his lap one year later. This tragic event, 
however, was a blessing in disguise, for Oruka was able to resume school, while he and his other siblings 
survived as what he calls “multi-mothered mother-less children” of all the nine wives of his father (Oruka 
1997, 282 and Odhiambo 1996, 13). 
6 Philosophy studies at Uppsala, according to Oruka, were divided into two tracks: practical and 
theoretical. He chose to specialize in practical philosophy (i.e., ethics, socio-political philosophy, and 
legal philosophy), which he thought would be more useful for understanding the problems of Africa, 
particularly for helping to liberate it and also sustain its independence (Graness and Kresse 1997, 212). 
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Upon graduation with a Bachelor of Science degree (a year ahead of his class), Oruka 
surprised his sponsors when he opted to drop science for philosophy, a choice that inevitably cost 
him his scholarship (Oruka 1997, 281). Nonetheless, he found his way to Wayne State University 
in Detroit, MI., accompanying Professor Hedenius for a Masters degree in philosophy, which 
degree he completed within a year. Under the supervision of Hedenius, Oruka wrote a thesis on 
the concept of punishment in 1969, which he later refined and published under the title Punishment 
and Terrorism in Africa in 1976 (Odhiambo 1996, 13).  
After completing his Masters degree, Oruka once again accompanied Professor Hedenius 
back to Uppsala University where, owing to his excellent academic record, he easily regained 
admission for the doctoral programme in philosophy. He wrote a dissertation on the concept of 
freedom, obtaining a Ph.D. in 1970. He would later develop and have this work published into a 
book entitled Philosophy of Liberty: An Essay on Political Philosophy in 1991.7 
Upon his graduation in 1970, the twenty-seven-years-old Doctor of Philosophy returned to 
Kenya, where he was hired by the University of Nairobi as “special lecturer” of philosophy. That 
title, as Masolo observes, really meant that he had no regular appointment, may be due to his young 
age but mostly due to scepticism and bias of those who led the department (Graness and Kresse 
1997, 233). Oruka himself sadly laments that when he was hired to teach at the University of 
Nairobi, the department of philosophy was “suffocated” with religious studies. Majority of the 
staff, moreover, were clergy and lay theologians who had little time for philosophy. In fact, most 
of them did not believe that Africans have the ability to think logically, let alone do philosophy at 
                                                          
7 Life abroad was not easy for Oruka. He had to survive by doing such odd jobs as pushing trolleys in 
paper factories. Meanwhile, his residence, as he lightly puts it, “was in a wrecked boat resting like a lame 
duck in one of the gulfs of the Baltic Sea” (Oruka 1997, 283). Despite all these challenges, however, 
Odera Oruka found solace in reading whatever philosophical material he could lay his hands on. 
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the University level. To back up his point, Oruka cites one Rev. Bishop Stephen Neil (Oruka 1991, 
16), whose bias against Africans was tremendously “revered”. 
Surprisingly though, Odera Oruka rose in academic rank so quickly owing to his prolific 
publication. By 1986, he had assumed full Professorship, thereby becoming one of the first two 
African full faculty members of philosophy at the University of Nairobi (Nyarwath 2009, 2). It 
was here also, and owing to his passion for philosophy, that Oruka initiated and spearheaded the 
separation of philosophy from religious studies, a fierce administrative battle that was eventually 
won and approved nine years later - July 1980.8 Consequently, he became the founder-chairman 
of the new department of philosophy, a position he held for about six years. And with this new 
arrangement in place, Oruka, together with other upcoming scholars like Masolo, was able to lay 
a lasting foundation that would see the University of Nairobi transform into a hub of African 
philosophy (Oruka 1997, 233). But unfortunately, he never lived long enough to see the full 
fruition of this dream. On December 9th. 1995, at around midday, Odera Oruka was tragically 
overrun by a lorry along Mbagathi road in Nairobi. He died shortly after aged 51 years old. 9 
2.2.2. Academic Achievements and Awards 
A quick survey at Oruka’s short life vis-à-vis his achievements and awards reveals a man 
whose legacy will last long. At the time of his untimely death, Oruka had published at least six 
                                                          
8 Needless to say, considering the biased situation at the University of Nairobi then, Oruka also had to 
“naturally” join such African scholars, as Ngugi wa Thiong’o, Micere Mugo and Okot p’Bitek from the 
department of literature and history, who were already questioning the Eurocentric curriculum that was 
just but a colonial heritage. While the former three championed Oral Literature from Africa, Oruka was 
committed to his Sage philosophy project (Presbey 2016). 
9 There is controversy surrounding Oruka’s death. While some say it was politically organized (for Oruka 
was a fierce critic of the then Kenyan government led by president Moi), others claim Oruka was by then 
at the verge of mental breakdown and was just roaming along the streets. But whichever the case, one 
thing is certain: Oruka’s death was a huge irreplaceable loss to academia, though his legacy lives on. 
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books and co-authored three. In addition, he had over fifty essays and academic papers published 
in local and international newspapers, journals, and texts. His writings were mainly on philosophy, 
ethics, politics, economics, science, and environment. 
Apart from his busy schedule at the University of Nairobi, Odera Oruka never tired of 
giving lectures and talks outside Nairobi, especially in Africa, as a visiting Professor. He was ever 
committed to teaching and promoting philosophy in Africa. And for that reason, Oruka has been 
described properly as “a true son and a savant of Africa” (Odhiambo 1996, 12). But he also got 
numerous invitations to attend international philosophical conferences in Europe, America, and 
Asia, where he always emerged among the most impressive guest speakers (Ogutu 1995, 6). In 
fact, just before his tragic death, Oruka was scheduled to go to Marist College in New York as a 
visiting Professor for about a year (Odhiambo 1996, 19). And most notably, Odera Oruka held 
prestigious positions, either as a member or a leader, in various local and international societies 
and organizations. He also received numerous awards both locally and internationally.10 
Now all these achievements and awards reveal Odera Oruka as a world-class philosopher, 
an intellectual whose work cannot be ignored. As Barasa rightly describes him, Professor Odera 
Oruka was known by his peers and junior scholars as an incisive yet disarming intellectual, a don 
who could not suffer mediocrity, revisionism, or foolishness. As a philosopher, and more so a 
refined logician, Oruka proved himself decent, wise, witty, objective, lucid, and accommodating 
in his arguments (Graness and Kresse 1997, 21). He also always preferred the use of clear 
communication, with avoidance of jargon to decipher truth. “I have always written simply.” Oruka 
says, adding “I do not know how to use verbosity, and I hate philosophers who rain circumlocution 
                                                          
10 For a list of his awards, see Nyarwath 2012, iv; Ogutu 1995, 6; Graness and Kresse 1997, 21-22. 
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on me” (Oruka 1997, 286). Finally, as a creative and artistic author, Odera Oruka often employed 
irony, sarcasm, as well as “wiry chuckles” - perhaps to pour scorn on fools and awaken those in 
slumber (Graness and Kresse 1997, 22). No wonder, then, his writings are very attractive to read.  
2.2.3. Oruka’s Lifestyle 
Despite his steady academic achievement, Odera Oruka was a modest person who always 
preferred substance to style. He has been described as a person who “nursed a humble but often 
thoughtful provoking concern about the enigma surrounding the destiny of humankind, 
particularly among the poverty-stricken peoples worldwide” (Ogutu 1995, 10). Commenting about 
his achievements and his vision for philosophy in Africa, Oruka honestly says that he has hitherto 
been clearing obstacles on the way to philosophy, and that he does not consider himself having 
reached the core of what he envisioned should be done. He writes,  
If all were more or less well with the world, I would have spent the time and energy I have 
employed in publishing in social-legal-political philosophy reading and writing in the area 
of philosophy of science and theory of knowledge. I do not, however, believe that I have 
reached the core of what I should do in philosophy. It has all still been an attempt to help 
clear obstacles on the way to philosophy (Oruka 1997, 286). 
 
Indeed, Odera Oruka was much concerned about three obstacles to philosophy; and by 
extension to truth, wisdom, and justice. These obstacles are: (i) social-economic deprivation of the 
disadvantaged, (ii) cultural-racial mythology and prejudice among the global society, and (iii) the 
illusion of appearance in the human mind (Oruka 1997, 283). And of these three obstacles, quite 
often Oruka vehemently argues that the socio-economic deprivation with its accompaniments – 
hunger, oppression, etc. - is the greatest constraints to both mental development and creativity. For 
him, “socio-economic deprivation is the fastest way to historical and scholastic nonentity” as it 
has been evident in the African case and in other so-called “third world” areas (Oruka 1997, 283). 
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His numerous essays and texts, then, can primarily be seen as attempt to give a philosophical and 
practical response to that single most challenging obstacle. 
Odera Oruka lived humbly. He has been described as a sober modern man who lived a 
simple but quality life, despite his status and tremendous achievements (Graness and Kresse 1997, 
21). The biggest car that Oruka owned, for instance, was a Peugeot 504. His office at the University 
of Nairobi, we are told, was merely twelve meters square, with no personal computer, for he 
preferred sharing the department’s computer lab for his prolific production. According to Barasa, 
who was one of his closest research assistants, unlike the majority of African academics and elites 
of his time whose primary pursuit and loyalty was easy material gains and power, Oruka’s public 
life revolved around four major activities: learning, teaching, researching, and humbly providing 
for his family (Graness and Kresse 1997, 20). 
And Odera Oruka never forgot his modest background, though he fought strenuously to 
emancipate his people from poverty and other social, political, and economic injustices. His 
residence by the time of his death was in a humble Nairobi middle-class suburb, South C; yet, as 
Barasa further tells us, Oruka always looked forward to visiting his rural home in Nyang’ungu 
when his busy schedule allowed (Graness and Kresse 1997, 20). More so, Oruka was always ready 
to share his fortunes with the less fortunate in society, especially the needy but bright children, for 
many of whom he paid their school fees. 
I wish to conclude this section by saying that Odera Oruka was clearly a noble person, a serious 
thinker, a sagacious mentor, a path finder, and a committed philosopher; a man who practically 
lived what he philosophized. Following the Socratic tradition, which he closely associated himself 
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with, Oruka understood philosophy primarily as love of wisdom,11 which would inevitably lead to 
pursuit of truth, justice, and hence strive for betterment of the wellbeing of humanity and their 
environment. No wonder, then, Oruka’s philosophy seems to revolve around two major themes: 
(i) practical philosophy, and (ii) philosophic sagacity (or sage philosophy).  
In what follows now, I attempt to discuss and analyse the first of these two rather related themes 
that properly define Oruka’s legacy as a philosopher. We shall start by looking at Oruka’s 
understanding of what philosophy is or ought to be, before narrowing down to his special focus on 
practical philosophy, and especially ethics. In the next chapter, we shall see how Oruka practically 
responds to the daunting question about the nature and the existence of philosophy in Africa, with 
much emphasis on his philosophic sagacity as the new trend. And in so doing, we hope to expose 
a real philosopher committed to wisdom, truth, and justice.  
 
2.3. Oruka’s Commitment to Practical Philosophy 
Oruka’s entire philosophy can be seen as having two overarching objectives: (i) to reconstruct 
the sagacious practical dimension in philosophy, and (ii) to liberate philosophy in Africa from 
ethnological and racist prejudices (Graness 2012, 13). The first objective, which will be discussed 
in this section, involves Oruka’s emphasis on practical commitment as he exhorts philosophers to 
try to come up with thought processes that could be applicable to contemporaneous challenges 
facing humanity, thereby improving their welfare and that of the environment. And key among 
                                                          
11 Oruka often quoted the rhyme of one sage Stephen Kithanje of Meru, Kenya, who defines wisdom as 
the ability to be conscious of where one is coming from (the past), where one is now (the present), and 
where one is going in life (the future). But he also understood wisdom as the ability to think, reason, 
respond to and act according either to one’s inborn insights or acquired knowledge and experience in 
order to critically challenge a situation or manner of doing certain things, as well as strive to offer a viable 
alternative solution to a contemporary problem. We shall further interrogate that view shortly.  
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these challenges is socio-economic inequality and poverty. The second objective, which will be 
treated in the next chapter, is well covered in Oruka’s book Sage philosophy; a project he initiated 
to prove the existence and practice of a genuine philosophy in Africa. 
The two objectives, however, are very much related and complementary. In fact, it has been 
argued that Oruka’s entire work can be understood as basically “philosophizing against social and 
theoretical deprivation and suppression of the African” (Graness and Kresse 1997, 241). To me, 
that sounds like an excellent view that captures Oruka’s legacy in philosophy; a legacy that lies 
especially in his commitment to the practical dimension of philosophy and his insistence that 
philosophers, just like any other scholar, have an essential duty of social and practical commitment 
that involves ethical duty. This section, and indeed the entire project, is precisely dedicated to 
defending that position as it also tries to expose Oruka’s commitment to practical philosophy, with 
special focus on his ethical thought. 
Now one pressing issue that preoccupied Oruka was trying to establish how philosophy does 
or could contribute to the enhancement of the value, security, and dignity of human life (Oruka 
1997, 143). And as we shall see shortly, Oruka challenges contemporary philosophers to take the 
etymological definition of philosophy as ‘love of wisdom’ seriously, thereby to try and make 
philosophy more sagacious by coming up with theoretical insights and ideas that can be put into 
practice for the betterment of the wellbeing of people and the environment. It is regrettable, though, 
that Oruka’s commitment to practical philosophy is less known than, say, his sage philosophy; yet, 
the former seems to be the direction that Oruka desired and envisioned his philosophy should take. 
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The title of his posthumously published book - Practical Philosophy: In Search of an Ethical 
Minimum (1997) - evidently attests to this.12 
2.3.1. Philosophy Must be Made Sagacious 
Reading a number of Oruka’s works reveals a philosopher who was convinced that philosophy 
must be made sagacious. But that would happen if philosophers were to first of all try to combine 
their speculative, critical, and analytical technique, skills, and methodologies with a sagacity (or 
wisdom) that is practically oriented to the betterment of people’s wellbeing without neglecting the 
environment.13 This is well established in his 1970 Ph.D. dissertation, Philosophy of Liberty 
(published as a book in 1990), which is arguably the foundation of his socio-political philosophy. 
His Sage Philosophy is yet another testimony to this fact. Indeed, as Kresse rightly observes, 
Oruka’s various philosophical works can and should be seen as manifestation of his commitment 
to the practical relevance and social significance of knowledge and wisdom (Kresse 2013, 26). 
That means Oruka was strongly opposed to purely abstract speculative discourses (e.g., mere 
rhetoric), even though he was not opposed to “theoretical” discourses that were applicable in real 
life situations.14 In fact, Oruka did so well in trying to apply his theoretic/ philosophic knowledge, 
skills, and techniques into praxis by critically questioning some common assumptions, thoroughly 
clarifying concepts, and ardently using his insights to reconsider such human fundamental issues 
as social, political, and economic predicaments. He tried to find solutions to some of these 
                                                          
12 This book is a collection of Oruka’s “practical” essays, which had been published elsewhere, and that 
Oruka himself was revising in view of republication before his tragic death in December 1995. It is 
dedicated to such practical issues as liberty, social justice, humanism, eco-philosophy, consumerism, etc. 
13 Oruka attests to this fact in an interview he gave in 1995, barely three months before he died, where he 
seems to espouse on the aphorism: “wisdom surmounts might” (cf. Graness and Kresse 1997, 253 ff.). 
14 I use the term “theoretical” here loosely in reference to discourse written or otherwise proposed as 
viable solution to some human predicaments. This is to contrast merely abstract speculative discourse.  
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problems, as he also challenged other philosophers to do the same. He was convinced that 
philosophers ought to employ sagacity or wisdom in their endeavours lest their philosophies 
become irrelevant to others and the society. He says, 
Great philosopher are path-finders, and path-finders disobey the routines of pedestrians when 
they emerge to command the war of the search for knowledge unless they are tempered by the 
rare quality of wisdom and sagacity (Oruka 1997, 203).  
 
What Oruka appears to be doing here is to challenge philosophers (plus other scholars) to be 
sagacious - that is, to be in touch with “reality”, to be practically relevant in trying to solve human 
predicaments, and to acknowledge their limitations as well. He cites Hegel who, despite being 
arguably one of the greatest thinkers in the West allegedly boasted to being the last philosopher, 
and that his standpoint was the culmination of philosophy’s historical development,15 thereby 
proving his deficiency in matters of sagacity.  
Oruka’s own life-style, as we saw earlier, is a clear testimony of how a philosopher ought to 
make philosophy sagacious, that is, make philosophy “an art of living” and “a way of life” (Hadot 
1995, 28). He tried to live in accordance with the philosophy he propagated. But this required total 
commitment to practical issues without, of course, neglecting theoretical perview. Thus, as Wiredu 
rightly observes, Oruka’s commitment to practical philosophy does not imply any form of shying 
away from theoretical issues; it rather means that practical commitment, especially with regard to 
his quest for socio-politico-economic justice, was the most crucially motivating factor in his entire 
philosophy (Graness and Kresse 1997, 142). And to underscore this point, it will be helpful to first 
consider Oruka’s understanding of what philosophy is or ought to be. 
                                                          
15 cf. Hegel (1975) Lectures vol. 1.46. 
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2.3.2. What is Philosophy? 
The question of what philosophy is or ought to be is no doubt central for Oruka, just as it is 
with many other philosophers. There have been numerous theories and definitions of philosophy 
throughout human history, with many of these philosophers hardly coming to a general consensus. 
To some, for example, philosophy can be described as a rigorous systematic inquiry and writing 
about any topic; that is, an extension of intellectual search for answers to such questions as: ‘what 
is x?’, ‘why x?’, ‘how is x?’, etc.; where “x” could be a substitute of anything. To others, however, 
philosophy is found within the realm of predicaments (or chaos) and in trying to find possibilities 
or viable solutions to those predicaments. Deleuze and Guattari in What is Philosophy? adopt this 
description, insisting that philosophy ought not to be mere speculation, reflection, or simply 
communication of what is given “ready-at-hand” for the sake of it; instead, philosophy is supposed 
to create “concepts” that are always new (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 5), thereby bringing about 
new possibilities, and hence, its relation to social, political, and economic development.  
Now as we shall see shortly, Odera Oruka would have most likely agreed with the latter 
description rather than the former. Commenting on the indisputable relevance of philosophy in 
every society, Oruka observes that philosophy is “the basic framework behind all our [human] 
practices” without which there would be chaos in society (Oruka 1997, 185).   
2.3.3. Speculative and Practical Philosophy 
Philosophy can be further considered as a discipline; in which case it is defined as a study, an 
inquiry, or just a wonder that involves arguably the most deep-seated issues about life and reality 
as such (that which is). Put differently, it is a study of such issues as natural phenomena, human 
person, human knowledge, God, logic, morality, language, politics, etc. But that definition is too 
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general; thus, as Oruka says, philosophy ought to be further divided into two branches, namely, (i) 
speculative or theoretical philosophy, and (ii) practical philosophy. While speculative/ theoretical 
philosophy “treats issues about the fundamental principles of knowledge and the metaphysics of 
reality”, practical philosophy “addresses principles of ethics and the rules of their application in 
the social, political, religious, and legal life of human kind” (Oruka 1997, xi).16 The former 
involves such studies as logic, physics, metaphysics, epistemology, cosmology, theodicy, etc.; the 
latter involves philosophical ethics, legal and political philosophy, etc.  
It is in this regard that we, in this section, intend to emphasize Oruka’s commitment to the 
practical dimension of philosophy and especially his ethics, without, of course, undermining the 
speculative dimension. Our position with Oruka is that whereas speculative dimension is helpful 
in, say, sharpening people’s brain, increasing knowledge, improving insight and broadening ideas, 
it should nonetheless not be seen merely as the end of philosophizing. Rather, insofar as there still 
are predicaments affecting humanity and the environment, speculative philosophy ought to be seen 
and used as means to create practical philosophies that would help improve the life and the 
wellbeing of people and their environment. This is what Oruka believed would make philosophy 
sagacious; it would make it be what it etymologically is - love of wisdom.  
However, we need to point out that by giving priority to the practical dimension, and 
particularly ethics, Oruka does not intend to be reducing philosophy to ethics. Rather, he only feels 
that philosophy should first and foremost be used to settle such practical and urgent issues as 
combating socio-economic and environmental injustices, before engaging in other “luxurious” 
                                                          
16 Oruka, however, points out further that historically, that distinction, common in Europe and especially 
Scandinavian Universities, is in line with Kant’s distinction between theoretical reason and practical 
reason (cf. Kant 4:387-392).  
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speculative exercises. In other words, he felt that ethical issues ought to be part of the central kernel 
of philosophy if philosophy is ever to become practically relevant.   
To that effect, then, and as we mentioned earlier, even though Oruka was well known for his 
sharp logic, just as he had great passion for philosophy of science and epistemology (which all fall 
under the speculative domain), circumstances forced him to practically spend his time and energy 
first clearing what he considered to be three current and future obstacles to philosophy, wisdom, 
and justice in general, namely, (i) social economic deprivation, (ii) cultural-racial mythology, and 
(iii) the illusion of appearance (Oruka 1997, 283-286). Thus, Oruka reflected, wrote and published 
extensively in social, ethical, economic, political and environmental issues. But he also expresses 
the view that if he ever lived to old age, and “if all were more or less well with the world”, then 
philosophy of science and theory of knowledge (or epistemology) would have been his “resting 
ground” (Oruka 1997, 284). This point will become clearer as we proceed.  
2.3.4. Philosophy defined as “love of wisdom” 
As we said above (2.3.3), Oruka is known to have treasured and pursued the etymological 
definitions of philosophy as “love of wisdom”. This definition, Oruka says, is perhaps the most 
compelling and proper, though it unfortunately seems to be taken for granted, especially today. It 
not only makes philosophy be seen not merely as an endeavour to seek knowledge for the sake of 
it, but also challenges philosophers to apply such knowledge in real life situations. In other words, 
it makes philosophy become what Hadot calls “an art of living” and “a way of life” (Hadot 1995, 
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28), thereby making philosophy a life-long endeavour to pursue wisdom that would enable one to 
“know thyself”17 better, and hence relate well with the ‘other’.18   
And in my view, it is this endeavour to love and pursue wisdom that ultimately makes one 
sagacious; it makes one try to practically apply what has been discovered (knowledge, insight etc.) 
in one’s own life and in that of other people. Understanding philosophy as ‘love of wisdom’, then, 
comes closer to what practical philosophy seems to be all about: striving to be practically relevant 
and ethically responsible to both oneself and the ‘other’. Now to elaborate this point, it is important 
to consider what wisdom is, and why it is worth pursuing.  
The term “wisdom” (in Greek sophia) can be understood in two senses. First, in its broader 
sense, it refers to a quality or an attribute of some intellectual beings such as humans, angels, deity, 
etc. Second, in its narrower sense, wisdom refers to a quality attributable to humans only. Thus, 
we talk of a wise person or a sage as the one who is able to make proper judgments in life based 
on his or her account of the past, analysis of the present and projective goals of the future.19 Indeed, 
as Oruka rightly defines it, wisdom (or sagacity) is that “quality which enables a person to utilize 
knowledge of his traditions and human nature in general for the purpose of making mature and 
objective judgment about life and human relations” (Oruka 1991, 40). Viewed from this 
perspective, then, wisdom or sagacity confers both insight and ethical inspiration to a person so 
that one may relate healthily with other people, conscious and mindful of the environment also. 
                                                          
17 This ancient Greek aphorism is often attributed to the Delphic Oracle, though it has foundation in other 
cultures, especially in ancient Egypt. Socrates is known to have adopted it as the most basic principle in 
search of wisdom and ethical life. For details, see Plato’s dialogues: Philebus (48c); Charmides (164d); 
Phaedrus (229e); Protagoras (343b); and Alcibiades I (124a, 129a, 132c). 
18 The term ‘other’ here refers to a fellow human being and the environment as such. 
19 I will use the term “wisdom” interchangeably with “sagacity” in reference to this latter sense. 
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But in a little bit more complex way, we can define wisdom as the ability to think, reason, 
and act according either to one’s inborn insight or acquired knowledge and experience in order to 
critically challenge a situation, a lifestyle, or a manner of doing things, and strive to offer viable 
alternative solutions to some contemporaneous challenges facing humanity and their environment. 
This, according to Oruka, is what makes one a philosophic sage - a human person who can 
competently combine both theoretical insight and practical aspects of life for the betterment of the 
wellbeing of humanity as such without jeopardizing the environment. And as we shall see shortly, 
such a philosophic sage is also necessarily an ethically responsible person.   
Viewed from this perspective, then, wisdom or sagacity appear closely related to prudence 
(in Greek phronesis), one of the “intellectual virtues” that disposes us to perform certain tasks, 
fulfil duties, and be more responsible in the best way possible under a given circumstance.20 Hence, 
quite often, especially in the wake of human peril and suffering, a wise person (a sage) is expected 
to depict the highest degree of competency, urgency, and adequacy in order to not only promote 
human life but also safeguard human dignity, thereby significantly reduce possibilities of misery 
in the eyes of many by offering the best possible but viable solution to their problems.  
Thus, it is on these grounds that we, following Oruka’s insight argue that practical 
commitment, especially in matters ethics, is the single most crucially motivating factor in 
philosophy. It is arguably the end of any genuine philosophy, for it first and foremost prompts one 
to quest for social justice, which is part and parcel of being sagacious and hence more responsible 
as a moral agent. This, however, does not in any way imply that speculative philosophy is 
irrelevant or not necessary; rather, it means that good philosophers (philosophic sages) ought to 
                                                          
20 cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, book VI. 
 33 
carry out their theoretical and analytical work in a manner that will be practically relevant and 
helpful to them and to the ‘other’. Oruka captures this point beautifully when he says: 
So, a sage is wise; he has insight, but he employs this for the ethical betterment of the 
community. A philosopher may be a sage and vice versa. But many philosophers do lack 
the ethical commitment and inspiration found in the sage. ... A sage proper is usually the 
friend of truth and wisdom. A sage may suppress truth only because wisdom dictates, [but] 
not because of some instrumental gain (Oruka 1991a, 9). 
 
It is apparently clear, then, that for Oruka (who closely associates himself with Socratic 
tradition), ethical commitment is one of the central aspects of a good philosopher (philosophic 
sage) and hence genuine philosophy. And he never relents in emphasizing the centrality of ethics 
in philosophy. In his essay “Achievements of Philosophy” (Oruka 1997, 95-105), Oruka identifies 
four missions of philosophy: (i) Truth, (ii) Aesthetic, (iii) Communicative, and (iv), Moral/ Ethical. 
He, however, points out further that moral/ ethical mission is the most important one, for it makes 
philosophy be in touch with the urgent and dominant needs of the people.  
To complete its proper function, then, Oruka suggests that “philosophy has to extend its 
function to the ethics of human life and the conditions for the improvement of the world for human 
existence” (Oruka 1997, 99). This concern, he says, is what would actually make philosophy 
sagacious and relevant, given that it “calls for philosophers to help reorganize and rationalize the 
available knowledge in order to improve human understanding and the welfare of mankind” 
(Oruka 1997, 99). Nonetheless, despite this emphasis on ethical commitment, Oruka quickly points 
out that the other three missions, particularly those concerned with pure search for knowledge, 
cannot and should not be ignored. 
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2.3.5. Philosophy Understood in Two Senses 
According to Oruka, philosophy (as love of wisdom) may also generally be understood in two 
senses. First, in its broader and “loose” sense, philosophy refers to “a person’s or a people’s general 
unexamined outlook on life” and reality as such (Oruka 1991, 26). Hence, we talk of people’s 
culture, traditions, beliefs, and their general way of life or world-view as philosophy. But in its 
strict and “proper” sense, philosophy ought to be understood as a critical evaluation of people’s 
outlook or world-view, “and a free reflection on ideas and concepts as a mirror of reality” (Oruka 
1991, 26). Now understood in the latter sense, there is often a general consensus that philosophy 
is or ought to be foundational, scientific, critical, analytic, and systematically reflective. Also, 
while the former sense (the “first-order” culture philosophy) is often driven by what Oruka would 
later dub popular or folk sagacity, the latter sense (the “second-order” philosophy) has its base on 
philosophic sagacity.21   
In both senses, however, Oruka generally takes philosophy as a universal human activity that 
essentially involves the use of reason to solve human peril, satisfy curiosity and wonder, just as it 
also aims at increasing knowledge, wisdom and truth. Oruka’s position here is evidently contrary 
to some thinkers in the West, whose rather unfortunate thesis is that philosophy is an essential 
characteristic of European civilization. For Oruka, reason, which is arguably the driving force in 
philosophy, is a human endowment and not a monopoly of any one culture or race (Oruka 1997, 
183). Nonetheless, he insists that in its strict sense, philosophy proper qualifies to be considered 
“scientific”, given that it involves critical thinking, reflective analysis, and logical inquiry and 
explanation about reality (nature, humans, deity, etc). And it is this strict or “proper” sense that 
                                                          
21 I come back to this point later, but for details, see Oruka 1991a, 45-55.  
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Oruka was much interested in. He was interested in seeing philosophy as a product of critical, 
reflective, and free thought process; always characterized by logical consistency, and often tied to 
independent thinker(s) who in most cases challenge the status quo rather than being merely 
complacent (Kresse 1996, 23; Graness and Kresse 1997, 61-62). 
2.3.6. Philosophy as Foundational Discipline 
Apart from understanding philosophy as ‘love of wisdom’ Odera Oruka is also known to have 
endorsed and somehow praised the often-called “classical” understanding of philosophy as a 
foundational discipline, the base upon which other sciences and human knowledge is built.22 
Although this view was highly challenged especially during the age of Enlightenment, perhaps it 
would be unwise to declare philosophy irrelevant even in such fields as empirical sciences, 
mathematics and engineering. To presuppose that philosophy is a foundational discipline, Oruka 
says, is “to take the stand that there is somewhere a solid correspondence between the world and 
human thought about the world” (Oruka 1997, 208).  
It also means that philosophy (indeed every science) has as its primary business the task of 
digging out and explaining such a correspondence. In other words, Oruka felt that philosophy was 
and is still the most reliable base and route not only in search of wisdom and knowledge, but also 
in establishing criteria for truth and falsehood, as well as right and wrong. He writes:  
Thus, philosophy is the base on which all social practices are built. When we are forced to 
justify our lives ... our political system, ... our legal system, ... our marriage system, in the end 
the ultimate justification will have to be philosophy (Oruka 1997, 185).  
 
                                                          
22 The term “classical” here refers to the Ancient, Medieval, and Scholastic era, when philosophy was 
taken as comprising nearly all forms of human search for knowledge and truth.    
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And on that note, Oruka was scornfully opposed to the so-called “postmodernism” as a trend 
in philosophy. Postmodernism may be described as a philosophical “movement” that developed in 
the mid to late 20th century as a radical departure from the Ancient, Scholastic and Modern 
philosophies. It is typically characterized by an attitude of scepticism or distrust toward reason. 
Thus, it is opposed to classical topics of metaphysics, epistemology, enlightenment, idealism, etc.; 
thereby rejecting any possibility of objective truth. Instead, postmodernism asserts that knowledge 
and truth are the products of unique systems of social, historical, and political discourse and 
interpretation, meaning they are contextual and relatively constructed (Bertens 1995).  
Oruka also regularly attacked extreme “logical positivism”, another late twentieth century 
trend that claims philosophy has no foundational knowledge or truth to proclaim, and that these 
should be left to the domain of empirical sciences (Oruka 1997, xii). He, for instance, criticised 
such logical positivists and linguistic analytic thinkers as Ludwig Wittgenstein and Richard Rorty, 
who seem to discredit metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics – arguably the bulk of what had 
traditionally been included in philosophy per se. Thus, Oruka, for instance, faults Wittgenstein’s 
conclusion that philosophy “is merely an extra-intellectual activity showing what is impossible to 
express or explain”, just as he also takes offense with Rorty, for whom “philosophy is not a mirror 
of reality, but only one of the activities in the conversations of mankind” (Oruka 1997, 167). 
2.3.7. Philosophy as Dialogical Exercise 
Despite being critical of postmodernism and logical positivism, Oruka was also alive to the 
fact that philosophy also ought to be dialogical. That means apart from generally being a universal, 
critical, reflective and free or independent human activity, philosophy also ought to be a kind of 
self-enriching exchange. And as a self-critical discourse, philosophy ought not to be rigid and 
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closed, but rather dynamic, lucid and open to dialogue. Put differently, any genuine philosophy 
ought to be open to engage not only with other philosophies but also other disciplines so as to 
satisfy humans’ desire for knowledge, truth and wisdom.  
It is on this account that Oruka challenges philosophers to put forward their ideas, insights and 
thought processes “not as absolute truths or authoritatively injected dogmas, but as tentative 
proposals whose truths are open to reasonable consideration and discussion” (Oruka 1997, 171). 
But for that to happen, it would require philosophers to have some ethical responsibility, and hence 
instil some discipline and respect for each other. 
Being dialogical in nature, philosophy also is supposed to be “a perspective of the whole or 
part of the whole of the human predicament and an insightful suggestion on how to get out or 
conform” (Oruka 1997, 206-207). And this perspective, he says, may be expressed either orally or 
literarily. Hence, philosophy, according to Oruka, is “a conceptual logical discourse, a discourse 
that is self-critical. It is a discourse better enlivened and preserved by the tradition of writing, 
though writing is not necessary condition for philosophy” (Oruka 1991, 26; 1997, 184). Here, 
Oruka does not wish to underrate the importance of literacy and proficiency in philosophy; rather, 
he wants to underscore the fact that writing is not thinking while philosophy is about thinking and 
and trying to find new possibilities or viable solutions to human and ecological predicaments.  
Putting that fact into consideration, in my view, is very helpful, for it will not only ensure 
healthy dialogue among philosophers (orally or literary), but most importantly also, it will make 
philosophy become what it etymologically really is – ‘love of wisdom’. It will also help emphasize 
the fact that wisdom or sagacity, the key object in philosophy, is not gauged by how proficient one 
is in writing or talking; it is rather gauged by the quality of what one says and/or writes, that is, 
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whether it is practically relevant to people and the environment or not. But again, for philosophy 
to be practically relevant, it is imperative that philosophers have some practical commitment or 
some ethical duty to instil some discipline, respect and concern for the ‘other’.  
2.3.8. Philosophy and Humanism  
And now having looked at Oruka’s understanding of what philosophy is or ought to be, it 
is time to pursue further the argument we have been trying to implicitly make: at the heart of any 
genuine philosophy, there lies some practical commitment that often inspire good philosophers to 
be sagacious, be ethically responsible, and hence produce a philosophy that is practically relevant 
to the lives of people and their environment. To grasp that argument, though, it is important to 
highlight Oruka’s conviction that the ultimate and the most basic standard of moral good, which 
seems to be the central object of a genuine philosophy, is or should be humanism or humanness, 
by which he means ensuring “the quality and security of human life” (Oruka 1997, 138).  
Indeed, Oruka believed that it is within the nature of a genuine philosophy to discern, 
safeguard and promote “moral good” that would lead to a more humanised society where people 
love and care for each other.23 That means it is an inescapable function of genuine philosophers 
(and indeed every moral agent) to, among other things, have concern for a substantive quality and 
security of human life over and above mere existence. Put differently, it is within its natural 
mandate for philosophy to search for a remedy to human problems, especially where humanism 
seems to be in danger or decline (Oruka 1997, 138).  
                                                          
23 Indeed, as Masolo rightly observes, most of Oruka’s work seems to be raising the issue of ethics of care 
to the level of global justice (Masolo 2012, 25). 
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However, in saying that philosophy ultimately ought to concern itself with moral good and 
humanism does not, as Oruka says, amount to confusing philosophy with such disciplines as 
religion, technology, and politics that also in a way concern themselves with the human problem.  
He also believes that for philosophy to carry out that mandate (i.e., championing moral good and 
humanism), it needs to be not only critical but also dialogical in nature. That would make it 
effectively safeguard and promote the value and dignity of human life, discouraging the prevailing 
and impending inhuman practices in the world. Such a philosophy, Oruka argues, should take 
cognizance of science, technology, religious beliefs, and “the reality and nuisance of political and 
mystical powers” (Oruka 1997, 139). But philosophy should not be subservient to these realities 
and nuisance; rather, “it must apply its critical and dialectical reason to them and tolerate nothing 
that is against the quality and security of human life” (Oruka 1997, 139). 
2.3.9. Philosophy and Ethical Commitment 
One aspect that properly defines Oruka’s legacy as a philosopher is his unrelenting ethical 
commitment. It is what underscores the sagacious or the practical dimension of his philosophy. As 
a person, he felt ethically bound to contribute to the wellbeing of humanity and the environment 
irrespective of geographical, racial, or any other sectarian demarcations. In fact, Oruka believed 
that this is how any genuine philosophy ought to proceed, it being a universal human activity and 
hence independent of racial or regional boundaries. Oruka elucidates this point further saying, 
In the last analysis, philosophy is not a language analysis, not the exercise enjoyed in a 
logical dialogue, and not a special insight of the world reserved for some race or gender. 
Philosophy is a perspective of the whole or part of the whole of the human predicament 
and an insightful suggestion on how to get out or conform. This sort of perspective can be 
found in anybody … In every community, there are always people who specialize in 
offering or studying such perspectives (Oruka 1997, 206-207, emphasis mine).  
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According to Oruka, such few people in every community who specialize in offering 
insightful perspectives on how to resolve human predicaments are properly referred to as 
philosophic sages. He defines a sage as “that sort of person a culture produces who is able to mirror 
and reproduce logical and intuitive steps of the metrics of the culture” (Oruka 1997, 207). Such a 
person could be formally educated and literate or uneducated and illiterate. All we require to have 
a philosophic sage, Oruka says, is “the ability to help coin a path for escape” or find justifiable 
solutions when one’s culture (society) is at risk (Oruka 1997, 207). My position is that for that to 
happen, it is imperative for the said philosophic sage to be ethically responsible as a moral agent.  
Thus, Odera Oruka challenged his contemporary philosophers to embrace this ethical 
committment, thereby making their philosophies more practical and relevant, given that the world 
considered as a global society was and is still experiencing human perils and unwarranted 
sufferings. And as a typical philosophic sage, Oruka himself tried to fulfil this task by generously 
sharing his insightful thoughts through writing, teaching, and mentoring especially the youth. He 
wrote extensively and gave talks on such ethical topics as justice, human rights, liberty, ecology, 
economics, politics, among others.  
All these talks and writings clearly demonstrate his unrelenting ethical commitment. It is 
quite rather unfortunate that much of these writings remain unexplored as they ought to. Our task 
in the subsequent chapters of this project will be to engage some of Oruka’s practical philosophy, 
especially his ethical thought. And as we shall see, Oruka’s practical philosophy is not just another 
speculative work on such topics as mentioned above. Rather, his is a philosophy pointedly 
characterized by a special interest to the real life of the people, especially in Africa. He explains 
why and how he got so much involved with practical philosophy in an interview conducted on 
10/27/1993 at the University of Nairobi where he says: 
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At that time (sixties and early seventies) main-stream philosophy in Scandinavia and 
U.S.A. was mostly logical positivism and linguistic philosophy. But I was more interested 
… in philosophy that would be useful for understanding the problems of Africa, for helping 
to liberate it and also sustain its independence, and for that matter, I became naturally 
interested in ethics, social political and legal philosophy (Kresse 1996, 22). 
 
Thus, it was after critically observing and being conscious of the predicaments his people in Africa 
were going thought that prompted Oruka to philosophically respond as a sage: trying to find some 
way out of such evils as poverty, human rights abuse, and neo-colonialism (Graness 2012, 8). 
Oruka therefore held the view that philosophy ultimately has this sagacious cum normative 
(regulative) role to not only inform, critique and intellectually challenge people, but most 
importantly also transform their lives by trying to practically improve on their welfare (Oruka 
1997, 218). For him, as we pointed out earlier, the speculative aspects of philosophy (like logic, 
metaphysics, epistemology, etc.) ought to be seen and used primarily as means to produce practical 
philosophy. But this presupposes philosophers having some ethical responsibility, just as it implies 
the normative ethical dimension of philosophy. In fact, it is this normative ethical dimension of 
philosophy that, to Oruka, differentiates between what he calls the sage proper (philosophic sage) 
from the mere philosopher (speculative theoretician or rhetorician).  
In another interview carried out on 08/16/1995 (four months before his tragic death) at the 
University of Nairobi, Odera Oruka emphatically reiterates this point saying, 
The mere philosopher [theoretician] one could call him a scientist of the mere thought in a 
broad sense, he looks for thoughts, he looks for principles that guide nature, for principles 
that guide society, he looks for knowledge. The mere philosopher looks for pure knowledge 
and tries to express knowledge, but the sage [proper] cares about knowledge, and he adds 
to knowledge morality, the moral spirit. He aims at the ethical betterment of the community 
that he lives in. So to me, the sage [proper] has these two policies: he has the science, the 
knowledge plus ethical obligation for himself, for the community and for the world 
(Graness and Kresse 1997, 254, emphasis mine). 
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Here, we can see Oruka scornfully attacking mere speculative philosophers or theoreticians in 
favour of a philosophic sage who, on top of having scientific knowledge also has ethical obligation 
as tools for the betterment of his or her life and the lives of others in the world.  
To emphasize his point, Oruka singles out Socrates from his contemporary rivals in the 
ancient Greece and Asia Minor - the Sophists. While the former represents a philosophic sage or 
a sage proper (given that Socrates was concerned primarily with pursuing such ethical virtues as 
truth, justice, courage, and above all wisdom), the latter fit the bill of being mere philosophers, 
given that they went around teaching people how to twist ideas to simply win arguments regardless 
of the truth.24 The sophists were interested in mere rhetoric for money, fame, and honour. Socrates, 
on the other hand, was committed to defending the truth to a point of death; and he always 
emphasized ethical commitment to everyone in the community, a commitment geared towards 
gaining practical knowledge necessary for the betterment of all. Indeed, at his defence before the 
Athenian jury, Socrates is recorded saying: 
And while I have life and strength I shall never cease from the practice and teaching of 
philosophy [love of wisdom], exhorting anyone whom I meet after my manner, and 
convincing him, saying: ‘O my friend, why do you who are a citizen of the great and mighty 
and wise city of Athens, care so much about laying up the greatest amount of money and 
honour and reputation, and so little about wisdom and truth and the greatest improvement 
of the soul ...? (Plato Apology, 29 d-e). 
 
Here then lies a philosophic sage with admirable ethical commitment, the one whom Oruka 
proposes for us to emulate. Socrates is said to have diligently obeyed his conscience that inspired 
                                                          
24 Cf. Plato’s dialogues: Sophists, Gorgias, Protagoras, Laches, etc. It is important to note that in most of 
these dialogues, while the sophists claim to possess knowledge, Socrates, the sage proper, only claims to 
be “lover of wisdom”. For Socrates, wisdom or sagacity is the ability to beware of the limits of one’s 
knowledge (Apology 21d, 22e). Indeed, the only thing that Socrates seems to know with certainty is the 
fact that he does not know; hence, the so-called “Socratic ignorance” that prompts one to pursue the 
ethical imperative to use one’s limited knowledge for the sake of the common good. 
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his ethical commitment, which arguably made him the wisest of all people in Athens. It is the same 
commitment that Oruka, who situates himself within Socratic tradition, was trying to promote in 
our contemporary era. He envisioned a philosophy that would be more practically relevant in 
solving our socio-politico-economic predicaments. Thus, like Socrates, Oruka had passion to make 
human life better, more dignified, and therefore more enjoyable. And in his writings, Oruka also 
challenged other contemporary philosophers and scholars to do the same.  
Of course, not everyone, especially today, would agree with Oruka’s view. Some might 
accuse him of reducing philosophy into this one sagacious ethical (normative) dimension. Bertrand 
Russell and other logical positivists, for instance, might single out symbolic logic as the most 
essential part of philosophy. But that, in my view, would not invalidate our argument so long as 
that logic would find its practical relevance. Put differently, Russell’s position would not invalidate 
our claim that speculative aspect of philosophy, and human knowledge as such, should be used as 
means to solving human predicaments before engaging in some “luxurious” intellectual exercises.  
Indeed, as Odera Oruka would say, it is unfortunate, and regrettably so, that philosophy 
understood as ‘love of wisdom’ seems to have been lost in the technical and analytic language 
during the last few decades. He laments that the contemporary era (especially since the mid 
twentieth century) seems to have lost the sagacious normative dimension of philosophy with its 
practical relevance and ethical commitment.25 Consequently, as Graness aptly argues, philosophy 
seems to have been reduced into a mere “expert knowledge”, a sort of “science in the ivory tower” 
often characterized by specialized and complicated jargons (Graness 2012, 1). It is in this view, 
                                                          
25 This is a dimension of philosophy that by and large leads to genuine humanism or humanness; that is, 
an ethical dimension that largely emphasizes centrality of human life and its non-negotiable dignity. 
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therefore, that we propose Oruka’s legacy, particularly his advocacy for ethical commitment, to 
be seen as a philosophic call to retrieve back to that sagacious normative dimension of philosophy, 
thereby ensuring a genuine humanism and authentic practice of justice at global level.  
2.4. From Theory to Praxis: how to make philosophy sagacious 
We have been at pains trying to justify why Odera Oruka felt that philosophy must be made 
sagacious; meaning that philosophers ought to use their speculative, analytical, and critical 
techniques, skills, and methods to come up with a philosophy that is practically committed to the 
betterment of people’s wellbeing and their environment. We have also tried to argue that Oruka’s 
life as well as his philosophical works can and should be seen as manifestation of a philosopher 
committed to alleviate some socio-politico-economic predicaments, thereby elucidating practical 
relevance and social significance of knowledge. 
At the same time, we have several times pointed out that while Oruka was opposed to marely 
abstract speculative discourses, he was not in any way opposed to theoretical discourses that were 
applicable in real life situations.  In fact, this was precisely what Oruka was trying to do: applying 
his philosophic knowledge, skills, and techniques into praxis by critically questioning some 
common assumptions, thoroughly clarifying concepts, and ardently using his theoretical insights 
to reconsider such human fundamental issues as socio-economic inequality and deprivation. He 
tried to find solutions to these problems, just as he also challenged other philosophers to do the 
same. He was convinced that philosophy could be made sagacious if and only if philosophers could 
embrace some ethical duty in their endeavours lest their philosophies become irrelevant.  
In this section, let us look at some ways in which philosophy can practically be made 
sagacious (i.e., practically relevant to the betterment of people and their environment), which is 
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what Oruka’s legacy seems to advocate. There are two questions that we need to respond to. First, 
what does sagacious normative dimension of philosophy consist of? And second, how can it be 
achieved? Both questions, however, are relevantly related; they not only seem to be challenging 
us to see what social justice would entail, for instance, but they also challenge us to develop what 
we might call “an intercultural approach to philosophy” that would ensure genuine practice of 
justice at the global level.26 Indeed, the two questions seem to relate well with our guiding question 
in this project, namely, what do we fundamentally need to do as humans to ensure global justice?  
To the first question, then, we say that the sagacious normative dimension of philosophy 
refers to that ethical aspect of philosophy that by and large leads to humanism or humanness; it is 
an ethical dimension of philosophy that largely emphasises promotion of human life and its non-
negotiable dignity so as to enhance the common good. It consists mainly in the ethical commitment 
of philosophers to become sagacious (or wise) by trying to apply their speculative knowledge, 
skills, ideas, and insights so as to create philosophies that would be relevant and beneficial to 
solving humanity’s predicaments. In other words, it consists in philosophers’ commitment to make 
philosophy more practical, where theory and praxis overlap for the common good. As Oruka would 
say, genuine humanism or humanness is often manifested in someone’s actions (say, in writing or 
arguing), and is always directed towards the betterment of the overall living conditions of people, 
regardless of their geographical, racial or any other sectarian affiliation in the name of building an 
authentic global justice for all (Graness and Kresse 1997, 254).  
                                                          
26 This is a new orientation in philosophy that, as Oruka points out, neither privileges any culture, 
philosophical tradition or method, nor imposes a hierarchy of any sort; it is a kind of new orientation that 
is open to various ways of philosophizing, provides freedom of thought in every culture, as it tries to 
understand, interprete and integrate various philosophical traditions into the “world discourse” so that 
there is much better understanding than misunderstanding (Graness and Kresse 1997, 246-247). 
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As we said above, to be a sagacious philosopher means having the ability to put insightful 
knowledge and experience of a practical nature into some good use. That means philosophers by 
no less means have a special ethical obligation to make their philosophies more practically relevant 
and socially acceptable so as to enhance the wellbeing of their people, and hence surmount what 
Oruka calls “the disappointing present” - by offering solution to the current problems. To put 
differently, the ability of philosophers to think critically has to be made fertile for the betterment 
of their society now and in the future.27   
The point we are trying to make is that for philosophy to become sagacious, it ought to 
inevitably be a product of philosophic sages, that is, thinkers who can distinguish between the two 
dimensions of philosophy (speculative and practical) and to put much emphasis on the practical 
aspects. This follows Oruka’s insight that wisdom, which he equates with sagacity, is not 
intellectual sophistication and vice versa; for one can be an expert in logical and cogent reasoning 
and still be an idiot on matters of life and human relations (Oruka 1991, 40). The following quote 
perhaps will sufficiently clarify the point. 
Philosophy is an art of reasoning and provides a critical intellectual weapon and 
methodology for analyzing and synthesizing the basic problems of man, society and nature. 
[But] in dealing with the problems of man and society, philosophy is moral and social. And 
the problems and definition of moral good and the ideals of humanism fall within the real 
moral and social philosophy (Oruka 1997, 140).  
 
Here, Oruka is trying to draw attention to the two dimensions of philosophy - theoretical 
and practical – that makes it become both an art of reasoning and a way of life. But he seems to 
give priority to the latter, especially ethics (moral and social philosophy), in tackling human and 
societal problems without collapsing the two. He seems to be saying that the two dimensions ought 
                                                          
27 By philosophers here we mean the philosophic sages whose ultimate goal is to promote humanism.  
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to overlap in a balanced way to bring about much-needed viable solution to human predicaments. 
Thus, Oruka would later say that the main function of moral philosophy is to “apply rigorous 
analytic and synthetic reasoning to the basic moral and social problems and help explain or define 
moral good, moral evil, and the requirements of a humanist social order” (Oruka 1997, 140).  
It appears, then, that it is the normative ethical dimension that makes philosophy become 
sagacious, meaning the major task of genuine philosophers (philosophic sages) is to get to where 
both theory and praxis overlap in a balanced way for the common good. Elsewhere, in an interview 
conducted in October 1993, Oruka reiterates this point saying that philosophic sages ought to have 
such ethical commitment even in a deeper way than other professionals (Kresse 1996, 30).  
And now turning to the second question (i.e., how we can achieve the sagacious ethical or 
normative dimension of philosophy), we propose adopting Odera Oruka’s approach to philosophy, 
namely, philosophic sagacity. This is a trend that insists that the wisdom (sagacity) worth pursuing 
would have to be first and foremost philosophic; that is, critical, well-founded, clear, and flexible. 
To that effect, therefore, we propose that philosophy can be made sagacious in three ways. First, 
by finding philosophic sages who, like Socrates, are entirely committed to philosophic wisdom 
and truth within our societies today and giving them a platform, a chance to air their voices, and a 
wider coverage, thereby exposing their thoughts in response to the current human predicaments.  
Second, we can make philosophy sagacious by applying the theoretical knowledge (i.e., 
the ability to think, reason and insightfully argue) to our contemporary ethical, social, economic, 
and political issues. This in effect is a huge challenge to philosophers to try and collaborate with 
scholars from other disciplines rather than remaining aloof in their field. Indeed, it appears that 
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without such sagacious co-operation with other disciplines, no envisioned solution linked to the 
welfare of all in our globalized society today would be achieved. 28 
The third way in which philosophy can be made sagacious and hence practically relevant 
would involve philosophers initiating and promoting open, candid, and truthful philosophical 
discourse with each other on various issues affecting humanity and the environment at the global 
level. This is in line with Oruka’s conviction that philosophers ought to be open to dialogue and 
critique if they are to advance and enrich each other. Philosophers also need to study and embrace 
or accomodate other philosophies of the world. Asked to comment on how African thinkers could 
make contribution to “world philosophy”, Oruka emphatically replied: 
Through the kind of discussion they are doing already and also through discussing not only 
specifically African problems but also the problems which are philosophical anywhere. I 
think ... African philosophers should even discuss German philosophy and be sent to 
contribute to German Philosophy, discuss Chinese Philosophy, Indian Philosophy and 
interact with those philosophers, have debates, have seminars with them (Kresse 1996, 26). 
Such an exchange, however, ought to be done in such a way that it accommodates most 
world philosophies on an equal level. This will not only promote “intercultural philosophy” 29 but 
it will also ensure a genuine quest for justice at the global level, a quest for justice that is culturally, 
economically, socially, politically, and historically sensitive.  
It appears, then, that Oruka would most likely advocate for an intercultural philosophy or 
simply a “philosophy of all cultures” today; he would champion for a philosophical forum whose 
                                                          
28 For practical ways in which philosophy can collaborate with other disciplines, see Oruka’s intriguing 
essay: “Philosophy and other Disciplines”, in Graness and Kresse 1997, 35 ff. Here, Oruka discusses the 
relation and use of philosophy to other subjects studied at most universities. He defends the view that 
philosophy “is always for life and not life for philosophy”, meaning philosophers ought to take a lead in 
offering practical solutions to societal problems, thus challenging those who prefer to study it in isolation. 
29 See footnote no. 26. Here, I need to point out that this orientation has been pursued and practiced for 
over twenty years now, resulting into the journal Polylog based in Vienna (cf. polylog.org.). 
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goal is to establish global exchange and healthy interaction on equal level. Here, philosophies in 
Africa would intellectually engage philosophies in Europe, America, Caribbean, and in Asia. The 
aim is to establish a much stronger intercultural philosophical tradition as a human heritage. And 
in my view, such philosophical discourse will be one of the best forums for establishing justice at 
the global level. It fits well with Oruka’s stance that philosophy needs to be critical and dialogical 
in nature if it is to succeed in carrying out its mandate of pursuing humanism and moral good; that 
is, safeguard and promote the value of human life, as well as discourage the prevailing and 
impending inhuman practices in the world (Oruka 1997, 139). 
But one may object that different cultures and specific forms of fundamental beliefs might 
create obstacles to having a meaningful and mutual philosophic discourse, given that philosophical 
content is, to a large extent, determined and shaped by one’s cultural beliefs. To overcome these 
obstacles, we suggest with Oruka to either bracket what he calls “cultural fundamentals”30 (though 
this might be difficult thing to do) or better yet make them as transparent as possible. That would 
make dialogues freer and fairer, as people mutually understand their cultural prohibitions and learn 
to respect them (Oruka 1997, 194). It would further help us overcome the temptation of “totalising 
our own cultural specifications as the universals”, which, unfortunately, is what essentially defines 
our history. The tragedy of colonialism and imperialism, Oruka says, could be singled out as “a 
classic case of a given culture’s specifics totalised as the universals”, thereby hampering effective 
cultural and other forms of development in Africa (Oruka 1997, 195). 
  While receiving his second doctorate degree (i.e., Fil Dr. honoris causa) from Uppsala 
University in Sweden on June 4th 1993, Odera Oruka reiterated the same point (i.e., the possibility 
                                                          
30 These are “concepts, attitudes, styles, and [psychological] expectations specific to a given school of 
thought” that tend to cause “obstacles to smooth intellectual dialogue and exchange” (Oruka 1997, 194). 
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of having meaningful inter-cultural exchange in philosophy and other forms of thought processes) 
more vividly saying: 
All philosophical theses ... are rooted and driven by their cultural origins; hence, the first 
requirement for any useful philosophical dialogue is that all cultural origins be bracketed 
or at least must be made transparent and unpolluting during the dialogue (Oruka 1997 176). 
 
Indeed, if only we could succeed in either bracketing or making our different cultural 
fundamentals as transparent as possible, then we would create a conducive environment where 
participants would mutually and respectfully interact and express their philosophical thoughts with 
the same rights of expression in a situation that is free of some powerful domination that often rule 
the international political and economic exchanges. This would create, as Oruka says, “a new and 
fresh thinking in the philosophic path-findings and cross-culture debates” with an ultimate goal of 
solving human predicaments (Oruka 1997, 199). Perhaps that may sound ideologically attractive, 
but, I think, it is also realistically possible with some effort.  
In our subsequent chapters, we will see how Oruka’s practical philosophy challenges us to 
embrace such an intercultural approach that promotes freedom of thought if we are to ever succeed 
in establishing a genuine practice of justice at the global level. His ethical concept of the human 
minimum, which is a right to a minimum qualitative standard of living for all humans, will inspire 
us to regard the world as our “common good” or a common homeland governed by the principles 
of interdependence and responsibility for the ‘other’. Consequently, we shall see Oruka proposing 
an ethics that is more eco-centric rather than anthropocentric, an ethics that challenges us humans 
to take the complex inter-relatedness and inter-dependence of being into a serious consideration. 
His ethics – parental earth ethics, in other words, offers motivation for socio-economic fairness 
as well as environmental concern, hence “ecological fairness” with Nature.   
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2.5. Conclusion 
Professor Odera Oruka can be described simply as a brilliant, incisive, and down to earth 
African philosopher who worked his way through to build a long-lasting legacy. His entire life, 
though short, was nonetheless full of invaluable qualities and great achievements. He spent his 
entire life so vibrantly and tirelessly in pursuit of knowledge, truth, and wisdom in a manner that 
neither privileged anyone nor excluded nobody.  In this chapter, we have tried to expose Oruka’s 
rather difficult yet tenacious academic journey; one that is characterized by countless number of 
challenges, but one that ultimately made him a distinguished scholar, a respected don, an 
accomplished author, and an inspiring mentor-friend.  
Because of the love he had for Africa, Oruka was known as one of a few internationally cited 
African intellectuals who stayed “home”. As an astute intellectual, despite many everyday-life 
hardships on different fronts (social, political, economic, etc.) in Kenya where he was based, Oruka 
was astonishingly ever productive in terms of publication and intellectual output. More so, as a 
prolific writer, Oruka did not limit his philosophy to academia, for he regularly wrote newspaper 
articles also, thereby extending the philosophical questioning process and problem solving to a 
wider audience. He was also open to dialogue and critique, always standing for what is reasonably 
acceptable rather than being swayed by the urge to be politically expedient and correct. What an 
exemplary person we had, what a legacy! His is an inspirational story, especially to many young 
people in Africa where equal opportunities are not often assured and forthcoming.  
Oruka’s enormous work in philosophy can be seen as having two major overarching objectives: 
(i) to reconstruct the sagacious normative dimension in philosophy by trying to make philosophy 
more practical and relevant to humankind and the environment; and (ii), to liberate philosophy in 
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Africa from ethnological and racist prejudices that dominated his time. To achieve these two 
objectives, Oruka first sought to address arguably one of the classical, if not perennial questions, 
namely, what philosophy is or ought to be, before seeking its relevance in life. This approach 
ultimately helped him to prioritize and emphasize on the ethical duty of a moral agent, thereby 
demanding practical relevance from philosophers and other scholars as well.  
Indeed, as we have seen in this chapter, philosophy from Orukan standpoint has two 
complementary dimensions: speculative and practical. Thus, from speculative point of view, 
philosophy can be understood as a critical, deductive, and reflective thought process; always 
characterized by abstract reasoning, logical consistency, and often tied to individual thinkers. But 
such critical thought processes, Oruka insists, must have a sagacious normative dimension, 
meaning that knowledge, skills, and insights from speculative abstract reasoning should first of all 
be seen and used as means of creating philosophical discourse that aim at contributing to the 
betterment of the wellbeing of people and their environment. The latter is the practical aspect of 
philosophy that Oruka seems to prioritize and emphasize more. 
The two dimensions of philosophy, however, should not be seen as enemies to each other; 
rather, they ought to be complementary. Speculative philosophical disciplines such as logic, 
metaphysics, epistemology, etc., are very crucial in sharpening the mind and gaining insight and 
knowledge, but that knowledge should be translated and possibly transmitted to others in ways 
that can be practically helpful in life.  Hence, a good philosopher, a philosophic sage as Oruka 
would say, ought to be not only logically refined, lucid, and critical, but also objective, decent, and 
accommodative in arguments. In other words, he or she should resolutely work hard to pursue and 
communicate the truth rather than try to decipher it with verbosity and circumlocution. Most 
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important, a good philosopher also ought to be responsibly committed to try and resolve 
predicaments affecting humanity as such and the environment.  
Thus, we have also seen that for Oruka, who situates himself within the Socratic tradition, 
philosophy is or ought to be essentially understood as ‘love of wisdom’. This means that it is and 
should be inextricably tied to both conceptual and practical ways of solving humanity’s 
predicaments, thereby promoting their dignity and ensuring social justice. Put differently, we have 
seen that philosophy thus conceived as ‘love of wisdom’ ought not to be just another “science in 
the ivory tower”. Instead, philosophy ought to ultimately promote humanism or humanness (i.e. 
concern for the ‘other’) in a way that would ensure genuine practice of justice at global level. In 
this way, philosophy can be seen at best in service of humanity as people try to put theory into 
praxis so as to improve on their wellbeing. This, however, does not mean that we tolerate laziness, 
idleness, greed or mendacity in the name of humanness. Oruka, for instance, would not endorse 
the idea of giving free money to some strong and able persons who could work for it in some other 
honest way, given that this would degrade the very notion of humanness; just as greed, corruption, 
and possessive individualism do.  
To that effect, we have discussed at length Oruka’s commitment to practical philosophy, 
highlighting the ethical dimension as the end or the ultimate goal of philosophising. We have seen 
the sagacious ethical responsibility that Oruka felt philosophers should embrace – one that aims at 
not just abstract speculative discourse, but most importantly making better the lives of people and 
their environment. This has helped us clarify one of our major claims: at the heart of any 
philosophy worth its salt, there is always some practical commitment that quite often inspire 
philosophers (indeed every human person) to be ethically responsible. 
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Thus, we have seen that for Oruka, one thing that is unavoidable for normal adult human being 
is to be ethically responsible. That involves, among other things, being concerned about the 
wellbeing of oneself and the ‘other’. To be exempted of this responsibility, Oruka says, one must 
be either an infant, an idiot, or otherwise incapacitated. But ethical duty must also be taken both 
in terms of what we do and what we do not do as moral agents. Thus, the big question should be: 
what am I doing (or not doing) as a human being, a moral agent, to improve not only my own life 
and dignity but also that of other humans especially the less privileged without jeopardizing the 
environment? In my view, this is no doubt one of the greatest challenges that Oruka’s philosophy 
poses to us today. It is a challenge that we seek to address further in this study.  
Odera Oruka is well known for his Sage philosophy, a project that he ingeniously initiated and 
wrote about as a response to some misconstrued bias against Africans – that Africans are incapable 
of having or doing philosophy given that reason and logic are foreign to them. But he also wrote 
extensively on other socio-politico-economic issues affecting humanity, especially in Africa. His 
work seems to be a typical product of a philosophic sage, given that he used his intellectual skill 
and vast knowledge to write a philosophy that is practically relevant to the betterment of the 
wellbeing of humankind and the environment. It is rather unfortunate that many do not recognize 
or appreciate that the late Odera Oruka was such an important practical philosopher.   
In our subsequent chapters, we will focus on exposing Oruka’s practical philosophy. And to 
begin with, the next chapter will specifically discuss Oruka’s contribution to the shaping and 
developing of philosophy in Africa. Here, we shall embark on publicizing perhaps one of his most 
distinguishable landmarks - philosophic sagacity. In the context of his Sage philosophy, and in 
response to a rather distressing question on the nature and the existence of philosophy in Africa, 
philosophic sagacity becomes a genuine trend (or means) of retrieving and critically reconsidering 
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traditional or classical wisdom that would be instrumental in solving some contemporaneous 
issues. It springs from the idea that wisdom or sagacity involves being aware of the past so as to 
make proper judgments for the present and the future. Thus, we will see how Oruka was able to 
successfully master the tension between tradition and modernity. And in this way, Oruka is able 
to rescue philosophy in Africa from ethnological and racist prejudices.    
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CHAPTER 3 
ORUKA’S COMMITMENT TO PHILOSOPHY IN AFRICA 
Philosophy is conceptual and logical discourse ... the difference between African philosophy and Western 
philosophy does not lie in the use of reason, which is a universal human trait (Oruka 1991a, 26). 
 
3.1. Introduction 
In our previous chapter, we focused on the legacy of Odera Oruka where we tried to expose, 
espouse, and critically evaluate his commitment to philosophy from a practical point of view. 
Among other things, we discovered that Oruka envisioned a kind of philosophy that is more 
practical than theoretical, a philosophy that is relevantly committed to the betterment of the welfare 
of people and their environment. In this chapter, we will, on the same impetus, explore Oruka’s 
incontestable contribution to the shaping and development of philosophy in Africa, which is 
another way of espousing his commitment to practical philosophy.  
As mentioned in chapter two, Oruka’s entire philosophy can be seen as having two overarching 
objectives, namely, (i) to reconstruct the sagacious practical dimension in philosophy, and (ii) to 
liberate philosophy in Africa from ethnological (or mythical) and racist prejudices. The current 
chapter will focus on the second objective, which is well covered in one of his most famous works 
- Sage philosophy. This is a project that Oruka ingeniously initiated to demonstrate that there really 
exists a genuine philosophy in Africa, thereby dispelling some biased views about Africans.  
The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section displays the historical and contextual 
background that informed or prompted Oruka’s response to the then contentious issue of the nature 
and the existence of philosophy in Africa. The second section considers philosophic sagacity in 
depth as a new outstanding trend in philosophy. Here, we shall see Oruka’s approach to philosophy 
as a practical response to one of the most intriguing issues in contemporary Africa, namely: social, 
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economic, political, and intellectual deprivation and suppression. And hopefully, this will portray 
Oruka not only as a sage but also a diligent philosopher committed to seeking justice for his people.  
The two overarching objectives mentioned above are inextricably tied together. This is 
another point we want to underscore. Indeed, we’ll see that Oruka’s commitment to philosophy in 
Africa is in tandem with his understanding of what philosophy is, or ought to be: a way of critical 
thinking in pursuit of truth about the most fundamental principles of human life and their relations 
with the environment. According to Oruka, then, philosophy (understood as ‘love of wisdom’) 
seems inescapably tied to some ethical commitment and social responsibility. Thus, he challenges 
contemporary philosophers to embrace that commitment and responsibility to bring to the fore 
practical dimension of philosophy, thereby enhancing the wellbeing of their people without 
jeopardizing the environment.  
Now it is from that perspective, we shall try to argue, that Oruka’s commitment to defend, 
shape, and develop philosophy in Africa attests to his general task of philosophizing against social, 
political, economic, and theoretical deprivation and suppression. Indeed, as Richard Bell rightly 
observes, philosophy in Africa, among other things, ought to be tied to the experience of the lived 
reality of the people, which is made up of the pre-colonial traditions, its colonial history, current 
harsh circumstance, and human struggles (Bell 2002, 35).  
Oruka’s philosophy seems in pursuit of that agenda. His approach to philosophy (i.e., 
philosophic sagacity), we urge, is also practically relevant today beyond Africa. It emphasizes that 
philosophy worth its salt ought to be tied to individual critical thinkers rather than being 
misconstrued into some community-based pseudo philosophy (ethno-philosophy), which 
nonetheless only perpetuates such oppressive structures albeit in different form. It also underscores 
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that genuine philosophy ought to be sagacious; meaning it ought to be practically relevant in 
solving contemporaneous issues affecting humankind and the environment. Thus, the chapter will 
conclude by justifying Oruka’s commitment to such critical issues as human rights, ethical duty, 
humanism, communalism, and above all global justice.  
3.2. African Philosophy: A Turbulent Path 
The issue of the nature and the existence of philosophy in Africa has, until recently (1990s) 
gone through what one might aptly call a turbulent journey.31 This journey is marked by several 
significant historical phases, with some arrogantly if not ignorantly denying any possibility of 
having philosophy in Africa, while others vehemently trying to defend its rightful position. As a 
result, there have been a number of trends or schools of thought in pursuit of this course. According 
to Oruka, for instance, this issue first went through what he calls “the myth of pre-philosophy”, a 
stage in which African mind and culture were generally claimed to be extremely alien to logic, 
reason, philosophy, and civilization (Oruka 1991a, 45). Ironically, though, representatives of this 
phase include such famous philosophers as Hume, Kant, Hegel, among others.32  
As a reaction to the ‘myth of pre-philosophy’, there arose a second phase, that is, the “ethno-
philosophical phase” in the works of such scholars as Tempels, Mbiti, and Kagame. But as we 
shall see shortly, although this second phase tried to assert the nature and the existence of 
                                                          
31The issue was problematised since the early 1960s through late 1990s with intensive debate meant to 
handle such topics as: What is philosophy? What is African philosophy? Did the Africans in their typical 
traditional cultures ever philosophise? Should African philosophy, if any, overlap with other philosophies? 
Who qualifies as an African philosopher? etc. (Oruka 1997, 160). 
32 Of course, their derogative works, had been carefully concealed from academia until mid-20th century 
when their racist overtones, arrogance, and ignorance were exposed. For an intriguing coverage, see C. 
Neugebauer, “The Racism of Hegel and Kant” in Oruka 1991, 247-257 and Odhiambo 2009, 1-19. 
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philosophy in Africa, it nonetheless found itself lazily conceiving of it as a communal affair (with 
no individual philosophers) that uniquely defined the African mind. 
That necessitated the rise of yet another phase, the “professional phase”, which saw individual 
Africans who had been professionally trained as philosophers in Europe and elsewhere grappling 
to articulate issues about African philosophy. But in this endeavour, the professional school of 
thought unfortunately alienated itself from (or took for granted) the existence of indigenous 
African thinkers. And it was precisely due to this and other challenges that Odera Oruka came up 
with a new trend he dubbed philosophic sagacity. This trend as we shall see, tries to capture both 
indigenousness and professionalism in African philosophy. To get this point clearly, therefore, let 
us first consider these phases in depth.  
3.2.1. The Myth of Pre-Philosophy (The First Phase) 
The ‘myth of pre-philosophy’ represents a time when African mind and culture was, out of 
bias or ignorance, considered inadequate: extremely alien to logic, reason, philosophy, civilization, 
and scientific inquiry. This position, which Odhiambo calls the “conventional conception of the 
African mentality” holds that anything African could not be philosophical, and likewise, anything 
philosophical could not be African (Odhiambo 2009, 1, 43). It appears in some disparaging works 
of such Western philosophers and scholars as Kant (Philosophical Anthropology), Hegel (Lectures 
on the History of Philosophy), Levy-Bruhl (The Notebooks on Primitive Mentality), Westermann 
(The African Today), among others. According to this literature, Africa could only be described as 
primitive, static and “dark”; which sadly situates Africans as pre-logical, pre-scientific, pre-
literate, and hence pre-philosophical (Neugebauer 1991, 54).  
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Kant’s bias and blatant racism, to start with, though unknown in the mainstream academia, is 
incontestable. Kant seems to defend the monogenetic racial theory: humanity descended from an 
original “stem species” that began in one part of the world; different races, however, emerged as 
members of that species migrated to different parts of the world with different climates, which 
triggered their predisposition to produce the physical features (and especially the skin color) they 
needed to survive in these new environments. And for Kant, once climate and environment trigger 
human predispositions to produce racial differences, that process is irreversible (Boxill 2017, 45).   
Thus, in his lectures on Philosophical Anthropology, Kant discerns four races of human species 
according to colour-line, namely, white (European), yellow (Asian), black (African), and red 
(Native American) in that pecking order, which order is determined by decreasing mental and 
general capability (Oruka 1990, 251). Excepting the first (i.e., white) race, Kant claims that the 
other three races inherently suffer from mental defects. Commenting about the black race, for 
instance, in “Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime” Kant writes: 
The Negroes of Africa have by nature no feeling that rises above the ridiculous. Mr. Hume 
challenges anyone to adduce a single example where a Negro has demonstrated talents, … the 
difference between the white and black races seems to be just as great with regard to the 
capacities of mind as it is with respect to color (Kant 2:253).  
 
In yet another essasy entitled “Of the Different Races of Human Beings” (1775), Kant further 
observses that “The Negreo, who is well suited to his climate, [is] strong, fleshy, supple, but who 
given the abundant provisions of his motherland, is lazy, soft and trifling” (Kant 1775/2007, 82-
97; cf.  Kant 2:438). And to rectify such defects, Kant says the Negro is fit for special training, 
which trainng he recommends to be done by thoroughly thrashing the Africans, preferably with a 
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split bamboo cane rather than an ordinary whip owing to the thickness of their skin.33 And behold, 
Kant erroneously justifies slavery and colonial imperialism, a move that, unfortunately, would 
contradict what he is famously known for: a morality based on the categorical imperative.34   
It is important to note also that Kant generally regards the concept of ‘race’ in terms of “class 
distinction” prevalent not only in human beings (hence the pecking order above) but also in other 
animals. And such class distinctions, he says, are inevitably inherited by nature. Thus, mixing of 
races, according to Kant, should entirely be avoided; it can only cause misfortune and damage.35 I 
wonder how such racism in Kant can be defended or reconciled with his “mainstream” thoughts.   
Hegel’s bias is equally scary, as he disparagingly describes Africa in a rather general and 
derogative way. In his Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, for instance, Hegel describes 
“Africa proper” (by which he means the sub-Saharan region) as a continent enclosed within itself, 
with no signs of development, and whose dominant principle is “cultural backwardness”. He says, 
In Africa proper, man has not progresses beyond merely sensuous existence, and has found it 
absolutely impossible to develop any further. Physically he exhibits great muscular strength, 
which enables him to perform arduous labours; and his temperament is characterised by good-
naturedness, which is coupled, however, with completely unfeeling cruelty (Hegel 1975, 172). 
 
Hegel apparently divides Africa into three regions: (i) the land to the south of Sahara (Africa 
proper); (ii) the land to the North of Sahara (Europe-Africa); and (iii) the region of the Nile and 
                                                          
33 See Immanuel Kant’s Menschenkunde oder Philosophische Anthropologie (1831), edited by Starke, p. 
352 ff, quoted by Eze Chukwudi (ed.) 1997, 116. For original quote, see Kant, “Physische Geographie”, 
Zweyter Band, Konigsberg 1802, in Der Neger, Hrsg.: E. Henscheid, Frankfurt/ Main 1985, p: 7-22.  
34 See the second formula that states: “So act that you use humanity, in your own person as well as in the 
person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” (Kant 4:428).  
35 Cf. I. Kant VIII, p: 121, and IV, p: 271 in: Kant-Ausgabe der philosophischen Bibliothek, Hrsg.: K. 
Vorländer; cf. also R. Eisler, “Kant-Lexikon”, Berlin 1930, p: 439.  
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Ethiopia (Asia-Africa). He however says that Africa proper “is the characteristic part of the whole 
continent” (Hegel 1975, 173). Hegel then denies in Africa not only philosophy but also history, 
morality, religion, culture and civilization (Hegel 1975, 174). And by extension, he also denies 
Africans two major concepts in his philosophy: reason (or spirit) and consciousness.  
Now to support his outrageous claims purporting that black people are inherently inferior to, 
say, white people, Hegel further argues that North Africa (especially Egypt and Carthage), whose 
civilization is no doubt a classical marvel, is not part of Africa; its inhabitants are not Africans but 
Europeans in character. But that is obviously untrue. There also were many other civilizations in 
ancient Africa that Hegel arrogantly ignored to investigate. Thus, as Christian Neugebauer rightly 
points out, Hegel’s purported description of Africa clearly unmasks his main source about Africa: 
ignorance and racial biasness (Neugebauer 1991, 54). At best, Hegel relies on embellished stories 
and travel diaries to disparagingly define Africans as static, primitive, dark, savage, illogical, 
philosophically innocent, and culturally homogeneous (Bernasconi 1998, 43-46). He writes, 
The negro is an example of animal man in all his savagery and lawlessness, and if we wish to 
understand him at all, we must put aside all our European attitudes. We must not think of a 
spiritual God or of moral laws; … we must abstract from all reverence and morality, and from 
everything which we call feeling. All this is foreign to man in his immediate existence, and 
nothing consonant with humanity is to be found in his character. For this reason, we cannot 
properly feel ourselves into his nature, no more than into that of a dog (Hegel 1975, 174).  
 
Consequently, the much-celebrated German philosopher concludes his introduction of the 
Lectures by stating unequivocally that he is not going to include Africa in his analysis. For him, 
world history (by which he means a progressive development of the consciousness of human 
freedom) properly speaking begins in China (or Persia) and ends in Europe (Hegel 1956, 180).  
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It is for these and other racist remarks that Odera Oruka critically observes that the ‘myth of 
pre-philosophy’ can be seen as an attempt to establish two things about Africa: (i) the impossibility 
for having any philosophic dialogue; and (ii), an obvious (i.e., conventional though not accurate) 
nonexistence of a tradition of any organized philosophical systems in Africa (Oruka 1987, 47). In 
this regard, also, the myth seems to naively regard philosophy only in the “usual” sense as the 
heritage of the West, thereby treating it as a typical or a natural European activity foreign to other 
races and continents like Africa. But to think that logic, reason, science, philosophy, religion and 
civilization are exclusively European enterprises, as Kresse points out, no doubt, amounts to a 
serious scientific if not philosophical blunder (Kresse 1996, 23). Nonetheless, and perhaps on a 
positive side, it was after the ‘myth of pre-philosophy’ was exposed that debates on the nature and 
existence of philosophy in Africa took another better twist, ushering in the second phase.  
3.2.2. Ethno-philosophy (The Second Phase) 
To offset the ‘myth of pre-philosophy’, some scholars have made frantic attempts to show 
that African societies – ancient or contemporary – are neither innocent of logic, reason and hence 
philosophy, nor alien to civilization. This school of thought dubbed ethno-philosophy, marks the 
second phase in search for the nature and existence of philosophy in Africa.36 But as we shall see, 
despite its apparent noble motive, ethno-philosophy ends up describing African philosophy merely 
as “traditional-communal-thought-system” often found in fables, proverbs, songs, and other 
                                                          
36 Paulin Hountondji, one of the leading African Philosophers and a fierce critique of this school of 
thought, claims to be the one who coined this term ethno-philosophy (Hountondji 1983, 34). However, in 
a more recent publication Hountondji acknowledges that the term had been employed almost three 
decades earlier by Nkuruma in his doctoral thesis undertaken (but uncompleted) at the University of 
Pennsylvania (Mosley 1995, 175). It is not very clear though whether Nkuruma uses the term ethno-
philosophy in the same sense as Hountondji does, that is, in reference to “a collective thought” often but 
erroneously attributed to African philosophy (Gyekye 1995, xvi). 
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linguistic features (Oruka 1987). Thus, it is reflected in such expressions as ‘Bantu philosophy’, 
‘Agikuyu philosophy’, ‘Luo philosophy’, etc; which “philosophies” as Gyekye aptly observes, 
subscribe to a “monolithic set of ideas and beliefs”, hence unanimity (Gyekye 1995, xvii).  
Ethno-philosophy, furthermore, starts with a strong anthropological assumption that 
African philosophy is and must only be different from, say, European philosophy. But that 
assumption, of course, is fallacious. Ethnophilosophical trend, therefore, spectacularly fails to 
solve the real problem at stake: tackling the misconception about the nature and the existence of 
philosophy in Africa. Indeed, as Oruka rightly observes, ethno-philosophy seems to only succeed 
to embody what he calls “the myth of a unique philosophy”, another kind of myth that requires a 
communal consensus as it fuses (or confuses) mythologies with philosophy (Oruka 1991, 45). In 
other words, ethno-philosophy only identifies with the totality of customs and common beliefs of 
a people (Oruka would call this folk philosophy), thereby forming a sharp contrast with a deductive 
philosophy developed by a critical mind and consistent logic of individual thinkers. 
The point we are trying to make here is that following Oruka’s insight, and contrary to the 
ethno-philosophical approach, philosophy (whether African or otherwise) ought to be a product of 
critical, deductive, and reflective thought process, always characterized by logical consistency and 
often tied to independent individual thinkers who in most cases challenge the status quo. But at 
the same time, such philosophers ought to embrace and integrate some ethical commitment and 
social responsibility so as to make their philosophies relevant and practical to the betterment of 
humanity’s wellbeing and the environment. I come back to this point later, but first, let us first 
look at some examples of ethno-philosophy.  
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3.2.2.1. Placide Tempels and “Bantu Philosophy” 
One of the key proponents of ethno-philosophy is Rev. Placide Tempels, a Belgian Catholic 
priest who did missionary work from 1930s through 1960s among the Luba people in today’s 
Democratic Republic of Congo. In response to the ‘myth of pre-philosophy’ that we discussed 
above, Tempels sought to defend a contrary position, urging that speculative thought and reasoning 
was indeed a permanent and prevalent feature of pre-colonial Africa. Thus, Tempels contends that 
to deny logic and ontology (and hence philosophy in its strict sense) to the Africans or any other 
“primitive” group of people is an unrealistic and untenable position.  
In his small but widely read book entitled Bantu Philosophy, Tempels claims that Bantu 
philosophy comprises of some basic principles that underlie the African behaviour, beliefs, and 
customs. These principles, which revolve around the concept of vital force, are crucial given that 
they govern Africans in their day-to-day lives. Thus, according to Tempels, Bantu’s behaviour, 
ontology, wisdom, psychology, ethics, religion, and “restoration of life” are all centred in the value 
of vital force - a reality that, though invisible, yet is supreme and permeates every Bantu (Tempels 
1945, 49). And behold the Bantu philosophy!  
It should be surprising and intellectually baffling, though, that Tempels could claim almost 
single-handedly to have discovered Bantu (or African) philosophy; one that is uniquely communal, 
permanent and stable system of beliefs, though consistent with some peculiar and inferior logic 
based on one primordial concept of vital force (whatever that may be). And it is this “philosophy”, 
Tempels says, that has perennially been handed over from ancient to the modern Africa. It is what 
defines the African mind despite the fact that the very African mind could neither formulate nor 
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articulate. It is a kind of philosophy that required an outsider to define and articulate it for the 
world to know all about its nature and existence.37 
Now it is in this regard that we maintain how difficult it is for any reasonable person to see 
how Tempels could possibly succeed in attacking the myth of pre-philosophy, let alone enhancing 
helpful debates on the nature and existence of Philosophy in Africa. His major claims are obviously 
controversial if not outright false. According to Oruka, Tempels committed two “intellectual 
crimes” by first claiming that “the Bantu were not themselves capable of theorising and articulating 
their own ‘philosophy’, and second, he confused people’s Weltanschaung with philosophy as an 
academic discipline” (Oruka 1997, 164).  
Yet, perhaps on the positive side as Odera Oruka further notes, “Tempels was ahead of the 
European anthropologists and missionaries who found no philosophy worth its salt in African 
culture; a culture which to them was a product of ‘a primitive mentality’” (Oruka 1997, 164). Thus, 
Tempels has incontestably been accredited as the first European scholar to have published a work 
that prima facie seems to systematically debunk the ‘myth of pre-philosophy’ despite the fact that 
he does this in the sense of finding, as Oruka elsewhere rightly puts, “rationality in the irrational” 
(Oruka 1990, 16). Now whether Tempels deserves such an accreditation or not might be debatable, 
and the scope of this study may not allow me to delve into that debate. But it remains reasonably 
clear to me that Tempels, just like most ethno-philosophers, was gravely mistaken to generalize 
his anthropological findings that he then lazily baptized Bantu (read African) philosophy. 
                                                          
37 I concur with Gail Presbey, who, along with Paul Radin, critiques Tempels’ approach as highly 
“presumptive and wrong-headed insofar as Tempels presumed to describe Bantu philosophy on behalf of 
Bantu speaking people” (Presbey 2016, 5). 
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Scholars in African philosophy, however, remain divided on this, with some praising 
Tempels as being arguably the father of African philosophy (Masolo 1995, 46). Others have aired 
their discomforts while appreciating his contribution. Commenting on Tempels’ text, for instance, 
Odera Oruka, scornfully observes that it is “full of intolerable paternalism of a vigorous Western 
missionary who is eager to save the souls of the Bantu people” but nonetheless ends up crafting an 
idiosyncratic “philosophy” that denies them knowledge proper, except that knowledge which is 
mystical and sporadically magical (Oruka 1995, 21).  
This, to me, sounds a valid criticism against Tempels’ methodology and intentionality; for 
Tempels only grants to Bantu people the knowledge of vital force that happens to hierarchically 
permeate being: God, Spirits, ancestors, humans, animals, plants, and other stuff in that pecking 
order (Tempels 1945, 23-35, 55-59, 61-64). But obviously this cannot be the only knowledge that 
Bantu people, leave alone Africans, are capable of, neither is it the only kind of knowledge that is 
idiosyncratically unique to them as Tempels would like us to believe. 
3.2.2.2. John S. Mbiti and “African Philosophy and Religion” 
Another scholar who has immensely contributed to propagate the ethno-philosophical 
approach to African philosophy is a Kenyan-born theologian John S. Mbiti. In his rather famous 
text entitled African Philosophy and Religion (1969), Mbiti sets out to emphasize the unity of 
African religions and philosophy. As he categorically puts it in the introduction, one can hardly 
separate philosophy from religion in Africa, since “Africans are notoriously religious,” and it is 
religion more than anything else that governs or drives their life (Mbiti 1969, xii).  
Mbiti consequently conflates traditional African religions with African philosophy, thereby 
describing the latter as simply having to do with how Africans ordinarily but uniquely respond to 
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life in their different daily activities. What follows then in the remainder of his book is an analysis 
of such topics as time, kinship, family, birth, child naming, initiation, marriage, death, prayers, 
sacrifices, magic, etc. And in thoroughly treating these topics, Mbiti seems to portray Africans as 
not only unique but also strangely mysterious. 
With regard to the concept of time, for instance, Mbiti suggests that time in the African 
mind is not similar to, say, the Western concept of time that has three significant phases: past, 
present, and future, with time moving from the past to the future. According to Mbiti, Africans are 
philosophically unique since their concept of time has two dimensions, namely, a long-past and 
the felt-present; with hardly any future (except that which covers about six months to two years). 
He uses Kiswahili words zamani and sasa to describe the two dimensions (the long-past and the 
felt-present) respectively, saying that the latter (sasa) covers all that is present plus the short future 
of about six to two years (Mbiti 1990, 17-24).38 Time in Africa, Mbiti also adds, moves from 
present to past, given that time in Africa is measured in terms of events. 
The idea of time moving from present to past is significant in Mbiti’s philosophy, though 
it remains highly dubious. For him, the past (zamani) is the permanent “storehouse” for all events; 
it is “the ocean of time in which everything becomes absorbed into a reality that is neither after 
nor before” (Mbiti 1990, 23). Thus, events move from sasa and disappear into zamani. The latter, 
therefore, as Oruka observes, seems to be “the period of myth that gives the sense of foundation 
to all things in the sasa period” (Oruka 1997, 188). And it is from this concept of time, one would 
say, that Mbiti understands African philosophy as “the permanent and unquestionable foundation 
of beliefs that give sense to every aspect of life and the history of the people” (Oruka 1997, 188). 
                                                          
38 It is surprising that Mbiti chose not to use the Kiswahili word usoni, which literally and properly 
translates into “infinite future”. But that would water down his whole analysis of time.  
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Thus, like in Tempels, African philosophy from the ethno-philosophical point of view becomes in 
Mbiti a permanent if unanimous body of beliefs that the whole community lazily absorbs.39    
3.2.2.3. Why Ethno-philosophy is a flop 
As we hinted above, despite its attempts to debunk the ‘myth of pre-philosophy’, ethno-
philosophy as a school of thought seems to flop for various reasons. First, it tends to see philosophy 
in Africa as a collective enterprise, a communal participatory thought process, thereby lacking in 
the basic characteristics (e.g., individual intellectual astuteness) ordinarily attributed to other world 
philosophies (Odhiambo 2009, 65). In other words, ethno-philosophy tends to present philosophy 
in Africa as merely a lived communal worldview. Ethno-philosophy, therefore, can be described 
as “the study of collective forms of culture as manifestations of African philosophical systems” 
(Ivan and Masolo 2000, 4); at best only giving us what is supposedly assumed in everyday life.  
Ethno-philosophy has further been accused of serving the interests of colonialists and 
imperialists whose intention is to dominate and exploit Africans, having classified them as 
uniquely inferior. It basically aims at presenting and defending traditional African worldview as a 
thought system, albeit within a particular culture. Upon careful scrutiny, however, it becomes 
apparent that this trend only succeeds in portraying philosophy in Africa as unique, idiosyncratic, 
and distinct from, say, Western philosophy in a pejorative manner. This is because at best, ethno-
philosophy is only exercised as a collective wisdom of a people, one that is almost uncritically 
shared by everybody in the society. The end result, then, is not philosophy in the proper sense of 
the word. Hence, as Oruka rightly says, whereas Western philosophy is identified with reason, 
                                                          
39 Others who subscribe to ethno-philosophical approach include: Kagame (1959); Horton (1987); and 
Griaule (1965). For details, see Odhiambo 2009, 43-64.  
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logic, and science, African philosophy in the eyes of ethno-philosophy is defined by the opposite 
of these attributes, which ultimately creates “a subtle form of master-slave distinction between the 
two races” (Oruka 1991, 20).  
As a communal thought system, ethno-philosophy also seems desperately impersonal; it is 
not identifiable with any individual thinker, which again works against the Africans and their 
interests within the global society. Hence, Oruka describes it as “the philosophy of everybody; it 
is understood and accepted by everyone. It is at best a form of religion. But would in other cases 
function perfectly like a taboo and superstition” (Oruka 1982, 48; cf. Oruka 1990, iv-v). This point 
has had support from other contemporary scholars who lament sadly that philosophy in Africa has 
been unfortunately presented by ethno-philosophers as atypical; that is, as “a remarkable unanimity 
with no dissenting voice ... a philosophy without philosophers” (Odhiambo 2008, 96; 2009, 73).  
Another criticism levelled against ethno-philosophy pertains to its methodology. In its 
endeavour to get to the underlying basic principles of reality and behaviour of the people in Africa, 
ethno-philosophy employs a methodology similar to that which cultural anthropology ordinarily 
uses, namely, ethnology. This, according to Oruka is a method employed in cultural anthropology 
to study “a people as a collective and unified one-willed organism” (Oruka 1991, 19). The 
information acquired is then craftily described in a philosophical language. The end-product, 
however, as Hountondji aptly observes, is neither anthropology nor philosophy proper but a 
conglomeration of both, or more euphemistically ethno-philosophy. For him, such a process mostly 
succeeds in producing “ethnological works with philosophical pretensions” (Hountondji 1983, 34). 
Evidently, then, ethno-philosophy falls spectacularly into the same pitfall it so desperately 
sought to avoid. Just as the ‘myth of pre-philosophy’ tends to confine philosophy to the West, 
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ethno-philosophers embark on writing something about philosophy in Africa, but, as Odhiambo 
says, they do so not without a remarkable naivety. They try to argue, for instance, that African 
culture and its philosophy are a uniquely lived experience, and not a myriad of concepts to be 
idealized or rigorously rationalized by critical mind. In other words, they see philosophy in Africa 
as “an inseparable part of the concrete, of culture as Africans feel and live, and not an entity to be 
isolated and discussed [critically]” (Odhiambo 2008, 98). But in so doing, they also almost 
unconsciously demonstrate that philosophy understood as a detailed, critical, rigorous, intellectual 
exercise has no place in African culture, both traditional and modern. 
Elsewhere, Oruka affirms this point, cautioning that the contentious issue is not that there is 
and perhaps there must be a distinction between African philosophy and, say, Western philosophy; 
for indeed, “the historical, cultural, and environmental conditions and choices in the two systems 
are reasonably different. But, whatever the difference, it does not qualitatively lay in the use of 
reason” (Oruka 1991, 26). Hence, for Oruka, the greatest disservice to development of philosophy 
in Africa is to deliberately or otherwise deny Africans the use of reason, which is a universal 
human trait, and instead attempt to “dress it in magic and extra-rational traditionalism”, which is 
what ethno-philosophy basically does (Oruka 1991, 26). 
Here, Oruka seems in tandem with Lévi-Strauss whose “structuralism” acknowledges reason 
in all people’s thought process despite their cultural and environmental difference (Lévi-Strauss, 
1976). Gyekye also seems to agree with Oruka when he astutely argues that philosophy (by which 
he means ‘intellectual inquiry into fundamental questions about human experience’) is essentially 
universal human activity; meaning the propensity, the desire and the capacity to wonder and hence 
to raise fundamental questions about nature, supreme being, human existence, etc, can be found in 
peoples of different cultures even though the responses given may vary (Gyekye 1995, xiv, 10). 
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3.2.3. Professional African Philosophy (The Third Phase) 
Owing to the above criticisms levelled against ethno-philosophy, some professionally 
trained African philosophers emerged to assert that African philosophy should be seen from the 
professional/ academic perspective. This trend, which forms the third phase in search for the nature 
and existence of philosophy in Africa, insists that any African philosophy worthy its name should 
be not only individually based, but most importantly engrained with critical, complex but coherent 
arguments (Wiredu 1980, 34).  
Key proponents of this school of thought include: Wiredu (Philosophy and an African 
Culture, 1980), Bodunrin (The Question of African Philosophy, 1981), Hountondji (African 
Philosophy: Myth and Reality, 1983), and to some extent Odera Oruka. As Odhiambo rightly 
observes, these are professionally trained African thinkers who have one remarkable characteristic: 
they strive to employ techniques and methodology commonly but perhaps erroneously associated 
with Western philosophy only (Odhiambo 2009, 74). Also, while they generally concur that 
African philosophy should be independent, dynamic, critical, and discursive, yet they in most cases 
hold some interesting, divergent, and even sometimes incompatible views, especially when the 
question boils down to the exact nature of philosophy in Africa, or when the question involves a 
particular contentious issue. They try to lift the discourse to a “universal level” before turning to 
specific existential conditions and priorities affecting humanity in search of truth (Bell 2002, 27). 
A good example can be seen in reference to an intriguing debate between Oruka and 
Wiredu on the concept of truth. Whereas the latter in the essay “Truth as Opinion” holds that truth 
is nothing categorically set other than an opinion (Wiredu 1972), the former in his paper “Truth 
and Belief” opines that truth must be absolute and foundational to knowledge, otherwise if truth 
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were merely opinion, discourse would be vitiated by subjectivity, which would result in anarchy 
and chaos (Oruka 1975). Wiredu then responds to Oruka in a paper “In Behalf of Opinion” (1976), 
before Oruka’s rejoinder in “For the Sake of Truth” (1988). Unfortunately, that exchange could 
not last long following Oruka’s untimely death in 1995. Thus, Wiredu regrets that he was still 
planning on how to respond to Oruka in yet another essay, which most likely would have ignited 
another intellectual battle. It seems the two had created a habit of challenging each other in almost 
every topic they wrote about. However, their divergent views, fierce criticisms, and perhaps 
misreading each other only made their friendship grow deeper and stronger (contrary to the opinion 
of many). Wiredu affirms this point when in tribute to his fallen comrade writes:  
I recall that our friendship [with Oruka] grew even as our philosophical disagreements 
gathered momentum. I have pleasant memories of the long discussions Oruka and I had 
whenever we met, which was quite frequent. In these discussions, we took up points of 
disagreement much oftener than points of agreement, and we both found that rewarding; 
certainly, I did (Graness and Kresse 1997, 141). 
 
I bring out the passionate encounter between these two arguably most prolific philosophers 
in Africa then to show how the so-called “professional” school of thought envisioned philosophy 
in Africa ought to be: a robust formal (written) intellectual encounter characterised by systematic 
complex arguments and counter arguments by two or more critical minds in relation to a particular 
philosophical issue. Thus, as a trend basically meant to debunk the ‘myth of pre-philosophy’, the 
“professional” school of thought, then, seems to have the intention to articulate and defend African 
philosophy in the strict and technical usage of the term. 40  
                                                          
40 As a caveat, though, it is important to note with Oruka that representatives of this trend are referred to 
as “professional”, not because of their superior or otherwise individual intellectual astuteness, but simply 
because they hold the position that whatever African philosophy is, it must satisfy the criteria of 
professional philosophy: critical, independent, and discursive reflection (Oruka 1991, 20).  
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3.2.3.1.Why the “professional” approach might fail 
Despite all its noble intentions, the professional approach to African philosophy, unfortunately, 
also has some shortcomings. First, having been trained mostly in the Western traditions, the so-
called “professional philosophers” are often accused of inappropriately deploying Western 
techniques, logic, and methods to do African philosophy. They tend, in other words, to use Western 
“spectacles” to see African philosophy, thereby missing an invaluable chunk of African-ness. The 
end-result of what they qualify African philosophy becomes in essence, as Oruka says, “a scholarly 
exercise rooted in the West” (Oruka 1990, 16-19).  
Furthermore, even though the professional approach would grant the existence of African 
philosophy in its proper and strict sense, it nonetheless limits itself to modern or contemporary 
Africa, giving a false impression that traditional Africans were inherently incapable of technical 
philosophy (Odhiambo 2008, 97). In sum, the professional trend can be accused of going “too far 
in risking African philosophical identity to the Western bias”, that is, using Western philosophy 
as the measure of philosophizing in Africa. It also seems not to go far enough in limiting the 
discussion to the specific issues affecting the African context (Bell 2002, 28). 
3.3. Philosophic Sagacity: A “New” Trend  
Following our discussion so far regarding the nature and the existence of philosophy in 
Africa, it is now clear, I think, that the two trends (ethno-philosophical and professional approach) 
fail in one way or another to adequately address the issue, thereby debunking the ‘myth of pre-
philosophy’. Hence, it becomes imperative to think of another approach that would clarify the 
matter. And that is where the ingenuity of Odera Oruka comes in as he seeks to craft another trend, 
a kind of “hybrid” or go-between trend that would overcome the challenges of both ethno-
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philosophy and professional philosophy without losing their invaluable contributions. As we shall 
see, this “new” trend, which Oruka dubbed philosophic sagacity, proves to be very helpful in 
shaping the understanding of the nature and the existence of philosophy in Africa. It is also 
applicable elsewhere in the world, leading to a possibility of having an intercultural approach to 
philosophy, a prerequisite towards establishing a genuine practice of justice at the global level. 
3.3.1. Philosophic Sagacity enroute41 
Now in response to the ‘myth of pre-philosophy’ that had scornfully denied any philosophy 
in Africa, and owing to the challenges of ethno-philosophical and professional approach, Odera 
Oruka as early as 1974 came up with a new approach that would seek individuals within traditional 
African societies who were considered not only morally irreproachable but most importantly 
sagacious in a rather philosophic, critical, or didactic sense. The idea was to have a serious dialogue 
with these sages (normally in their own mother-tongue) and then systematically record their 
thoughts on such important issues as the nature of the Divine, the concept of human person, the 
meaning of freedom, democracy, justice, equality, time, death, afterlife, etc. The recording of such 
thoughts became for Oruka a concrete evidence of philosophy in Africa, which philosophy could 
later on be critically analysed and academically engaged with other philosophies. Philosophic 
sagacity, therefore, is a trend that aims at rescuing African philosophy in the technical sense of the 
word seen through African “spectacles”, that is, seen with little or no Western influence. 
Philosophic sagacity started with two rather ambitious but related projects that Oruka 
together with some of his students and colleagues at the University of Nairobi carried out in Kenya. 
                                                          
41 The term “philosophic sagacity” can be viewed in two rather related ways: first, as a trend or a school 
of thought; and second, as a quality or an intellectual capacity of an individual - a philosophic sage. In 
this section, we will mostly advance the former connotation rather than the latter to demonstrate Oruka’s 
practical response to the contentious issue of the nature and existence of philosophy in Africa.  
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The first project entitled “Thoughts of Traditional Kenyan Sages” was carried out in 1974. Its aim 
was either to substantiate or invalidate the claim that traditional African people were innocent of 
logical and critical thinking, and hence seemingly removed from any philosophical discourse. As 
Oruka tells us, it sought to address the following question: 
Would it be possible to identify persons of traditional African culture capable of the critical, 
second-order type of thinking about the various problems of human life and nature; persons 
… who subject beliefs that are traditionally taken for granted to independent rational re-
examination, and who are inclined to accept or reject such beliefs on the authority of reason 
rather than on the basis of a communal or religious consensus? (Oruka 1991, 17). 
 
The project was conducted in the form of dialogues with Kenyan sages across the country. 
Many of these dialogues have been published in Oruka’s classical text - Sage Philosophy. But as 
Oruka further notes, while some sages were found merely to reiterate cultural beliefs and moral 
systems, others were critical, independent-minded, and very insightful. The former are folk sages, 
whereas the latter are philosophic sages whom Oruka was mostly interested to expose to the world.  
In 1976, Oruka launched yet another project, this time bringing in some national and social 
dimensions. This project entitled “The Philosophical Roots of Culture in Kenya” was presented to 
the Ministry of Culture and Social Services, though it was never officially published. The two 
projects constitute what Oruka would later call “Kenyan philosophic sagacity”. This is because, 
whereas the 1974 project sought to identify philosophic sages in Kenya, the 1976 project was 
geared towards engaging their thoughts for the sake of finding lasting social cohesion and national 
prosperity (Odhiambo 2008, 94-95). Hence, for Oruka, philosophic sagacity is not just another 
school of thought for mere speculative abstract discourse; it is rather one practical trend meant to 
offer viable alternative solutions to some contemporaneous predicaments affecting his people.  
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There has been controversy regarding exactly when philosophic sagacity, as a trend, made 
its grand-maiden entry into philosophical arena, with some claiming 1978 while others holding on 
to 1981. I follow those who maintain that it was in 1978 when Odera Oruka officially proposed it 
to the international community during a conference to commemorate the achievements of A. W. 
Amo (1703-1759)42 in Accra Ghana (Odhiambo 2008, 92). During that conference, we learn that 
Oruka presented an intriguing paper entitled “Four Trends in Current African Philosophy”, where 
he identified four trends in (or approaches to) philosophy in Africa, namely, ethno-philosophy, 
nationalistic-ideological philosophy, professional philosophy, and philosophic sagacity.43  
In his conclusion, having analysed both the strength and the weaknesses of the other three 
trends, Oruka passionately appealed for philosophic sagacity as the ideal trend to approach African 
philosophy, showing how it overcomes most of the criticisms levelled against the other trends. The 
following year, Oruka is said to have read a slightly revised version of that paper during the 16th 
World Congress of Philosophy in Dusseldorf, Germany, where he once again defended 
philosophic sagacity. The paper, however, was only published in 1981, which perhaps makes some 
have the false impression that the term “philosophic sagacity” found its entry into the philosophical 
arena then (Odhiambo 2008, 92). Oruka would later develop and publish this paper as a book 
entitled Trends in Contemporary African Philosophy (1990). 
                                                          
42 Born in present-day Ghana in 1703, Anton Wilhelm Amo was brought to Germany by the Dutch West 
Indian Co. in 1707 as a child slave. He was, however, lucky to access education, becoming arguably the 
first black African known to have attended university in Europe where he exhibited great intellectual 
capacity. He studied law, medicine, psychology, and philosophy. He later taught at the universities of 
Halle and Jena and published several philosophical works. He returned to his native land in 1753, where 
he died later on in 1759 (Mabe, 2014). For more details, see Asante and Abarry 1996, 424 ff. 
43 Oruka would later on add two more trends: (i) hermeneutic philosophy, which consists of philosophical 
analysis of concepts in a given African language to help clarify meaning and logical implications; and (ii) 
artistic or literary philosophy (Oruka 1991, 5).  
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3.3.2. Philosophic Sagacity or Sage philosophy? 
There has been temptation to conflate ‘philosophic sagacity’ with ‘sage philosophy’ as if 
the two are synonymous. But, as we shall see, this amounts to misreading Oruka, given that the 
former is a derivative of or just one aspect of the latter.44 As hinted above, Sage philosophy is an 
ambitious project that proceeds from the premise that there are individuals within various African 
societies who exhibit some rare but philosophic insights, rigorous arguments, and viable positions 
while addressing some deep-seated issues related to nature, life, existence, deity, etc., both at the 
communal and universal planes. The assumption, as Barasa holds, is that if such individuals were 
engaged in a dialectical manner on their own or through midwifery provocation by a professionally 
trained philosopher, they can with ease reveal a great deal of insight, which may be harnessed for 
enlightenment and betterment of the wellbeing of their people (Graness and Kresse 1997, 20).  
Thus, besides being a trend or an approach employed to identify, philosophically provoke 
or engage, as well as sort out such enlightened individuals, philosophic sagacity can also be 
considered as an intellectual quality or product of philosophic sages. That means not every sage as 
such can exhibit philosophic sagacity as product of their thoughts. This point might become clearer 
if we take a keen look at Oruka’s understanding of sagacity. 
According to Oruka, sagacity can be considered in two senses. In one sense, sagacity 
consists of thoughts, beliefs, and convictions of people considered and acknowledged as wise by 
their respective communities. The condition for one to be considered wise in this case involves 
having or showing some deep insights and good judgments in one’s endeavours. But in yet another 
                                                          
44 For a detailed account on how the two terms appear in Oruka’s work, see Odhiambo, 2002 19-30. It is 
also worth noting that the phrase “African Sage Philosophy” is now commonly used in reference to the 
body of thought produced by persons considered wise in Africa (cf. Masolo 2006). 
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sense, sagacity refers to a body of basic principles, aphorisms, and tenets that underlie and justify 
beliefs, customs, and practices of a given culture (Oruka 1991, 34.) We therefore notice that 
sagacity – the object of sage philosophy - can be split into two: popular (or folk) sagacity, and 
philosophic (or didactic) sagacity. Oruka clarifies this point when he describes sage philosophy as,  
[T]he expressed thoughts of wise men and women in any given community [which is also] 
a way of thinking and explaining the world [in a manner] that fluctuates between popular 
wisdom (well-known communal maxims, aphorisms and general common-sense truths) 
and didactic wisdom (an expounded wisdom and rational thoughts of some individuals 
within the community) (Oruka 1991, 33; emphasis mine).  
 
He goes on to point out that while popular wisdom is often “conformist”, didactic wisdom 
is at times critical of the communal systems and popular wisdom. Put differently, while popular or 
folk sagacity consists of generally well-known communal principles and common-sense truths, 
didactic or philosophic sagacity expresses deep-seated insights and rational thoughts of some 
intellectually outstanding individuals within a given society. Oruka in fact refers to folk sagacity 
as “culture philosophy” or philosophy in the first order in contra-distinction with philosophic 
sagacity, i.e., philosophy in the second order; and he insists that his research project in Kenya was 
concerned with the sage philosophy of the second order to disprove the well-known view that real 
philosophical thought had no place in traditional Africa (Oruka 1983, 387; Oruka 1991a, 34). 
It appears, therefore, that sagacity or wisdom as such is the object of sage philosophy, with 
philosophic sagacity as one aspect of it and folk sagacity the other, even though the two aspects of 
sagacity are very much related. This is because it is the thoughts of persons already acknowledged 
as incredibly wise that, in fact, constitute the basis on which their respective communities build 
popular or folk sagacity. But that should not be the reason to conflate the two. Thus, we insist with 
Oruka that philosophic sagacity transcends folk sagacity by always being critical and non-
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conformist to attain that technical status. Put differently, whereas all instances of philosophic 
sagacity locate within sage philosophy, not every instance of sage philosophy amounts to 
philosophic sagacity; some could be instances of folk or popular sagacity (Oruka 1991, 33). 
From what we have said also, it is apparent that we can think of sages in two ways, namely, 
folk (or mere) sages on the one hand, and philosophic sages on the other. According to Oruka, a 
sage is a person who is well versed in the wisdom and traditions of his or her people. In this regard, 
a sage normally acts as a mirror reflecting the community’s wisdom, culture and traditions (Oruka 
1983, 386). But being a sage does not necessarily make one a philosopher; for one may be wise 
“within the conventional and historical confines of their culture”, yet, one may not be wise (or 
critical) “in understanding or solving the inconsistencies of their culture or coping with the foreign 
innovations that encroach on it” (Oruka 1983, 386).  
Some sages, however, have the capacity to transcend folk (or popular) sagacity so that as 
serious thinkers, they display not only critical thoughts, but most importantly adhere only to those 
aspects of sagacity that satisfy their rational scrutiny. And as Oruka points out, such sages are in 
most cases “potentially or contemporarily in clash with the diehard adherents of the prevailing 
common beliefs” (Oruka 1983, 386). They are not only critical, but sometimes rebellious against 
status quo or popular sagacity. For Oruka, then, only those sages who are critical and inquisitive 
qualify to be called philosophic sages; and philosophic sagacity, as a trend, aims at exposing and 
systematically rearticulating their insight, thoughts and ideas for the betterment of our society.  
On the other hand, though, there are folk sages who, unlike the philosophic sages, operate 
squarely and almost lazily within the confines of their cultural beliefs and status quo. Talking 
about folk sages, Oruka pointedly says:  
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Beliefs or truth-claims within culture are generally treated as ‘absolute’ (i.e., not to be 
questioned). Anything outside or contradictory to the culture is treated with indifference 
and even hostility. Those sages or persons who are (merely) experts in the culture defend 
this “philosophy” and the structure of their society with the zeal of fanatical ideologists 
defending their political line (Oruka 1983, p. 387). 
 
Thus, while folk sages may glorify communal conformity, a philosophic sage is in most 
cases sceptical and critical of communal consensus, often employing reason to assess it. Also, 
while folk sages are often identifiable by their consistent inability to isolate their own opinions 
from the beliefs of the community (for instance, being readily inclined to take refuge behind the 
popular unexamined positions whenever one is intellectually challenged), philosophic sages are 
clearly able to isolate community beliefs from their own critical evaluation, rationalization, and 
even criticisms, quite often enjoying a dialectic encounter with the challenger (Oruka 1991, 36). 
 To illustrate this point further, Odera Oruka compares two sages: Ogotemmeli from the 
Dogon community in Mali and Mbuya Akoko, a sage from the Luo in Kenya. In this comparison, 
Ogotemmeli, given his unequalled capacity to faithfully recite and fanatically defend beliefs 
common to his people, represents a typical folk sage. He makes no attempt either to assess or 
transcend them. Thus, in spite of the seemingly significant ideas attributed to him, Ogotemmeli 
cannot qualify to be a philosophic sage given that his doctrine is even well known to the average 
member of his community, especially the elders. His teaching, one could say, is rather esoteric in 
character, though not necessarily philosophical. When asked about what he thinks about women, 
for instance, Ogotemmeli lazily answers that according to customary belief of Dogon, a woman is 
fundamentally different from a man based on a curse and punishment from God. “After God made 
woman”, argues Ogotemmeli, “he gave her bad blood which has to flow every month... which 
obviously makes her inferior to man” he says (Griaule 1965, 146). 
 82 
Unlike Ogotemmeli, however, Mbuya Akoko (one of the philosophic sages interviewed by 
Oruka) not only knows his community’s culture and moral beliefs, but he also critically questions 
and quite often improves upon some of the traditional Luo beliefs, such as how the community 
thinks about women. As a philosophic sage, Akoko makes his own critical assessment arguing: 
A man has the physical capacity to run faster than a woman. But on the other hand, a 
woman has the physical capacity to undergo the pains of carrying and bearing a baby which 
a man lacks. So, we cannot correctly say one is superior or inferior to the other. ... In truth 
... the two [genders] are naturally equal or balanced ...” (Oruka 1983, 389). 
 
Here, then, we have an argument that is not only independent, but most importantly philosophical 
in the proper sense given that it goes beyond the communal chorus of the general Luo beliefs about 
women being inferior than men; it distinguishes Mbuya Akoko as a typical philosophic sage.  
It is crucial to note that Odera Oruka was compelled to make that distinction as he sought 
to answer Peter Bodunrin (one of his contemporaries) who, as an attempt to expose and critique 
Oruka’s philosophic sagacity had cited two other approaches to philosophy in Africa: (i) Griaule’s 
famous Conversations with Ogotemmeli (1965); and (ii) Sodipo and Hallen’s research on the 
Yoruba concept of a person in An African Epistemology (1981). Badunrin had then, according to 
Oruka, erroneously put the two approaches at the same par with Oruka’s approach, making him 
(Oruka) feel misread insofar as his philosophic sagacity trend is concerned. Badunrin had further 
unfairly criticised the genius in Oruka’s approach prompting a rejoinder (Oruka 1983, 388-393). 
3.3.3. Philosophic Sagacity versus Ethno-philosophy 
We have been at pains to ascertain that sage philosophy is not synonymous to philosophic 
sagacity. The two are related, although there are some crucial differences that many scholars 
unfortunately continue to overlook. This, however, has been to the disservice of sage philosophy, 
 83 
with some conflating it with ethnophilosophy. As Odhiambo aptly notes, critics quite often “equate 
sage philosophy with ethno-philosophy in toto, yet in actuality it is only the folk sagacity aspect 
[of sage philosophy] that lends itself to ethno-philosophy” (Odhiambo 2008, 105).  
Indeed, comparing philosophic sagacity with the ethno-philosophy reveals that the former 
significantly differs from the latter; the former is both individually-based and dialogical in nature. 
It is a thought process of variously known and named thinkers, and not a popular or communal 
worldview. More so, unlike ethno-philosophy, philosophic sagacity is rigorous and philosophical 
in the strict sense of the word (Oruka 1990, 17). Thus, we can only equate folk sagacity (but not 
philosophic sagacity) with ethno-philosophy.  
I find that point crucial, for it forms the basis of our previous position that philosophic 
sagacity aims at overcoming the challenges of ethno-philosophy, thereby salvaging its unique 
indigenous African-ness. Ethno-philosophy, as we said, has been frequently accused of merely 
rearticulating African’s communal or folk beliefs and customs using some pseudo-philosophic 
language but lacking in any independent, critical and coherent engagement. Perhaps folk (or 
popular) sagacity, the other wing of sage philosophy, may fail the task of overcoming this criticism, 
but surely not philosophic sagacity. Indeed, philosophic sagacity, as Oruka rightly says, is the only 
trend that can give “an all-acceptable decisive blow to the position of ethno-philosophy” (Oruka 
1983, 384). This gives us the impetus to interrogate further what philosophic sagacity aims at.  
3.3.4. The Hallmark of Practical Wisdom  
At this juncture one may ask: what exactly is philosophic sagacity concerned with? And to 
answer that question, we say that philosophic sagacity, as a trend in African philosophy, seeks to 
escape the many criticisms levelled against ethno-philosophy while manoeuvring its way past the 
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limitations of “professional” philosophy. Put differently, besides disproving the false suppositions 
of the former, philosophic sagacity becomes handy in rescuing the latter. At its best, philosophic 
sagacity seeks to bring back to light some of the lost glory of philosophy in Africa by emphasizing 
sagacious reasoning (i.e., practical wisdom) rather than merely abstract speculative discourse. But 
that does not mean philosophic sagacity is unfriendly to or incompatible with theoretical critical 
thinking. What it means is that theoretical critical thinking ought to be taken as means toward 
addressing practical issues affecting us. Thus, a good philosophic sage will have to employ critical 
thinking to come up with a philosophy that must be relevantly applicable to alleviate humanity’s 
perils, thereby help to improve people’s wellbeing without neglecting the environment.  
 To put this into the perspective of what we said earlier, philosophic sagacity seeks to 
combine and retain the unique indigenous value-systems found in ethno-philosophy with modern 
“professionalism” in the professional trend as it endeavours to handle fundamental issues and 
problems facing humanity and the environment across the board, but with special focus in Africa. 
Thus, as it seeks to rehabilitate philosophy in Africa, it focuses on African thoughts that are truly 
critical, discursive, and independent. Conversely it focuses on philosophical issues that are 
genuinely relevant to contemporary Africa. It does this by striving to find out how sages in Africa 
(traditional and modern) could effectively address the current problems (Odhiambo 2009, 97-98).   
Furthermore, cognizant to the fact that a sage can be either formally educated or not, 
philosophic sagacity expresses the view that there exist within various African communities 
individuals who, despite the fact that they have not had the benefit of having contact with the 
Western philosophy (such as the works of Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant, Heidegger, etc.) are, 
nonetheless, philosophical by the power of reason and inborn insight rather than by the authority 
of communal consensus (Oruka 1990, 16). 
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Thus, from a practical point of view, philosophic sagacity first and foremost aims at 
showing that the problem in traditional or modern Africa is not really lack of logic, reason, or 
scientific curiosity. The problem rather is failure to identify these factors (logic, reason and 
scientific curiosity) due to some unjustifiable, biased and racist misconceptions. The fact is: given 
that we can find some philosophic sages with a system of thoughts that employs a rigorous use of 
their mental gifts, then that shows clearly there is rational reflection in Africa.  
Second, philosophic sagacity aims at showing that communal consensus, a fact typical of 
most if not all traditional societies, should not be viewed as a hindrance for individual critical 
reflection. Indeed, as Oruka further observes, “just as religion and all kinds of dogmatic fanaticism 
did not kill philosophy in the West, traditional African folk wisdom and taboos left some room for 
real philosophic thought” (Oruka1983, 385). The main task therefore is to try to distinguish the 
two wings of sage philosophy and systematically rearticulate the thoughts of philosophic sages in 
every society. That would make philosophic sagacity arguably the most effective trend capable of 
understanding what philosophy is, before articulating the sort of philosophy found in Africa.   
Finally, and to conclude this section, we say that philosophic sagacity is a school of thought 
that enables our talk of philosophy in Africa without alienating African thinkers from their 
“intellectual roots”. Given that it tries to systematically bridge the gap between “traditionalists” 
and “modernists” insofar as the debate on the nature and the existence philosophy in Africa is 
concerned, philosophic sagacity guides us on how best we can do philosophy in a relevant and 
well-founded way to combat the current issues affecting humanity and the environment, while at 
the same time being aware of our cultural cum historical milieu. As an invaluable tool or means 
toward creating practical philosophy, philosophic sagacity, then, has an important function of 
distinguishing a genuine philosopher (lover of wisdom and truth) from, say, a mere rhetorician, a 
 86 
religious leader, or a political activist. Thus, philosophic sagacity is the hallmark of advancing 
practical wisdom, a prerequisite condition for building up a more humane and just society.45 
 
3.4. Conclusion 
This chapter was meant to further discuss Oruka’s commitment to practical philosophy by 
exploring his rather incontestable contribution to defence and shaping of philosophy in Africa. In 
response to some misconstrued bias against Africans, Oruka is known to have embarked on a 
research project in Kenya to demonstrate that there really are genuine philosophers who, solidly 
guided by reason, do critique the status quo as much as they propose new ways of solving human 
predicaments. Such philosophers might or might not have been formally educated through the 
Western system, for instance, but they nonetheless clearly demonstrate the use of reason, logic and 
critical thinking, thereby debunking the racist bias that Africans are incapable of having or doing 
philosophy given that reason and logic seems alien to them. At the heart of this project was Oruka’s 
concept of philosophic sagacity, in which this chapter had special interest.  
Thus, we started off by displaying the historical and contextual background that informed or 
prompted Oruka’s response to the then distressing matter of the nature and existence of philosophy 
in Africa, before considering in depth philosophic sagacity within sage philosophy. This was 
meant to show Oruka’s approach to philosophy as a practical response to one of the most intriguing 
issues in contemporary Africa: biased social, economic, political, and intellectual deprivation and 
                                                          
45 I am alive to several criticisms against philosophic sagacity, most of which, unfortunately arise from 
misreading Oruka. They include: Keita (1985); Badunrin (1981); and Masolo (1995). For an intriguing 
debate on how Oruka responded would have responded to such criticism, see Odhiambo 2010, 126-150; 
and Oluwole in Graness & Kresse 1997, 149-162. 
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suppression. It was therefore meant to portray Odera Oruka as a diligent practical philosopher 
committed to seeking justice for his people.  
In the first section, we critically considered the three phases that, according to Oruka, seem to 
characterize a rather turbulent path that finally saw the recognition and appreciation of philosophy 
in Africa. The first phase dubbed “the myth of pre-philosophy” comprises of a stage in which 
African’s culture and mind were generally claimed to be extremely alien to logic, reason, 
philosophy and civilization. Ironically, this phase is well represented by such prominent 
philosophers as Hume, Kant, Hegel, among others.  
The second phase, the ethno-philosophical era, saw such scholars as Tempels and Mbiti 
vehemently trying to assert African philosophy, but only succeeded in lazily conceiving of it as a 
communal affair (with no individual thinkers) that uniquely define the African mind. That 
necessitated the rise of yet another phase, with individual Africans who had been professionally 
trained as philosophers in Europe and elsewhere grappling to articulate issues about African 
philosophy. But in their endeavour, the so-called “professional phase” alienated itself from (or 
took for granted) the existence of indigenous African thinkers while at the same time going too far 
in employing Western methodologies and skills to determine how philosophy in Africa ought to 
be done. And it was precisely due to these challenges that Oruka ingeniously came up with a new 
trend he dubbed philosophic sagacity, a trend that tries to capture both indigenous value-systems 
on the one hand and critical professionalism on the other in developing African philosophy.  
The second section was dedicated to espousing philosophic sagacity as a trend that properly 
underscores Oruka’s practical dimension of philosophy. In the context of his Sage philosophy 
project, philosophic sagacity can be viewed in two related senses: (i) as a trend or a school of 
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thought; and (ii), as a quality or capacity of an individual who qualifies to be a philosophical sage. 
We tried to focus much on the first sense. Thus, we have seen that philosophic sagacity is no doubt 
one of the most profound philosophical trends in Africa, just as it is also applicable elsewhere. 
This is so because it calls for a genuine retrieval as well as critical reconsideration of traditional 
philosophic wisdom and insight that would be instrumental in solving contemporary problems.  
In short, using philosophic sagacity as his trademark, we have tried to show how Oruka was 
able to successfully master the tension between tradition versus modernity, thereby fulfilling a 
mediating function between the two value systems. This was done by showing how philosophic 
sagacity, as one of the trends in philosophy, sails through the challenges of both ethno-philosophy 
and professional philosophy. As a practically relevant school of thought, it takes a crucial step 
towards the preservation of traditional (classical) wisdom while at the same time contributing 
immensely to an independent and critical history of philosophy in Africa. This way, Oruka rescues 
the nature and the existence of philosophy in Africa, which is one way of seeking justice for Africa.  
At the same time, understood as a quality or ability that a philosopher has or ought to have, 
philosophic sagacity turns out to be handy in emphasizing the practical dimension of philosophy; 
it is that which qualifies one to be a philosophic sage, that is, a thinker who is not only reasonable, 
critical, independent-minded and logically consistent but most important also one who embraces 
ethical duty to improve humanity’s wellbeing without jeopardizing the environment. Thus, a 
philosophic sage, we argued, ought to be wise, meaning she or he should be able to make proper 
and reasonable judgments in life based on her or his account of the past, analysis of the present 
and projective goals of the future. To be wise would also mean that one should aim at pursuing the 
truth and upholding justice as an ethically responsible moral agent.  
 89 
Now looking at the trajectory of Oruka’s interest in philosophy reveals that over time, the issue 
of proving the nature and existence of philosophy in Africa to biased and racist outsiders eventually 
diminished in importance as the question of how sagacity and critical reflection could help Africa 
and humanity as such took centre stage (Odhiambo 2006, 21; Kalumba 2004, 39-40; and Presbey 
2007). Thus, it comes as no surprise to see Oruka’s practical philosophy remarkably working 
through and taking such topics as truth, justice, liberty, and ecological ethics to a global level, even 
long before such topics had become as “fashionable” as they are today. But it is also regrettable 
that many do not recognize or acknowledge Odera Oruka as an important practical philosopher.  
In my ensuing chapters, I will demonstrate how Oruka’s legacy, particularly his commitment 
to practical philosophy, is specifically a sagacious-ethical quest for a genuine practice of justice at 
the global level. It is a quest that seeks to uplift, safeguard, and promote humanity’s wellbeing 
while at the same time taking care of our environment. His concept of global justice, we shall see, 
aims at achieving not only ‘egalitarian fairness’ but also ‘ecological fairness’, which fairness ought 
to be realized irrespective of our geographical, national, racial or any other sectarian affiliation. 
His “parental earth ethics” is centred on the concept of human minimum; a unique “humanism” or 
humanness based on the principles of egalitarian and ecological fairness. It calls us humans, who 
presumably are rational cum ethical beings, to embrace some ethical duty toward each other as 
well as our environment, even as we pursue what we tend to think is rightfully due. It is therefore 
more eco-centric rather than anthropocentric. And being praxis-oriented, it seeks to realize socio-
economic reforms that would see the building of a more humane and more just global society. 
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CHAPTER 4 
ON HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITIQUE OF THE CURRENT DISCOURSE 
If human beings did not have some needs, they would not know or care about “rights” (Oruka 1991b, 53). 
 
4.1. Introduction  
As we have seen in the last two chapters, Odera Oruka spent a considerable portion of his 
short life mulling over the questions of what philosophy is or ought to be in general, with a special 
interest in philosophy in Africa from a practical point of view. He believed that any philosophy 
worthy of its name ought to be sagacious, meaning it ought to be practically relevant to the 
wellbeing of humanity and the environment. At the heart of his practical philosophy was ethics, 
which he regards as a philosophical inquiry into the moral language and principles that govern or 
ought to govern the conduct of human beings as well as determine their value and dignity in a 
global society (Oruka 1990b, 3). Thus, Odera Oruka ventured into such important ethical issues as 
human rights, justice, liberty, punishment, humanism, ecology, etc. 
This chapter aims at discussing the issue of human rights from a critical and practical point 
of view. Thus, using Oruka’s philosophical insight, I seek to critique the current human rights talk 
that to a large extent seems heavily influenced by modern cum post-modern liberal philosophies 
in the West. First, I try to establish what a human right is or ought to be, thereby determining the 
nature and the qualities of what could be considered human right per se. I then employ Oruka’s 
insight to establish a possible philosophical defence of human rights discourse, insisting on the 
actual enjoyment of their substantive elements, thereby ascertaining whether they all necessarily 
imply duty in the same way or not, and how far that duty (if any) ought to abide.  
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Next, I will critically engage John Locke’s philosophy of natural rights, pointing out some 
shortcomings therein. His account, as we shall see, conflates the idea of right and duty with 
freedom or power that people supposedly have to pursue their own interests. Thus, it tends to 
promote exaggerated individualism, greed, and hence irresponsible exploitation of the ‘other’.46 I 
will use Oruka’s insight to critique that position, before evaluating two important claims about 
human rights: (i) they are universal, inalienable, moral and legal norms for ensuring justice; and 
(ii) they ought to be socially guaranteed and enforceable, meaning they do have some compelling 
reasons to be enjoyed by all members of human species equally. Hopefully this will enable us to 
advance a sound critique of the current human rights talk, one that unfortunately tends to deny or 
ignore the concept of duty - understood in terms of the socio-ethical obligation that we humans 
ought to have toward the wellbeing of each other without over-exploiting our environment.  
Finally, using some traditional value-systems (or sagacity) from Africa, I will attempt to 
construct a different human rights discourse that would primarily enhance a genuine quest for 
justice at the global level. This will hopefully enable us to deconstruct a commonly held fallacy 
that human rights talk has its “origin” from modern liberal philosophies in the West. 
4.1.1. Preliminary Remarks 
It is arguably true that human rights are universal standard norms for promoting justice to all, 
where justice means striving to fairly render or facilitate the enjoyment of what every human being 
is justifiably entitled to insofar as one is human. That would, however, presuppose a global society 
governed by such principles as “egalitarian fairness”, which principle implies a sense of duty or 
                                                          
46 By the ‘other’ here I mean both fellow human beings who, for instance, supply labour as well as the 
environment from where wealth and resources come.  
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ethical obligation towards the wellbeing of each another for the common good. But that may raise 
a fundamental question: do all human rights imply duty in the same way?  
The current human rights talk to a large extent appears oblivious to that question, thereby being 
unable to enhance a genuine quest for justice at the global level. First, it seems more inclined to 
advancing the so-called civic or “political” right - for instance, right to freedom of speech - more 
than it does on socio-economic rights, such as the right to decent life. That oblivion has made it 
difficult to determine how best we can achieve actual enjoyment of rights, if any. Put differently, 
it has made it difficult to establish priority order so that not every individual’s claim would qualify 
to be a human right per se. As a result, the current human rights talk has become mere rhetoric for 
political purposes rather than being the means to ensuring actual enjoyment of justice for all.  
The current human rights talk also seems predominantly influenced by modern liberal 
philosophies from the West,47 thereby isolating other philosophical trends in the world. This has 
been partly due to a biased thinking that the idea of human right is a “child of Enlightenment” 
(Cranston 1962, 1), and that only Western liberal thoughts can make human rights be what they 
ought to be: universal moral and legal norms for ensuring equality, fairness and common good. 
Indeed, until the late 1990s, hardly did we have any major contribution from non-Western 
philosophies into the current human rights talk; yet, one would expect a meaningful discourse to 
be not only inclusive but also at the core of our natural quest for justice for all people. That lack 
of inclusivity, in my view, casts doubt as to whether the ideals supposedly being advanced in the 
                                                          
47 This is a philosophy mostly advanced by such modern thinkers as Locke and Hobbes, whose idea of right 
tends to exhort unlimited pursuance of individual freedoms and entitlements but at the expense of ethical 
duty toward the wellbeing of the ‘other’. It also tends to view human beings as self-autonomous agents, at 
liberty to construct their identity devoid of social norms guided by reason (i.e., nature). 
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current human rights talk are able to transcend the dominant philosophical thought (i.e., modern/ 
post-modern liberalism) so as to develop a universally acceptable discourse that would champion 
the enjoyment of what the idea of justice entails at the global level.  
To change this situation, I submit that we need to urgently engage and involve other non-
Western value-systems or philosophies so that we not only enhance the discourse itself but also 
ensure actual enjoyment of what is justifiably due to all humans – for instance, such basic human 
needs as security, subsistence and health care. This is what this chapter, inspired by Oruka’s 
insight, aims at. We want to inject some sagacity into the current human rights talk, part of which 
means being ethically responsible toward the wellbeing of each other and taking care of our 
environment. And that, to me, would enhance the quest for justice at the global level. We begin by 
considering the concept of human right and what it really means, or what it ought to imply.  
4.2. Defining Human Rights 
The term human right is an honorific term given that what it stands for is normally 
considered universally desirable, even though it cannot be precisely defined. It is perhaps one of 
the most problematic issues at hand. Most of us often cry “my right has been violated”, whenever 
we feel treated unjustly, pointing to a possibility that human rights are really tied to our natural 
quest for justice; yet, few can ascertain precisely what a human right is or entails. Even more 
troubling is the fact that only few can really establish the basis of our thinking that we humans 
have some universally accepted entitlements we can justifiably claim as fairly due. There is also 
the question about duty, namely, who is responsible for the fulfilment of such entitlements, and 
how far should that responsibility (if any) stretch? Our position with Oruka is that that obligation 
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ought to include every capable moral agent, our social, political, regional, racial or any other 
sectarian affiliation notwithstanding. That is what would ensure global justice (Oruka 1997, 85). 
Of course, some might argue against a single universally endorsed definition of human 
right despite our having a robust discourse in play (Nickel 2014). And this could be attributed to 
the fact that different thinkers tend to give different concept of what they think human rights are 
or ought to be based on their historical, cultural and philosophical orientations. Nonetheless, there 
has been consensus among ethicists at least in advancing a possibility of having some standard-
universal norms (or means) for respecting human dignity and promoting justice for all. Here, 
“justice” refers to not only receiving what one is fairly entitled to insofar as one is human, but also 
facilitating the enjoyment of what others are duly entitled to as well. 
Thus, we can tentatively define human rights as “universally recognized norms, standards 
or principles that are morally, socially, and therefore legally grounded to protect human beings 
from various forms of injustice based on our common humanity”.48 This is a definition Oruka 
would have most likely endorsed. Although he does not explicitly define human right, Oruka was 
deeply concerned about issues of racial discrepancy, social-economic inequality, oppressive 
governance, etc.; all of which are violations of justice, as they also contribute to abject poverty in 
the world. He had a great passion for holistic liberation of the poor and the oppressed.  
For the most part of his short life, Oruka spent a lot of time reflecting on and trying to find 
solutions to abuses of justice in the world, and especially in Africa. As we learn from one of his 
intriguing essays “Philosophy and Humanism in Africa”, Oruka believed that it is within the nature 
                                                          
48 I derive this “working definition” from Nickel 2014; Mutua 2013; Shue 1996; and Cranston 1962, and I 
intend to use Oruka’s insight to support and develop it further. 
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and mandate of philosophy to discern, safeguard, and promote “humanism and moral good”, which 
would in effect improve the quality and security of human life (Oruka 1997, 138-145). He also 
envisioned a theory of global justice that would, among other things, treat all human beings as 
existing in a global society governed by what he calls “rational and humanistic ethics” regardless 
of our national, regional, racial or any other sectarian affiliation (Oruka, 1989, note no. 9).   
According to Oruka, then, human rights are standard principles meant to ensure quality and 
security of human life for all. As universal, moral and legal norms also, human rights are meant to 
guarantee what all human beings are entitled to everywhere at all times simply by virtue of their 
being human (Cranston 1962, 36). But human rights are not just abstract ideals; rather, they are 
means to establishing a “humanized way of life on Earth” (Oruka 1997, 85). They are, in other 
words, means to ensuring enjoyment of something that would enhance human dignity, decency, 
fairness, equality and equitability for all. They are also means to ensuring a sense of duty or ethical 
obligation toward the wellbeing of each other despite our apparent differences.  
4.2.1. A Possible Philosophical Defence  
A more fundamental question, perhaps, may arise: what is the philosophical basis of our 
thinking that there are universally recognized “things” that all humans deserve to enjoy? This is 
no doubt a tough question to tackle. Granted that the idea of human right, as said above, implies 
equality or common humanity, and given that it is often associated with our (human) natural quest 
for justice, one might argue that unless all human beings are actually equal then we can neither 
have nor need similar universal entitlements. And given the current prevalent situation where 
people are physically, morally, socially and economically unequal, then the idea of having 
universally recognized norm to guarantee even the so-called “inalienable rights” for all humans is 
a just but farfetched, unnatural, and simply impossible moral plea (Vincent 1986, 8). 
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But as Oruka helpfully points out, such “elitist conception of human rights”, though 
widespread and popular among those who wish to perpetuate injustice in the world, is basically 
misleading. Thus, it should be replaced by what he calls “democratic conception of human rights” 
which states that “physical and moral differences among persons notwithstanding, men and women 
are, as human beings, endowed with dignity and worth, which entitle them all to certain 
fundamental rights and freedoms” (Oruka 1982a, 8). He elaborates further saying that these 
entitlements arise from the fact that all humans have similar needs, at least the basic ones.  
There is no difference in kind between the needs of people. Therefore, the equality of all 
human persons means at least that physically and morally human beings have the same 
needs. And they should all be entitled to the rights necessary for fulfilling those needs. 
Such rights are human rights (Oruka 1982a, 8). 
 
Thus, in response to a rather rhetorical question about the basis of our thinking about rights 
- in terms of entitlements that all humans deserve - we can follow Oruka’s “need-based account” 
and say that such a thinking derives from the fact that all humans are essentially equal; and that 
equality is based on undeniable fact that all humans naturally have the same basic needs key among 
them being physical security, subsistence and health care. And as we shall see later in the next 
chapter, these three basic needs constitute the substantive elements of the right to a human 
minimum, an ethical principle Oruka says is the basis for enjoying any other human right.  
Elsewhere, Oruka reiterates this point saying that a human right cannot be said to exist 
devoid of the actual enjoyment of its substantive element (Oruka 1991b, 53). To say that human 
beings have ‘right to food’, for instance, is not enough. What matters most is whether people are 
actually enjoying or having access to quality food at the time they need it. And to that we may add 
and say human rights cannot be enjoyed adequately without people having a sense of duty or ethical 
obligation toward the wellbeing of each other, thereby promoting justice and common good.  
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In sum, our discussion so far indicates that human rights are or ought to be intricately tied 
to our natural quest for justice, which quest at minimum level implies enjoyment of some basic 
needs. It also indicates that human rights could philosophically be grounded on the understanding 
that we have not only a common humanity to share but also some common basic necessities we 
all need, pointing to what we might call “egalitarian common good.”49  Hence, the idea of human 
right also seems to imply a sense of duty - understood in terms of the ethical responsibility that we 
humans (as moral agents) have or ought to have toward the wellbeing of each other. Finally, the 
discussion also points to a possibility that the idea of human right can be traced from every 
organized human society geared toward egalitarian common good. I come back to qualify these 
claims later, but first, we need to engage John Locke, whose account seems to suggest otherwise. 
4.3. John Locke and ‘Philosophy of Right’ 
John Locke (1632-1704) is often considered the father of human rights talk, perhaps due 
to his systematic ‘philosophy of right’ that diametrically differs from his predecessors, one that 
seems quite palatable today. That, however, does not mean the concept of human right and what 
it really stands for – quest for justice – is a brainchild of Locke. As Cranston critically points out, 
whereas it might be plausible to trace human rights talk from modern philosophies, it would be 
blatantly fallacious to simply think the idea of human right is “the child of Enlightenment” 
(Cranston 1962, 1). In fact, as Hayden says, the concept of human right seems to have arguably a 
much more solid if not better foundation from some Ancient and Scholastic philosophies in the 
                                                          
49 By “egalitarian common good” I mean that for the sake of which human societies exist, which in most 
cases is desirable wellbeing for all. This follows from the fact that human beings, as Aristotle says, are 
social (political) beings (cf. Aristotle Politics 1253a). That means we all have a natural aptitude to live in 
solidarity so as to prosper and effectively achieve a common (though not uniform) desirable well-being or 
happiness. This, as we shall try to argue later, could be achieved within a society that is both egalitarian 
and communitarian oriented, a society where justice is the key governing principle. 
 98 
West, just as it does with other non-Western philosophies (Hayden 2001, 3). Locke nonetheless is 
a key figure to consider. 
Unlike his predecessors in the West (the Ancients and Scholastics) who, for instance, 
preferred the ‘eudemonistic’ approach to ethical issues – i.e., seeking happiness and social order 
via virtuous life – Locke, just like most of the 17th century thinkers like Hobbes, opted for “personal 
freedoms” to pursue one’s self-interest guided by “reason” or nature. Locke apparently thought, 
contrary to his predecessors, that humans are not by nature socio-political beings with some 
ultimate end or common good. For him, each of us simply pursues what seems good guided by 
reason (by which he means nature). That means we form societies out of convenience - for safety 
and freedom to pursue self-interest according to how nature and personal inclinations dictate.  
The Lockean account, no doubt, has significantly influenced the current human rights talk. 
A good example is the 1787 United States Constitution (cf. Guier 2017). In his Two Treatises of 
Government (1690), Locke claims that individuals have some basic “natural rights” independent 
of their socio-political structures, meaning there are entitlements that we all have equally in a “state 
of nature”. These are: (i) right to life, (ii) right to liberty, and (iii) right to property. They have 
become the ground upon which other human right declarations, including the UN Bill of Rights, 
have been made. They have also become the basis upon which the current human rights discourse 
has been advanced, especially in the West.  
Now according to Locke, “natural rights” are so called simply because they flow freely 
from “natural law”, by which he means (again contrary to his predecessors) the law that governs 
our human nature as individuals. It is this “natural law” or the law of nature that determines our 
individual choices based on reason and personal inclinations (Hayden 2001, 4). Here, we find 
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Locke cleverly diverging from the “classical” concept of natural law – such as the one advanced 
by the Scholastics - to develop a new kind of ethics that unfortunately seems to promote greed, 
possessive individualism, pride and irresponsible appropriation of wealth (Oruka 1997, 126).  
According to Aquinas, for instance, “natural law” derives from divine reason (i.e., God), 
and is imprinted within our hearts to govern human relations. It is the basis upon which the concept 
of right or entitlement and duty (understood in terms of ethical responsibility of a moral agent) are 
philosophically grounded. It is related to what is popularly known as “the Golden Rule” or the law 
of reciprocity prevalent in many world religions and cultures. Hence, natural law, for Aquinas, 
expresses the “essence” of universal morality that is supposed to guide all our human relations (cf. 
Aquinas ST. Qs. 91-94). Locke, however, reverses this view to claim that natural law (i.e., the law 
of nature) gives freedom to pursue individual self-interest.  
Locke starts off the second treatise by discussing “the state of nature”, which for him is a 
quasi-historical notion of a pre-political condition of humanity. This is a state of perfect freedom 
bound only by reason or the law of nature. It is also a state of equality in which no one has a natural 
claim to rule over another. It is therefore a non-political state where everyone has a ‘right’ (i.e. 
freedom) to make their own laws according to their own self-interest (cf. §4; §19). That means 
individuals have a right or freedom to choose what seems good to them.  
Although his account is not as radical as that of Hobbes who equates the state of nature 
with a state of war – where life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” (Hobbes 1994, xiii §9), 
the Lockean account, nonetheless, clearly runs contrary to the traditional concept of justice, the 
one advanced by most of the Ancients. He seems, for instance, to contradict Socrates who in the 
Republic claims justice for the most part means seeking egalitarian fairness for a common good 
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rather than personal interest. Instead, Locke seems to be embracing Thrasymachus and Glaucon, 
who both insist that some form of injustice and pursuing self-interest pays, and that the strong and 
mighty triumphs over others (Plato, Republic book 1). However, rather than directly advocating 
for injustice, Locke cleverly appeals to “human equality” that he believes would somehow lead to 
some sort of justice without the demand for common good. Apparently, his reasoning is that since 
no one has any natural claim to rule over another, there is no likelihood for injustice to thrive. But 
that argument, to me, sounds preposterous; it is difficult to see how it can be practically possible.  
The state of nature, though, Locke says, is not “a state of license” (§ 6); meaning people 
cannot simply do what they want. To grasp his point, we need to get what “the law of nature” 
means for Locke. This is the only law that binds people while in the state of nature. First, it confers 
to individuals a “divine” or natural duty to self-preservation, just as it also prohibits “waste”. It, 
for instance, prohibits suicide, given that life and everything else is a gift from God. Individuals 
only have “right” or duty to preserve it. Locke formulates the law of nature this way:  
The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges everyone: and reason, 
which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that being all equal and 
independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions (§ 6). 
 
It is quite clear therefore that priority is given to self-preservation by all means. Even 
punishment, for Locke, is not absolute, neither is it arbitrary. It is utilitarian rather than retributive; 
meaning it is for reparation and restraint or deterrence. Although it is only the victim who gets 
reparation in the state of nature, everyone may join in punishing another but only for restraint or 
deterrence, except in murder, which Locke considers “summum malum” or greatest evil (§11, §19).   
  But apart from ensuring self-preservation, the law of nature also teaches us not to harm 
others, thereby giving us just a restricted obligation. It is also silent with regard to what one ought 
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to do or not do to help another person pursue their interest. It is not the same as the traditional 
“Golden Rule” that says: ‘do unto others as you’d have them do unto you’ or ‘love thy neighbor 
as thyself’. Instead, Locke seems to be saying: ‘preserve yourself by all means, and when you can 
avoid it, do not harm others’. Locke, nonetheless, thinks the law of nature is the basis upon which 
every other human (civil) law can be considered a “right” (§12). 
In the same vein, Locke claims people generally agree to form societies, not so much 
because they want to come out of “the state of nature” or that they have mutual responsibility to 
pursue a common good, but in order to primarily protect and promote their individual interests (§ 
123-130). In other words, people, out of convenience, contractually decide to transfer to a public 
authority their individual powers to implement “the law of nature” on their behalf. But this power, 
Locke says, is conditional and limited to the said society’s capacity to protect individual rights or 
freedoms from invasion and to secure their more effective guarantee in life. Thus, when authority 
is imposed, the state of nature degenerates into “the state of war”, which in turn degenerates into 
slavery - where some work for others without agreement (§22).  
Connected to the law of nature is the Lockean account of liberty or freedom, another basic 
natural right. For Locke, we are all born free (or to freedom), by which he means we are born to 
live only under the law of nature with no other restraint. We only find ourselves under our parents’ 
guidance, for instance, until we attain the age of reason when the law of nature takes charge. That 
means no other law can strictly speaking restrain our freedom (§ 57-61). Instead, law is primarily 
meant to protect our freedoms. Any law that tends to restrain peoples’ rights or freedoms should 
not be obeyed. Thus, Locke defines liberty precisely as doing what one wishes to in accordance 
with “the law of nature”. And that capacity, he says, is grounded on the same law - reason (§63).  
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With regards to the right to property, Locke initially suggests that all things are freely given 
by God to all, pointing to a possibility of egalitarian communalism. But he later says property 
precedes political community; hence, people enter commonwealth basically to protect their ‘right 
to property’ (§27). He argues further that the need for consumption to survive is what gives rise to 
the need for private property and appropriation. In other words, the law of nature, which essentially 
calls for self-preservation gives us a right (i.e., freedom or duty) to appropriate whatever one can 
mix their labour with. That, according to Locke, is what God’s command to subdue the earth really 
means (§32). The earth, then, is made for man to exploit. Here, then we find a salient connection 
between Lockean concepts of right, freedom, and duty.   
By establishing money through consent, Locke argues, the formal condition for large 
appropriation and unequal estate is established (§ 37). And given that money does not spoil, he 
suggests that people become greedy only when money is introduced (§ 49-50). Thus, it is money 
that causes inequality, which in turn multiplies causes of quarrels and contentions and increased 
numbers of violations of the law of nature, which in turn leads to the decision to create a civil 
government, hence loss of freedom. Nonetheless, Locke believes large accumulation of wealth 
(private property and money) is socially good and beneficial. It depicts individual’s creativity, 
astuteness and “smartness”, given that labour is so much the greatest source of wealth.  
In effect, Locke seems to be saying that individuals can pursue and appropriate whatever 
wealth they may wish through labour, provided they have the means and opportunity to do so 
without necessarily minding who suffers pain or loss in the process (Macpherson 1962). But that 
would mean only the few mighty and powerful thrive at the expense of exploiting the weak and 
defenceless. And that seems to be the common modus operandi fashionable today. Hence, in Locke 
and other modern liberal philosophies, we find a salient anticipation of the current human rights 
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talk, one that oddly tends to promote not only individual rights and freedom of choice, but also 
possessive individualism characterized with greed and exuberant appropriation of wealth, with less 
emphasis on ethical duty toward the wellbeing of the ‘other’ (Oduor 2012, 224). 
4.3.1. Locke and the Current Human Rights Talk 
We have been trying to set up a possible basis of our thinking about human rights in Locke. 
His account, however, seems to be working differently from his predecessors’ ethical thoughts. 
His account also appears fundamentally opposed to what we said human rights are or ought to be: 
universally recognized norms that are morally, socially, and therefore legally grounded to protect 
human beings from various forms of injustice based on our common humanity. His account seems 
especially flimsy with regards to the kind of duty or ethical obligation that we humans ought to 
have towards the wellbeing of each other and our environment. It seems, therefore, not sufficient 
to establish a genuine discourse that would enhance global justice: dignity, decency, fairness, 
equality and equitability for all. Needless to say, Locke’s involvement with slavery has ruined his 
reputation as perhaps the great champion of liberty and equal rights (Armitage 2004).50 
One interesting move that Locke makes is to conflate the idea of right, duty and freedom 
together, thereby deriving a different account of justice (and injustice). For him, right refers to the 
freedom or liberty or power due to one having property and ability to use it because one has reason 
under the law of self-preservation (§57). But right also refers to entitlements or privileges that 
come about through labour and laying down some of our freedoms (§67, 78). Hence, our rights 
come about by birth or by labour and consent. And the basic right that we have is the duty or 
obligations one ought to do to ensure self-preservation (§ 88-89). That means my primary duty is 
                                                          
50 See also Uzgalis (2017) in Zack (ed.) 2017, 29; and Losurdo 2011, 3, 14.  
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to promote my entitlements and freedoms. But that would only lead to possessive individualism, 
greed and irresponsible exploitation of people and the environment. Put differently, Lockean so-
called “liberty-based account” seems to deny the fact that we are essentially socio-ethical beings 
who are also inter-connected with Nature – i.e., our environment (Oruka 1993). 
Another interesting twist Lockean account makes is to deny the idea of summum bonum or 
the highest good as the “end” of human action. That, in effect, makes ethics to depend upon what 
individuals can judge palatable to them. In other words, it is personal reason as directed by the law 
of nature that determines what one should or should not do. And given that the law of nature will 
always prioritize what is best for me, then I will not have any duty or obligation to mind the 
wellbeing of my fellow human being. What matters most is not “the good” as the end of 
philosophizing or leading virtuous life but rather personal good or pleasure as one dims fit. 
The Lockean account, then, seems to contradict what we said earlier: that the idea of human 
right ought to be intricately tied to our natural quest for justice, where justice at minimum implies 
enjoyment of some basic human needs. The idea of human right, we also said, implies a sense of 
duty understood in terms of the ethical responsibility that we humans (as moral agents) have or 
ought to have toward the wellbeing of each other. In what follows now, I attempt to use Oruka’s 
“need-based account” to advance these claims. Oruka’s insight, as we shall later see, derives from 
traditional African sagacity meant to enhance justice for egalitarian common good. 
4.4. Oruka’s Need-based Account 
In one of his striking essays entitled “Philosophy of Foreign Aid”, Odera Oruka neatly 
defines the concept of right as the rational basis for a justified demand of something that is fairly 
due to a member of the human species (Oruka 1997, 85). That something, he says, is the substance 
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of the right in question, and it ought to be socially guaranteed; meaning other people or global 
society should make some arrangements so that one will still be able to enjoy the substance of the 
right even if actually, and especially if, it is not within one’s own power and capacity to arrange 
or ensure enjoyment of the substance of the right in question. 
Oruka’s argument follows that of Henry Shue, who says that “to have a right is to be in a 
position to make demands of others” (Shue 1996, 13), that is, to claim that which is inherently due. 
Shue, however, points out that in making the demand of that which is inherently due, one also 
needs to be mindful of the wellbeing of others. Now Oruka picks up this idea to further claim that 
the concept of right is the rational basis for a justified demand of something that one ought to have 
access to in order to live and function as a human person - not merely exist as a human being but 
actually enjoy living and functioning as a responsible moral agent (Oruka 1997, 86). That means 
the concept of right also necessarily implies duty, the latter being understood in terms of the ethical 
obligation that we humans have or ought to have toward the wellbeing of the ‘other’. 51  
It is through the idea of human right, Oruka further argues, that we relate or ought to relate 
and treat each other as equal members of one global society. Put differently, it is on the basis of us 
(humans) having some “justifiable claims” that one can reasonably hope to be treated humanely, 
that is, treated with fairness, respect, dignity and care, failure to which certain vital human 
potentialities such as rationality, creativity and character development would adversely be 
affected. Here, Odera Oruka seems in concurrence with such contemporary thinkers like Martha 
Nussbaum and Amartya Sen who both agree on “capability approach” to the issue of global justice, 
thereby arguing that human rights are necessary not merely for life but for a life of dignity, a life 
                                                          
51 Similar argument has been made by Miller (2005), who talks about “care ethic” that acknowledges the 
situatedness and interdependence of human existence.  
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worthy of human beings capable of exercising their potentials in a freely and effective manner 
(Nussbaum 1997, 2011; Sen 2004, 2005).  
Oruka therefore connects and justifies the idea of human right with human needs, saying 
that their actual enjoyment ought to be socially if not legally guaranteed against any standard 
threats lest they adversely affect people’s functionality, security and good conduct. That in effect 
qualifies Oruka’s “need-based account” which says that without realizing some basic human needs 
- security, subsistence, and health care - then human dignity, morality, personhood, etc., cannot be 
effectively realized (Oruka 1997, 87).  Elsewhere, Oruka makes this point clearer saying,  
We usually need a right not just for its own sake but in order to fulfill something. 
“Something” must refer to certain needs that are either necessary for maintaining our 
survival or for advancing and enriching it. If human beings did not have some needs, they 
would not know or care about “rights” (Oruka 1991b, 53). 
 
Oruka’s position presupposes that there are some basic needs or entitlements that human 
beings can justifiably demand from each other, either to maintain or enrich their survival. It also 
points to the fact that the actual enjoyment of the substantive element of any right in question, 
which for him is the most important thing, ought to be socially if not legally guaranteed (Oruka 
1997, 85). Thus, Oruka could most likely have agreed with his critic/ friend Kwasi Wiredu, who 
defines human rights as “justifiable human entitlements” that are morally, legally, and socially 
owed to all (Wiredu 1996, 172). He could also most likely agree with Patrick Hayden, who says 
that human rights are “essentially inviolable kinds of entitlements that are required to attain basic 
security, well-being, self-respect and dignity for all” (Hayden 2001, 8). 
Perhaps one might be tempted to dismiss Oruka’s need-based account (i.e., talking about 
human rights in terms of necessary human entitlements) as less inclusive, given that it seems not 
to capture such “obvious” rights as freedom or liberty the way Lockean account does. But before 
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raising this criticism, it is important first to note that the term entitlement can be understood in two 
related senses. In one broader sense, the term entitlement means power, capacity, or the prerogative 
to claim, demand and pursue what is justifiably due. In another narrower and proper sense, 
however, entitlement means the substantive element or the object under pursuit. The former 
implies and presupposes liberty/ freedom to demand and pursue the substance of what is justifiably 
due. This is because liberty in and of itself cannot be the substance of what is justifiably due (Oruka 
1991b 53). It is not the end but rather the means to actual enjoyment of the right in question. Hence, 
liberty or freedom ought to be understood as an entitlement also (i.e., as one of fundamental human 
rights) but only in the former sense, not in the latter sense. However, other basic human needs such 
as physical security, subsistence and health care are all basic human entitlements in the second and 
proper sense of the word. Hence, they ought to be given priority.  
Now that distinction, to me, is very important because, as we shall see later in the next 
chapter, it forms the rationale behind Oruka’s claim that the three basic needs - physical security, 
subsistence and health care - together constitute the right to a human minimum, which right, he 
says, ought to be fulfilled first if the other human rights, including ‘the right to liberty’, are to be 
actually and effectively enjoyed. Here, it forms the basis of our critique of the current human rights 
talk that unfortunately seems not keen to acknowledge such priority order.  
4.4.1. Moral and Legal Rights 
According to Oruka, human rights could further be considered as either morally or legally 
grounded and binding. And what determines the difference is their enforceability. They are 
considered legally grounded or binding, he says, “if they are to be enforced by a given legal system, 
by the sanctions of law”. They are, however, considered morally grounded or binding “if they 
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ought to be enforced by an ethos arising from the prevailing moral system” (Oruka 1997, 87). 
Morally-grounded rights, Oruka further notes, are usually universal insofar as the obligation to 
ensure their fulfilment or to blame their violation is a duty of every person, every responsible moral 
agent. They include the right to physical security, subsistence and health care. Legally-grounded 
rights – such as right to freedom of speech or assembly, however, have the government or some 
other “legal” institution as addressee.  
Again, Oruka’s views resonate well with some leading contemporary human rights 
protagonists. James Nickel, for instance, defines human rights as “moral and legal principles” that 
aim at identifying some “necessary positive and negative prerequisites” for humans to lead “a 
minimally good, decent, and happy life” (Nickel 2014). His definition presupposes that human 
rights are not only universal norms (meaning they ought to apply everywhere for everyone) but 
also that they are enforceable either morally or legally. And being enforceable, as Kuper adds, 
means they have compelling reasons to be realized and enjoyed, otherwise there results some 
serious unpleasant effects, especially to the victim (Kuper 2005, 17, 80). 
In my view, Oruka would have agreed with Nickel and Kuper, but he would quickly point 
out that human rights are not like legal enactments, meaning their duty does not oblige in the same 
way. Hence, some rights, he says, are considered inalienable to the extent that they flow from the 
very human nature. A good example is the ‘right to life’ whose object is self-preservation through 
actual enjoyment of such basic human necessities as security, subsistence, and health care. Such 
necessities are also rights, Oruka argues, adding that they also ought to be considered “absolute” 
in the sense that nothing can justifiably compromise their demand (Oruka 1997, 87). Denying 
someone of such basic needs, then, is tantamount to denying one of the very human life. On the 
other hand, there are some human rights - such as right to freedom of speech, assemble, associate, 
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worship and own properties - that are or ought to be considered rights prima facie; meaning, 
“however important they may be to enhance human life, they can justifiably be overridden by other 
rights or by something of a greater moral significance” (Oruka 1997, 87). 
Now that is another crucial distinction Oruka makes, but one quite often ignored in our 
current human rights discourse. Whereas inalienable rights are also essentially necessary for 
people’s existence and normal human functionality as moral agents, the prima facie rights are not 
necessarily essential, even though they are important. That is why inalienable rights are said to be 
absolute, meaning nothing can justifiably compromise their enjoyment without adversely affecting 
human existence and functionality. They are also universal; meaning they ought to be guaranteed 
for, and actually enjoyed by, all human beings everywhere. They are, in other words, the basic 
prerequisites that are essentially necessary (though not sufficient) for humans to lead a minimally 
secured, decent, healthy, and possibly happy life.  
In the next chapter, we shall see Oruka pushing this argument further to claim that the 
actual enjoyment of the three inalienable rights (or needs) - physical security, subsistence and 
health care - is the foundational basis for the actual enjoyment of other human rights, thereby 
ensuring a more “humanized life on Earth” (Oruka 1997, 85). Put differently, the actual enjoyment 
of the three basic human needs above is what defines the right to a human minimum, which right 
is a basic prerequisite means to enjoyment of other human rights (especially freedoms).  
4.4.2. Human Rights and Correlative Duty 
We mentioned earlier that enjoyment of human rights implies correlative ethical duty, 
although not in the same way. This is yet another important insight that Oruka introduces in our 
current human rights discourse. For Oruka, duty means the specific obligation, commitment and 
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responsibility that we humans have or ought to have toward the wellbeing of each other and the 
environment. In fact, it is the concept of duty, Oruka says, that makes us different from other non-
rational beings (Oruka 1997, 103). It is therefore crucial in ensuring the actual enjoyment of the 
substantive elements of our rights, given that rights are supposed to be socially if not legally 
guaranteed. This is because no one can effectively enjoy the substance of his or her right (which 
is what matters most) in isolation. Conversely, rights cannot be violated unless people interact 
without minding the need or the well-being of the ‘other’. What ensures harmonious interaction 
with each other and with our environment, and hence effective actual enjoyment of the substance 
of our rights, we now submit, is the sense of ethical duty as defined above.    
To put the point differently, the concept of duty is essential to advancing the concept of 
right, the latter being understood as a justifiable demand of something due upon each other, 
however difficult it might be to point out the ‘other’. But that ipso facto means that rights basically 
have “addressees” who could be either individuals or government agencies. Thus, Oruka observes 
that the concept of ‘right’ is correlative (but not equal) to that of ‘duty’ so that if a person has a 
right to something very basic and necessary, it means somebody else has the duty to ensuring its 
enjoyment, however difficult it might be to point out that other person (Oruka 1997, 87).  
In that argument, Oruka seems to agree with Shue, who says that the duty associated with 
our rights typically require some actions that ought to be carried out by individuals or government 
agencies; hence, both positive and negative duties. The former involves what “addressees” should 
do to ensure actual enjoyment of rights; the latter involves what they ought to restrain from doing 
to ensure enjoyment of the right in question (Shue 1996, 52). And to what Shue is saying, Oruka 
adds that duty, especially with regards to the basic human needs, reciprocally binds every capable 
and responsible moral agent (Oruka 1997, 103). It refers to what a human person is reasonably 
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expected to do, uphold, or desist from in order to assist another, especially those lacking the basic 
needs, to enjoy their needs. And because it is tied to our natural quest for justice (part of which 
means enjoyment of some basic needs), the concept of duty, therefore, just like the concept of 
right, also ought to be considered morally, socially, and therefore legally grounded. That is why 
Oruka insists that we can only talk of duty in reference to human beings who alone are presumably 
rational, moral and social beings (Oruka 1997, 130).  
Here, we find Oruka injecting something desperately lacking or not given enough attention 
in the current human rights talk, namely, that human rights cannot be said to exist without there 
being some measures in place to ensure the actual enjoyment of their substantive elements. But 
such necessary measures, and hence the actual enjoyment of rights, can only be had if and only if 
we all embrace a sense of ethical duty toward the wellbeing of each other our geographical, racial, 
or any other sectarian affiliation notwithstanding.  
We might easily claim that every human being has a ‘right to life’, for instance. But that is 
not enough to guarantee that everyone (including the most vulnerable) is actually enjoying that 
which sustains life: security, subsistence, medicines, etc. We need therefore to revise not only our 
thinking but also the “world order” to ensure that majority, if not every member of human species 
is actually enjoying at least the basic inalienable rights (Kuper 2005). This is basically what Oruka 
means when he says that human rights, especially the basic inalienable rights, also have correlative 
necessary duty that ought to be morally, socially, and therefore legally binding. He writes, 
There is … the moral obligation that requires every moral agent to protect … the right to 
life of every human being. This obligation is not confined just to relatives and members of 
one’s nation. It is a global duty for every member of the human race (Oruka 1997, 103). 
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Oruka seems to agree with Kuper who, in emphasizing global responsibility, suggests the 
need to shift our approach to human rights talk “from a recipient-centric articulation of rights to 
an agent-centric approach”, thus focus more on identifying those with capacities and obligation to 
deliver on basic rights. We need, in other words, to focus on “who must do what for whom?” 
(Kuper 2005, xi). For Oruka, that ethical duty more intricately binds every capable responsible and 
capable moral agent within the global society. His proposal also resonates with other contemporary 
philosophers like Peter Singer (2002, 2010) and Thomas Pogge (2004, 2008), who both challenge 
affluent individuals and nation-states to reverse “the drama of global inequality”, given that they 
(the affluent) are the ones who shape “the world order” (Kuper 2005, 31).  
We shall explore that possibility in chapter five when we discuss in depth the right to a 
human minimum. For now, though, we can summarily confirm with Oruka that human rights are 
or ought to be globally recognized norms or principles that are morally, socially, and hence legally 
grounded to protect us from various forms of injustice based on our common humanity. 
That definition, however, seems to be predicated upon two major premises: (i) every human 
being, insofar as one is human, has some basic needs or entitlements to claim, pursue, enjoy, and 
hence be able to lead a more decent, dignified and possibly happy life; and (ii) human beings are 
(at least essentially) rational, moral and social beings. That means both local and global society 
has a duty or ethical responsibility to provide for or at least facilitate the pursuit and realization of 
decent life to every member of human species. That in effect means we all have a shared collective 
ethical duty to ensure justice (which for the most part involves egalitarian common good) in every 
social order we participate in, both locally and globally (Kuper 2005, 10; Graness 2015). 
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4.5. On the Bill of Right  
In this section, I wish to use Oruka’s “need-based account” to critique the current human 
rights talk on the fact that it appears clogged with mere rhetoric as the clamour for more rights 
increases without establishing proper mechanism to realize their actual enjoyment. That clamour 
has led to what we might call “human rights inflation”, a situation where every individual agitation 
seems to be part of the human right corpus (Nickel 2014, 9; Kuper 2005, ix).  
Of course, one might argue that expanding human agitations is itself desirable, for it might 
lead to expansion of human possibilities and hence maximizing “utility”. But the problem with 
maximizing possibilities without establishing proper mechanism to realize them, I think, would 
take people’s preferences at face value, urging us to satisfy as many of our preferences as possible 
without really distinguishing those that are necessary for really ensuring a dignified human life 
and those that are for superfluous things we merely want. In other words, it would make it difficult 
to distinguish between human ‘needs’ and human ‘wants’, which distinction is crucial if we are to 
be more ethically responsible towards the wellbeing of each other (Reader 2005). 
Thus, the current human rights talk also seems to be getting the priority wrong. Rather than 
stressing the actual enjoyment of the basic inalienable rights, we find priority given to rights that 
ought to be considered so prima facie. A quick snip through the UN “Bill of Rights”, for instance, 
reveals a trend where priority is given to civil or political rights (such as right to citizenship) more 
than the socio-economic rights, some of which involve basic human needs (Cranston 1962, 47; 
Mutua 2013, 47). And that trend, as Mutua further points out, unfortunately appears to have been 
carefully designed by the organizers of the first UN assembly in 1948. 
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Without entering much into politics, it is worth noting that there were two major blocs 
during the first UN assembly: the Western bloc led by traditional liberal democracies like the 
United States and Britain on the one hand, and the Eastern bloc led by former Soviet Union on the 
other. The former bloc, however, had an upper hand; it was the key player in drafting the Bill of 
Rights.52 Thus, its members were keen to push for liberal principles that would ensure protection 
of the so-called individual rights and freedoms (hence the civil/ political rights) according to the 
philosophies of Locke and other modern liberal thinkers in the West.  
The ‘socio-economic rights’, however, mostly championed by the Eastern bloc were 
somehow foreign or unknown to the Western bloc. Hence, their inclusion, as Cranston critically 
observes, “represented a considerable diplomatic victory for the Communist members of the 
United Nations” (Cranston 1962, 34). Mutua supports that claim, adding that they were, in other 
words, included just to compromise and accommodate the ‘others’ – the Eastern bloc (Mutua 2013, 
47). And being alive to this “fraud”, Oruka was keen to lament and wonder why article 25 of the 
Bill of Rights, for instance, which talks about the right to basic human needs strangely appears 
almost as an appendix to the whole document. According to Article 25,  
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of 
himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing, and medical care and 
necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, 
disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his 
control (United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948).  
 
                                                          
52 It is also worth noting that the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights” was codified into two 
covenants: (i) the international covenant on civil and political rights, and (ii) the international covenant 
on economic, social and cultural rights. The two covenants, however, came into force in 1976, and 
together with the “optional protocols”, they constitute what is now referred to as the “International Bill of 
Human Rights” or simply the “Bill of Rights” (see Oduor 2012, 225; and Mutua 2013).  
 115 
Now for Odera Oruka, this article 25 is perhaps the most important one given that it talks 
about what is so basic and necessary to safeguard human life and dignity. It should, therefore, have 
followed article 3 that talks about right to life had the organizers of the first UN assembly been 
careful enough to get the priority right, and if politics was not in display (Oruka 1991b, 86). 
Unlike most contemporary human rights protagonists, Oruka was careful to get the priority 
right insofar as the quest for justice is concerned. He sought to first defend or advocate for the 
actual enjoyment of such basic human right as the right to a human minimum, whose substantive 
elements ought to never to be denied to anybody, lest we adversely affect people’s life, creativity 
and ability to function or act as moral agents. He could not fathom, for instance, why priority 
should be given to civic or “political” freedoms before guaranteeing the ‘right to life’ whose 
substantive elements include physical security, subsistence and health care; yet, the actual 
enjoyment of the former presupposes and in fact depends on the enjoyment of the latter. He says: 
The necessity to have basic socio-eco-biotic needs fulfilled first precedes all thought [i.e., 
right to express oneself] because their fulfilment is the climate under which everyone might 
be able to move from mere instinctual action to thoughtful existence. The fact that they 
should be fulfilled cannot be a subject of debate or of any philosophizing. All debate about 
their fulfilment, to be reasonable, can only be about how they might best be fulfilled, not 
whether they should be fulfilled [first]. This is what we mean by stating that, in human life, 
these needs take priority even over thought (Oruka 1997, 100).   
 
It is on these grounds, then, we insist with Oruka that any human rights talk worthy its 
name ought to not only prescribe what one is entitled to as human, but also do so cognizant of the 
priority order, that is, by ensuring such basic needs as security, subsistence and health care first. 
It should also prescribe what one is supposed to do to assist or facilitate others in enjoying what in 
principle all humans ought to have access to. Such a discourse should also include some norms 
that restrains or prohibit what in principle ought not to be done to any human being. It should 
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prioritize, in other words, both positive and negative duties crucial to actual enjoyment of human 
rights, and hence to our natural quest for justice. This is because, as Oruka would say, human rights 
ought to be sought to fulfil some ends whose necessity or goodness can be easily encumbered and 
endangered by actions of other people (Oruka 1991b, 51). 
Indeed, the urgency to revise the current human rights talk as well as reorganize our socio-
political setting to get priority order cannot be overemphasized. As highlighted earlier, the idea of 
human right is so intricately tied to our natural tendency for justice. That is why a human right can 
also be defined as “a globally shared core conception of basic justice” (Pogge 1995). For Pogge, 
just like for Oruka, justice means, first and foremost, ensuring that all humans get access to and 
actually enjoy what is due to them – and especially the basic needs. And what is due to humans, 
Pogge insists, ought to be morally, socially and hence legally guaranteed. He says: 
By postulating a person P’s right to X as a human right, we are asserting that P’s society 
ought to be reorganized in such a way that P has secure access to X and, in particular, so 
that P is secure against being denied X or deprived of X officially (Pogge, 1995).   
 
Oruka would most likely have agreed with Pogge on this,53 but I think he would have added 
that justice also means upholding our ethical duty toward the wellbeing of the ‘other’, given that 
we are or ought to be socio-political beings. In other words, justice, as we said earlier, also means 
being keen to observe both positive and negative duties. It means being sagacious enough to be 
considerate to the needs of other humans. It also means taking good care of the environment even 
                                                          
53 See Oruka 1991b, 53-55, where he makes a brilliant argument for liberty saying that we should no 
longer ask the general question “What is liberty?” but rather “What is liberty for X?” (55). That follows 
his argument that liberty as a right ought to be relational; it ought to be considered as liberty for X in S, 
where X may represent any individual and S local or global society. He further says that “liberty for X in 
S” means that X has, with respect to S and with equality with others in S, ability and opportunity to 
obtain or satisfy X’s needs in S (54). The same, I think, can be said of justice. 
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as we pursue what we consider justifiably due, and to share with those who for some reasons lack 
especially the basic needs for humanity’s sake and for the common good. This, in my view, is the 
kind of sagacity Oruka wants to inject into the current human rights discourse, a sagacity that is 
also prevalent in most pre-colonial African societies.  
4.6. Human Rights Talk in Africa 
To conclude this chapter, I would like to discuss the concepts of right and duty from the 
traditional (i.e., pre-colonial) African perspective. The point of emphasis here is that contrary to 
some misleading views, the concept of human right, and what it implies was not alien in pre-
colonial Africa. Like in many other organized human societies, it was prevalently centred on 
peoples’ quest for justice, that is, in striving not only to give but also receive what is fairly due. 
That is why there were norms, customs and traditions that primarily sought to promote justice, 
safeguard human dignity, and hence uphold egalitarian common good.  
That, however, does not mean pre-colonial Africa was free from the abuses of rights or 
injustice against humanity; this is common to every human society. What it means is that there 
were measures in place to enable people access and actually enjoy what they in principle were 
justifiably entitled to. There were also measures to ensure people fulfil their ethical duties as moral 
agents. That means individual entitlements were relational; which in effect means they could not 
be sought outside the social context, nor were they sought for their own sake.  
The concept of human right in pre-colonial Africa was therefore defined and imbued with 
such ideals as solidarity, generosity, care, respect, and above all ethical duty, whose primary end 
was to promote justice and the common good. Put differently, the concept of right in pre-colonial 
Africa was engrained within the idea of justice rooted not just in individual’s claims against 
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society, but also in the physical, psychic, and social security of the entire community (Mutua 2013, 
79). Thus, even though one may argue that most pre-colonial African societies did not emphasize 
individual rights and freedoms in the same way as, say, modern Western liberal societies do, it 
would be fallacious to assume that they did not have the concept of human right at all. The fact of 
the matter is: while individuals had rights or entitlements they could claim and actually enjoy, they 
(individuals), nonetheless, remained members of a community in which they had an ethical duty 
to protect, uphold and secure.  
Thus, it was crucial in traditional Africa, as Cohen points out, to try and strike a balance 
between individual rights and freedom on the one hand, and communal ethical duty on the other 
(Cohen 1993, 3-4). Here, individual rights and freedoms imply communal duty to provide or 
facilitate their enjoyment; but communal duty presupposes individual duty to be ethically sound. 
This is what informed the notion of justice understood in term of striving to not only receive (as 
an individual) what in principle is fairly due, but also in ensuring the same to other people. And 
that, as Mutua argues, was meant to counter-check pride, greed, and exaggerated individualism as 
well as promote solidarity, cohension and common good (Mutua 2013, 75). 
Commenting about the Akan in Ghana, Wiredu reiterates that balance between individual 
rights (and freedoms) and community obligation, urging that even if individuals were believed to 
have some intrinsic value and hence “entitled to a measure of basic respect and dignity” - which 
ipso facto conferred upon them personhood and individuality - “they were nonetheless members 
of a community that generated duties and obligations such as participating in public works and 
sustained prosperous household” (Wiredu 1996, 243). And by adhering to these duties, each 
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individual enhanced their “personhood”. Conversely, if one failed to meet these duties and 
obligations, then their “personhood” also diminished (Wiredu 1996, 243-247).54 
The same can be said of the Agikuyu in Kenya (where I come from), and indeed almost 
every traditional society in Africa. The point is that in pre-colonial Africa, people were believed 
to be born equal, that is, as inherently valuable members, and they were to be treated so even 
beyond physical death (Kenyatta 1953). Thus, individuals were naturally endowed with certain 
basic entitlements – such as food, security, shelter, etc. - to sustain and enrich life. But each 
individual was also naturally endowed with a sense of duty toward the wellbeing of not only 
members of one’s own community but also foreigners. The Agikuyu, for instance, were known to 
be generous and hospitable even to strangers. One of their proverbs capturing that value says: 
mũgeni nĩ rũĩ, which literally means “a visitor is a river”, meaning visitors are passers-by, they 
don’t stay long and they cost little to host; yet, like a river, they normally bring invaluable treasure 
(Barra 998). Oruka can be seen inspired by such sagacity when he says that the ethical obligation 
to eradicate poverty, and so protect the ‘right to life’, “is not confined just to relatives and members 
of one’s nation, but is a global duty for every member of the human race” (Oruka 1997, 103) 
Some may ignorantly claim that individual rights and freedoms were not upheld in pre-
colonial Africa, but a critical study reveals the opposite was the case. One way in which individual 
rights were pre-eminently protected in traditional Africa was through viable judicial systems. The 
only “problem” perhaps is that such systems were different from what we have today. Another 
“problem” could be that they have not been as publicized as the current liberal judicial system is. 
But that does not mean there were no justice systems in Africa. Thus, as Oruka rightly points out, 
                                                          
54 Wiredu seems to have a similar conception of “personhood” as Oruka, namely, those qualities that 
make one function as a responsible moral agent (see Oruka 1997, 86). 
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the justice system in most pre-colonial Africa was well elaborated to ensure fair trial of the accused 
and fair recompense for the victim (Oruka 1985, 45).  
Makau Mutua concurs with Oruka, urging that just like we have in the UN “Bill of Rights” 
(article 5), no one in pre-colonial Africa could be punished without first given a fair hearing. 
Assumption of innocence until proven guilty was an absolute principle of justice. The right to 
“personal security”, moreover, was jealously guarded. The ‘right to life’ also was so pre-eminently 
valued that the power over life and death was reserved to just a few elders who could measurably 
exercise it after an elaborate judicial process on grievous matters like murder (Mutua 2013, 77).  
Comparing the penal system and judicial procedure in most of pre-colonial Africa with the 
judicial system in the modern “liberal” West, Odera Oruka in Punishment and Terrorism observes 
that the objective of settling offences in the former was to compensate the victim rather than punish 
the offender by inflicting pain, suffering or loss (Oruka 1985, 48). And compensation, Oruka 
argues, would take the form of one family or clan of the offender giving some material goods to 
the wronged person or his relatives. Even on serious offenses like murder, fair compensation and 
restitution was the preferred mode of settlement, except when the offender proved so notoriously 
dangerous to the entire community. On the death penalty, for instance, Oruka says: 
Death penalty was inflicted only on incorrigible and frequent murderers and witches. The 
argument [or rationale] for this was that such murderers and witches were a danger to the 
whole community and it was in the interest and safety of the whole community to dispense 
with them (Oruka 1985, 48). 
 
Thus, we evidently find herein an elaborate judicial system that aimed at jealously protecting 
individual’s ‘right to life’, except when that right proved a grievous threat to the common good. It 
is a system that contrarily runs against the current judicial system inspired by modern liberalism. 
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4.6.1. African Socialism 
African socialism can be defined as a way of life that exhibits a great deal of solidarity, 
communal sharing, and care, among other noble ethical values. It is meant to enhance the balance 
between individual rights and community obligations, which balance as we said, was highly valued 
in most pre-colonial African societies. Julius Nyerere, among others, has competently captured 
African socialism (not communism) in his philosophy of Ujamaa. This is a philosophy based on 
the idea of family-hood or kinship. It aims at protection of individuals and their “personhood” in 
a more dignified manner within the family setting (Nyerere 1968). But this protection comes with 
commitment and a sense of duty toward the wellbeing of other individuals, one’s own family, and 
the entire community. As Hyden further elaborates, Ujamaa is based on three key principles: (i) 
mutual respect as each family member recognizes the place and rights of others; (ii) common 
ownership of property for the common good based on the fact that all people have the same basic 
necessities; and (iii) obligation to work, given that every family member has the duty to provide 
for their right to food, shelter, security, etc. (Hyden 1980, 98).  
Apart from solidarity, especially in times of need,  socialism in Africa was also evident 
through such human values as tolerance, loyalty, hard-working, and consultative dialogue - also 
known as “consensus democracy”.55 And the aim was to make each member feel part of the entire 
community; with individual rights, dignity and autonomy, but at the same time with a sense of 
ethical duty imbued in each one’s consciousness (Mutua 2013, 79). In this way, African Socialism 
                                                          
55 This is a “non-party democratic system” of governance rooted in the traditional humanist and 
communitarian conceptions of the individual and the community in which political decisions are reached 
by consensus (see Wiredu 1996, 182-190).  
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not only supported individual rights, dignity and welfare, but it also did not allow gross inequality, 
exaggerated individualism or greed and irresponsible exploitation of the ‘other’. 
Thus, inspired by such value-systems from Africa, Odera Oruka insists on our having a 
sense of ethical duty as an essential part of ensuring the actual enjoyment of human rights. This is 
an important insight Oruka wants to inject to improve the current human rights talk. His philosophy 
underscores a sagacity prevalent in most pre-colonial Africa, just as it also attempts to develop a 
more unitary, integrated and solid conception of human rights where greed, pride and extreme 
individualism could be tempered by the individual’s obligation toward the wellbeing of the ‘other’ 
within a global society. According to this sagacity, a human being is to be understood not just as 
an isolated and abstract being, but most importantly as an integral member of a community 
animated by a spirit of solidarity and communalism (Mutua 2013, 65).  
Oruka’s philosophy also captures the underlying wisdom prevalent in traditional Africa, 
namely, that individual’s entitlements, joys, sorrows, etc., are interwoven into what we might call 
“social tapestry” (not social contracts) that denies isolated individuality. John Mbiti sums up that 
sagacity well with a maxim: “I am because you are, and because we are, therefore I am” (Mbiti 
1990, 141). That maxim, prevalent in most traditional African societies, means no one can exist 
on their own, given that humans are socio-political cum ethical beings. Oruka seems inspired by 
that maxim when he calls for a global ethics of inclusivity that would ensure a more “humanized 
life on Earth” (Oruka 1997, 85). For him, the world (i.e., humans and the environment) ought to 
be seen as a kind of family unit, that is, a “complex web of beings” governed by principles of 
interdependence and ethical responsibility (Oruka 1997, 150). 
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Part of what that means is that we human beings (who are presumably socio-political moral 
agents) are endowed not only with individual rights and freedoms, but also with global ethical duty 
to contribute to the unity and the common good of the entire global society, thereby proactively 
tying our personal needs with other people’s needs (Hayden 2001, 9). In deed this seems to be the 
epitome of the concept of human right as such. An in my view, it is what Oruka wants to use to 
critique and hence enrich the current human rights discourse. 
 
4.7. Conclusion 
This chapter was meant to advance “a need-based account” that would help give a sound 
critique to the current human rights discourse that seems predominantly influenced by modern 
Western liberalism. It was also meant to dispel a fallacy that the concept of human right and what 
it stands for – quest for justice - derives from liberal philosophies in the West. Thus, using Oruka’s 
insight, we have defined human rights as globally recognized norms, standards or principles that 
are morally, socially, and therefore legally grounded to protect human beings from various forms 
of injustice based on our common humanity. We have tried to analyse what that definition means, 
emphasizing the idea of duty or ethical obligation that it also implies.  
We have also seen that some rights are so basic and inherent to human life that they deserve 
to be called inalienable or absolute rights. Others, however, are just but considered human rights 
prima facie. That distinction, which sadly seems often ignored today, is very crucial because it 
advances our argument with Oruka that there are some basic rights whose actual enjoyment of 
their substantive elements cannot be compromised or denied of someone without adversely 
affecting their existential wellbeing and functionality as moral agents. 
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 And to debunk a rather misguided view that human rights talk is a child of Enlightenment 
and liberalism, we have critically engaged Locke, whose account tends to promote unlimited 
pursuit of the so-called individual rights (or freedoms) but at the expense of having ethical duty, 
thereby promoting greed, exaggerated individualism and irresponsible exploitation of the ‘other’. 
In fact, the Lockean account only seems contrary to his predecessors – the Ancients and Scholastics 
– who, in my view, had a much better grip of such ethical issues as justice. His account, we said, 
may not succeed in delivering a genuine human rights talk whose aim is to promote justice at the 
global level, with principles of egalitarian fairness and common good as the driving force. 
In the same vein, we have applied African socialism/ communalism to demonstrate that 
pre-colonial Africa was not innocent of human rights talk. The concept of human right, we said, 
was centred on people’s natural quest for justice, that is, in striving to not only give but also receive 
what is fairly due. It was also imbued within such values as solidarity, generosity, care, respect, 
and a sense of ethical responsibility. These communitarian ideals were also treasured among the 
Ancients in the West and other parts of the world. Unfortunately, they seem to have been eroded 
or altogether ignored today courtesy of the modern/ post-modern liberal philosophies.  
In my view, though, there is need to seriously reconsider what non-liberal philosophies can 
offer to enhance the current human rights talk. The truth of the matter is that principles of justice, 
human dignity, equality and equitability – which all are the basis of the idea of human right – are 
inherent in every organized human society. It behoves us, then, to critically evaluate such value-
systems, thereby seeing each philosophical tradition as essential contributor to, rather than try to 
project one as the ideal constituent of, human rights talk. Engaging such philosophies, moreover, 
will not only enrich the current human rights talk but will also enhance their actual enjoyment, 
which is essential for establishing a more humanized life in the world. 
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Odera Oruka’s practical philosophy is, no doubt, committed to that task. By critically using 
traditional African value-systems, Oruka is able to construct an ethics that would help curb the 
shortcomings often presented by liberal philosophies in the West: exaggerated individualism or 
greed, and irresponsible exploitation of the ‘other’. He was critical of modern and post-modern 
liberalism, just as he was keen to re-introduce practical sagacity into the current human rights 
discourse. Thus, he advances a “need-based account” of human rights as the means to a genuine 
quest for global justice. His account essentially calls for the actual enjoyment of some basic needs 
that may never be compromised or denied any human being, lest their existential wellbeing and 
functionality as moral agents be adversely affected. We shall try to advance this point further in 
the next chapter where we explore the concept of the human minimum – both as a right and a duty.  
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CHAPTER 5 
IN SEARCH FOR THE RIGHT TO A HUMAN MINIMUM 
For all human beings to function with a significant degree of rationality and self-awareness, they need a 
certain amount of physical security, health care, and subsistence (Oruka 1997, 87). 
 
5.1. Introduction 
In the last chapter, we tried to advance Oruka’s need-based account of human rights, as we 
also gave a critique to the current human rights discourse. We tried to situate Oruka among thinkers 
who subscribe to the view that human rights have their basis from the very human nature and 
status, meaning they are not political privileges, nor are they legally or otherwise revocable. Thus, 
linking the concept of human right with our natural quest for justice, we defined human rights as 
globally recognized norms that ought to be morally, socially, and hence legally grounded to protect 
us humans from various forms of injustice based on our common humanity.  
We therefore emphasized actual enjoyment of the substantive elements of rights as the most 
important thing, taking the idea of right as a rational basis for a justified demand of what in 
principle all human beings are entitled to insofar as one is human. And for Oruka, we observed, it 
is through the concept of right that humans ought to relate to each other as equal members of one 
species. The concept of right, we observed, is the basis for our socio-political way of life as moral 
agents. But we also realized that that ‘justified demand’ and actual enjoyment of what one is 
entitled to ought to go hand in hand with a sense of duty, that is, with some ethical responsibility 
toward the wellbeing of the ‘other’. And that duty, we further said, is often considered as either 
positive or negative. The concept of duty, then, refers to what we humans (who presumably are 
moral agents) are expected to do (hence, positive duty) or refrain from doing (hence, negative 
duty) in order to fulfil, realize or facilitate realization of what we in principle owe to each other.  
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We also noted that human rights are not on the same level, meaning the duty they elicit to 
realize or facilitate their enjoyment does not bind us in the same way. Hence, some rights (say, the 
right to subsistence) are considered inalienable or absolute to the extent that they flow from the 
very human nature. Such rights are necessary (though not sufficient) to preserve and sustain human 
life, just as they also enhance human dignity and our ability to function or act as moral agents. 
That in effect means nothing can justifiably compromise their demand; and nothing can 
legitimately jeopardize their fulfilment as well, even though that is not always the case. Other 
rights, however (say, the right to freedom of speech), are considered so prima facie. They are, 
strictly speaking, important though not necessary for human existence and functionality as moral 
agents. Their demand and their actual enjoyment, in other words, can justifiably be overridden or 
compromised by other rights or by “something of a greater moral significance” (such as national 
security), their importance notwithstanding (Oruka 1997, 87).  
Now that distinction, which sadly today seems often ignored, is very crucial because it forms 
the basis of Oruka’s critique of the current human rights discourse. It is also the basis of his 
argument for the idea of the human minimum: a claim that there are some basic human needs whose 
demand, realization and actual enjoyment ought to be morally, socially and hence legally 
guaranteed to every member of the human species, lest their existence and functionality as moral 
agents be adversely affected, thereby jeopardizing global security and peaceful co-existence.  
In this chapter, we focus on critically examining Oruka’s argument for the right to a human 
minimum, an ethical principle he crafted as a means to ensuring what he calls “a more humanised 
life on Earth” (Oruka 1997, 85); that is, a way of life governed by egalitarian principles of justice,56 
                                                          
56 Justice here means not only receiving what one is fairly entitled to, but also giving or facilitating 
realization of what others are duly entitled to insofar as they are humans.  
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key among them being the ethical duty toward the wellbeing of each other. We shall establish what 
constitutes the right to a human minimum, as we also seek to understand why it is not only the 
prerequisite for one to act as a moral agent but also the basis upon which other human rights can 
be sufficiently enjoyed. And being an ethical principle, the right to a human minimum, we shall 
see, also necessarily elicits a correlative ethical duty that binds or ought to bind every human being, 
every capable moral agent irrespective of their national, regional, racial or any other sectarian 
affiliation or demarcation. We shall interrogate further what that claim entails.  
As a critique to the current human rights talk also, we therefore seek to engage Oruka’s insight 
in depth. His philosophy, as we shall see, seems closely tied to issues of global justice (as opposed 
to international justice); that is, in striving to achieve for every human being what in principle 
everyone is justifiably entitled to insofar as one is a member of human species. It seeks to 
emphasize, for instance, the importance of realizing basic human needs for all as a necessary 
prerequisite for acting or functioning as a responsible moral and creative agent. His philosophy 
also emphasizes the importance of human relations and solidarity, hence the ethical duty that is 
central to establishing anything akin to global justice.  
Thus, following Oruka’s insight, we might discover that as human beings (i.e., rational socio-
ethical beings), we all have some basic entitlements that we are always necessarily justified to 
demand from each other. But a critical question is: what is the basis of that ‘justified demand’? 
Likewise, it seems we have some correlative necessary duty to fulfil or at least facilitate the actual 
realization of what in principle everyone is entitled to, especially the inalienable rights. But again, 
the question is: what is the rationale or the basis of that duty? Our assumption is that these rather 
difficult queries can be answered by critically analysing the concept of human minimum, the 
primordial ethical standard of living for every human being. The idea of human minimum, we will 
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see, is the rational basis of our justified demand of our rights. It is also the rational basis of our 
duty to each other as equal members of global society. It is therefore the basic principle of ensuring 
that justice is practiced at the global level.  
 
5.2. Human Minimum: Towards an Ethical Standard of Living 
Crucial to Oruka’s ethical thought is the concept of human minimum. It first appears in his 
1979 essay entitled “On Philosophy and Humanism in Africa”, where he uses it in reference to the 
minimum standard necessary for any human being to live a decent life worthy of a human person. 
Here, Oruka defines it as “the ultimate or most basic standard of moral good” whose aim is to 
ensure “the quality and security of human life” (Oruka 1997, 138). And for Oruka, the dignity and 
security of human life is measured by the quality and security of individual and collective existence 
or lifestyle. But that would be determined by how both local and global society responds to various 
forms of dehumanizing lifestyle of some of its members. It is the concept of human minimum that 
helps in establishing a bench-mark or a standard below which no one can reasonably be expected 
to tolerate if we are to ensure quality and security of human life. The concept of human minmum, 
in other words, is what defines “the highest ethics of humanism” (Oruka 1997, 139), whose 
ultimate goal is to establish a more humanised kind of life on earth.  
The concept of human minimum then appears in his 1989 essay dubbed “The Philosophy 
of Foreign Aid”, where Oruka employs it to argue for the ethical duty that global society has for 
everyone to live a standard humanly dignified lifestyle. Here, he develops it as the minimum basis 
for achieving global justice as opposed to international justice. He also links it with human rights 
talk, and so he defines the human minimum as “the very minimum a human being demands from 
the world so that he or she may be in a position to understand and recognise the rights of others” 
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(Oruka 1997, 147). Thus, using the concept of human minimum, Oruka is able to advance what we 
might call a need-based human rights discourse,57 thereby bringing about a paradigm shift insofar 
as our quest for global justice is concerned. 
To underscore that point, it is important to note that Oruka believed not only in human 
equality but also empowerment, which he wants to justify or at least attempt to achieve using the 
concept of the human minimum. He wants to develop an ethical principle that would justify 
equitable distribution or sharing of wealth and world resources. He is not necessarily advocating 
for monetary foreign aid, nor is he promoting merely giving hand-outs to the poor; rather, he wants 
to instil a sense of global responsibility towards the wellbeing of each other, part of which would 
mean ensuring: (i) equitable sharing or distribution of wealth and resources; and (ii) empowering 
the poor and the youth with skills and opportunities to realize their potentialities. 
 Oruka therefore envisioned a situation where all people in the world would have, in more 
or less equal measure, the ability and opportunity to satisfy at least the most basic human needs: 
physical security, subsistence and health care. And for those who for some reasons lack that ability 
and opportunity, he says, arrangements ought to be made so that their needs are also met (Oruka 
1997, 85). The assumption here, of course, is that we are all members of a global society that has 
some obligations to fulfil what in principle every member is entitled to (Oruka 1991b, 55-56). It 
is only when majority if not all members of the global society are able to enjoy their right to a 
human minimum that Oruka believed we can have anything akin to global justice. 
                                                          
57 This is a discourse that emphasizes the actual enjoyment of the substantive element associated with a 
particular right if that right is to achieve its “moral worth” (cf. Oruka 1991b, 55).  
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Thus, it follows that human minimum is or ought to be the same for all people, given that 
it is a standard below which no human being should be allowed or would willingly accept to sink. 
But that should not be construed to mean that everyone ought to be forced to meet the same 
minimum, although it is hard to believe that any reasonable person would prefer to live below the 
human minimum, that is, live without enjoying at least the basic needs. There are, no doubt, many 
people in the world today who live below the human minimum, but very few if any do so willingly.  
And on the same note, the human minimum should not be taken simply as a sort of static 
quantitative measure – ensuring a particular number of calories for food per day, for instance; 
rather, the quality and the standard of the substantive elements of the human minimum ought to be 
dynamically revised depending on how the society can afford, that is, based on the availability of 
resources and technology. Hence, Oruka’s important point, as I see it, is that it would be ethically 
irresponsible, and in fact, a form of injustice for some people in the world to exuberantly amass 
wealth and resources while others haplessly languish without even the basic needs. I come back to 
this later, but first, we need to clarify what the term ‘global justice’ means or ought to mean.  
5.1.1. Global Justice or International Justice? 
The term ‘global justice’ is perhaps a fairly recent term that has become “fashionable” in 
the late 1990s. But Odera Oruka as early as 1980s applied this concept in more or less the same 
way as it is used in the current cosmopolitan approach. As Anke Graness points out, he applied it 
to elevate the context of principles of justice to a global level, linking it to the ethical responsibility 
that every capable moral agent has to enforce justice on a global scale (Graness 2015, 128). Indeed, 
his 1981 essay - “John Rawls’ Ideology: Justice as Egalitarian Fairness” - attests to this fact.  
 132 
In that essay, Oruka critically engages the Rawlsian view of justice, which says that the 
scope of obligations to ensuring justice is defined and largely determined by the citizenship that 
people share within a particular socio-political setting. According to Rawls, therefore, one would 
have obligations of justice - ensuring what is fairly due to others - and hence the duty to meet or 
facilitate enjoyment of the basic human needs, for instance, only to the extent that people live 
together under a particularly recognized regional boundary (Rawls 2001, 70-74). But Oruka 
vehemently refutes that view, arguing that if justice was to be understood as “egalitarian fairness” 
(which is what human rights essentially seek to promote), then principles of justice, especially in 
matters of basic human needs, cannot justifiably have boundaries. This is because all humans in 
principle have the same basic needs (Oruka 1997, 123).   
Now even without going into details of Oruka’s attempt to “salvage and purify the 
egalitarian elements in Rawls” (Oruka 1997, 115), it is clear that there has been a misconception 
with regard to what global justice really is, with some applying the term ‘global justice’ when they 
actually mean ‘international justice’. But as Oruka pointedly says, it would be a huge mistake to 
think of the two terms as synonymous. And the key to unlock the difference largely involves 
clarifying the “entities” involved. Thus, whereas international justice involves a kind of “relation 
that holds between two or more independent nations,states or societies,” global justice, in contrast, 
is basically “a relation that holds between human or sentient beings within something called the 
global society” (Ericsson 1981, 20-21 quoted by Oruka 1997, 84).  
In other words, while international justice mainly has nation-states as its crucial entities, 
global justice takes human beings as primary subjects in quest for justice. Also, whereas the former 
is pretty much in practice today insofar as nation-states relate and deal with each other (say, in 
trade), the latter remains sort of an ideal to be realized. Oruka clarify the matter saying, 
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I do not pretend to believe that we have anything in the world today that can significantly 
be treated as global justice. Global justice is still only an ideal as far as nations are 
concerned. What obtains among nations is international justice rather than global justice 
(Oruka 1997, 84, emphasis mine). 
Thus, Odera Oruka suggests that we need to urgently formulate a theory of achieving global 
justice, and that formula would consist mainly on how we humans (socio-politico-ethical beings) 
ought to relate and treat each other as members of a global society irrespective of national, regional, 
racial, political or any other sectarian affiliation. And to justify this urgency, Oruka demonstrates 
how global justice is more relational, inclusive, dynamic and progressive than international justice, 
given that global justice is meant to be concerned with what is “good and fair” to individual human 
beings in terms of their needs, their citizenship notwithstanding (Oruka 1997, 84).   
It is in this context that Odera Oruka propagates the idea of human minimum, thereby 
bringing a dynamic shift insofar as our quest for justice is concerned. The goal is to have an ethical 
principle that would enhance a healthy human relationship within the entire global society. At the 
back of his mind, Oruka seems convinced that the most important issue in this endeavour has to 
do with what we all are entitled to or owe each other (i.e., our basic rights), and how we ought to 
responsibly try to realize or facilitate realization of that entitlement. But that would require, among 
other things, laying down some normative conditions for a fair distribution or sharing of wealth 
and world resources (Ericsson 1981, 20-21). It would also require having some ethical duty toward 
the wellbeing of each other, and especially the poor, so as to achieve egalitarian fairness. And for 
Oruka, that egalitarian fairness can only be had if we first guarantee the right to a human minimum.   
5.2.2.  Rationale for the Idea of Human Minimum 
To justify the idea of human minimum, Oruka appeals to the principle of self-preservation, 
which for him is not only the object of ‘right to life’, but also “the basic necessity for an individual 
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if he is to enjoy any other right” (Oruka 1997, 85). But to preserve life for an individual, Oruka 
observes, entails first and foremost satisfying some needs meant to sustain human existence, key 
among them being physical security, health and subsistence (Ourka 1997, 85). The three basic 
needs taken together, he says, constitute the very minimum any human being can justifiably 
demand from both local and global society for one to live a standard humanly dignified lifestyle. 
They, in other words, constitute the right to a human minimum, which right, Oruka says, ought to 
be treated as the most basic, universal, inalienable, absolute and necessary - not only for human 
existence but also for enabling us to function as moral agents.  
That argument follows Oruka’s noble conviction that all human rights that aim at ensuring 
the fulfilment of basic human needs ought to be treated so simply because they essentially ensure 
“necessary basic requirements for human survival and development anywhere and for the exercise 
of the functions of a [human] person” (Oruka 1997, 85). As a caveat, though, the human minimum 
should not be construed to be the end or the “floor” equivalent to mere self-preservation - as in 
Hobbes and Locke; rather, it is really the means or the “doorway” to living a decent and dignified 
life. As Oruka would say, it is only the basic necessity for enjoying other human rights (Oruka 
1997, 85). We shall be investigating further what the right to a human minimum entails, but for 
now, we need to clarify the claim that it is the basic necessity for enjoying any other human right. 
5.2.3. The Basis of other Rights 
As highlighted above, the idea of human minimum is the rational basis for demanding some 
basic necessities without which a human being cannot sufficiently enjoy life and other rights. It is 
therefore the basis for establishing “a more humanised life on Earth” (Oruka 1997, 85), that is, a 
life governed by egalitarian principles of justice. To get Oruka’s point, we need first to remember 
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his definition of ‘right’, which he says is the rational basis for a justified demand of something that 
is fairly due (Oruka 1997, 85). We need also to remember that for Oruka, the actual enjoyment of 
the substantive element of a right in question (which is what matters most) ought to be socially if 
not legally guaranteed. But for one to enjoy the substantive element of any right whatsoever, one 
must first of all be alive, secured, and healthy. Put differently, one must first be assured of the three 
basic needs that sustain life, namely, physical security, subsistence, and health care before one can 
effectively enjoy the substantive elements of any other right. 
On these grounds, then, Oruka claims there must be some rights that are crucial to ensuring 
the three basic human needs mentioned above; and these rights properly qualify to be everyone’s 
minimum reasonable demands upon the rest of human society. That means their fulfilment and the 
actual enjoyment necessarily ought to be morally, socially, and hence legally guaranteed so that 
no one member of human species goes without. This is because they not only ensure individual’s 
survival but also “preservation of the value of humanity in the universe” (Oruka 1997, 85). Here 
Oruka seems to be following Henry Shue who, in defending some basic human rights holds that 
even under unfortunate circumstances where it is not within one’s own power, for instance, to 
arrange on how to enjoy the basic needs, other people ought to make some arrangements so that 
one will still be able to enjoy them (Shue 1981/1996, 26, 27).58   
Hence, Oruka claims that the concept of human minimum is the rational basis for a justified 
minimum demand of the three basic needs - security, subsistence and health care, the denial of 
which “no self-respecting human being can reasonably be expected to accept” (Oruka 1997, 85). 
Now there are two possible interpretations here. First, we can take Oruka to be defending the 
                                                          
58 Shue has only security and subsistence as basic rights. Oruka, however, adds health care on the list, for 
it is indubitably basic, universal and necessary for preserving life and for the enjoyment of any other right.    
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human minimum precisely as that which is the most necessary (though not sufficient) means or 
basis for people to live a worthy humanly dignified life.59 But second, we can also take him to be 
defending the fact that every human being is entitled to enjoy that minimum justified demand 
insofar as one is human, which implies that we owe each other the human minimum both as a right 
and a duty. To me, both interpretations are complementary. Hence, Oruka elsewhere would define 
the human minimum as the very minimum a human being can demand from the world so that one 
may be in a position to understand, recognize and fulfil the rights of others (Oruka 1997, 147).   
Oruka further observes that the three basic rights referred to above are also human rights, 
meaning they are fairly entitled to every member of the human species and not merely to some 
citizens of a given nation. They are also universal, meaning they ought to apply everywhere in the 
same way, given that their fulfilment is very essential for the preservation of the very human life 
and for upholding human dignity. Finally, Oruka adds that the three basic rights are inherent to 
every human being, meaning their justifications flow from the very human nature. They are also 
“absolute” in the sense that nothing can or ought to compromise their fulfilment without adversely 
affecting human life, dignity, and ability to function as a capable moral agent. He says:  
I wish to refer to the three basic rights (the rights to physical security, health, and 
subsistence) as “the inherent rights of persons.” They are “inherent” because, for any 
individual to be able to exercise the function of a person (the function of being a capable 
moral agent), he [or she] needs at least the fulfilment of these rights as a necessary 
condition (Oruka 1997, 86). 
                                                          
59 Earlier (see footnote no. 1), we defined ‘dignity’ as that “special inner worth” associated with human 
species by virtue of them being rational and having capacity to act as moral agents. Here, we emphasize 
not only the importance of enjoying or realizing that dignity, but also the role that society ought to play to 
realize it. That, however, does not mean the society owes anyone their dignity; rather, it means the society 
can determine how people actually enjoy their dignity. A society that tends to neglect people’s right to a 
human minimum, for instance, would make it extremely difficult for them to live a dignified kind of life, 
to function as moral agents, for instance, even though they may still struggle to do so. 
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It seems quite clear, then, that the reason why Odera Oruka pushes for the concept of human 
minimum, both as a right and a duty, is not merely to defend human entitlements for the sake of it 
but rather to ensure that the majority (if not all) are able to enjoy a life worthy of a human person; 
that is, a life not of sheer survival – scavenging dumpsites for food or living in fear of imminent 
attack, for instance - but rather a more humanly dignified lifestyle that would enable people to 
function as they ought to. Oruka clarifies the matter saying:  
For all human beings to function with a significant degree of rationality and self-awareness, 
they need a certain amount of physical security, health care, and subsistence. Let us, for 
simplicity, refer to this minimum amount as the human minimum. Below this minimum, 
one may still be human and alive. But one cannot successfully carry out the functions of a 
moral agent or engage in creative activity (Oruka 1997, 87). 
 
One of Oruka’s points here is that for any human being to live and function as a human person 
(i.e., function with a significant degree of rationality, creativity, self-awareness, liberty and 
capability as a moral agent), one would need significant amount of what the concept of human 
minimum calls for, namely, security, health care, and subsistence. Although Oruka does not specify 
how much of these basic needs would be necessary, my take is that it is as much as the society 
(both local and global) can afford.  
Oruka, however, further points out that below the human minimum, that is, below some 
significant amount of security, subsistence and health care, “one may still be human and alive”, 
but it would be almost impossible for such a human being to “successfully carry out the functions 
of a moral agent, or engage in creative activity” (Oruka 1997, 87). And we might add to that and 
say that it would be difficult to freely engage in such human activities as studies, religious worship, 
or participation in decision making processes. Put differently, it would be more difficult to enjoy 
other human rights. I come back to this point below; but for now, we need to reiterate Oruka’s 
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point: meeting what the human minimum demands is very necessary (though not sufficient) for 
anyone to be truly reasonable, free, self-determinate, creative, and responsible moral agent. 60  
5.2.4. On Human Functionality 
The analysis above seems to lead us to an interesting but important discussion about the 
human minimum in relation to human capacity or functionality. And the question is this: how does 
the human minimum (as a right to some basic needs) or lack of it affect the human’s capacity to 
function as a moral agent? That question arises from Oruka’s assertion that enjoyment of the right 
to a human minimum is necessary (though not sufficient) for a human being to act as a moral agent, 
that is, function as a human person: reasonably, freely, creatively and ethically responsible (Oruka 
1997, 87). It also emerges from Oruka’s further claim that without practically realizing what the 
human minimum essentially calls for (physical security, subsistence, and health care), a human 
being tends to be reduced to function either as a brute or a human vegetable, thereby losing “the 
very minimum necessary for a decent definition of human being” (Oruka 1997, 87).   
Now to understand Oruka’s claims, we need to clarify what he means by the terms ‘person’ 
and ‘personhood’. The two terms have had varied connotations throughout history of philosophy. 
Boethius (480-524 AD), for instance, in De persona et duabus naturis, c. ii. defines a human 
person as “an individual substance of a rational nature” (Gedes 1911). For Boethius, then, it is the 
rational nature or some “isolated static quality of rationality” that grants human beings 
‘personhood’, and hence dignity and ability to act as moral agents (Mentiki 1984, 172). But that 
                                                          
60 I don’t intend to mean that people living below the human minimum in any way cease to be human beings, 
meaning they cannot or should not function as moral agents or engage in such activities as believing in 
God; in fact, majority of them do. What I want to emphasize, as the discussion below will prove, is how 
lack of the human minimum may adversely affect human functionality. Later, I will argue that perhaps it is 
unfair for any society to expect those members living below the human minimum to act as moral agents.   
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conception of a person does not address the role community plays or ought to play in realizing an 
individual’s ethical conduct in terms of pursuing their rights and fulfilling ethical duties. It does 
not, for instance, address how the physical or bodily needs of an individual would be met, yet these 
are, needless to say, central factors that contribute toward human development and fostering the 
individual’s personality, dignity and ability to function as expected – function as a moral agent.   
And that has been the critique to the so-called “classical” conception of ‘person’ and 
‘personhood’, especially in the West, where a human person is metaphysically conceived as “a 
self-sufficient atomic individual who does not depend on his/her relationships with others for the 
realization of his/her ends” (Gyekye 2002, 297). It seems to beg for another concept of “moral 
personhood”, where a human person would be defined largely “in terms of moral qualities or 
capacities” that are, nonetheless, realizable only within a community (Gyekye 2001, 304). 
To me, Oruka’s argument for the human minimum seems to be emphasizing the fact that 
that capacity to function as a moral agent ought to be actualized first if one is expected to make 
proper moral judgments, and hence function as a moral agent. His position is that ensuring what 
the human minimum demands is arguably the most basic necessity towards actualizing the human 
capacity to act as a moral agent. Oruka would therefore define a human person as a human being 
who not only has moral or ethical inclination (and hence capable of making moral judgments), but 
one who actually does that. But that would presuppose a community that has prepared or facilitated 
means and ways of making moral judgments. And one way of preparing an individual to make 
moral judgments is by ensuring such basic needs as physical security, subsistence and health care, 
which is what the idea of human minimum demands. That, Oruka believes, would make or allow 
people to fully utilize their rationality, and hence be more confident, creative, and free. It would 
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also make them ethically responsible toward the wellbeing of each other, thereby curbing pride, 
greed and possessive individualism.   
Hence, Oruka claims that a human person must have “characteristics which are additional 
to those qualities that are sufficient for the definition of a human being, i.e., a member of human 
species” (Oruka 1997, 86). Here, Oruka seems to be following Kant who argues that the idea of 
‘personhood’ implies human dignity; thus, it must be inextricably linked with human freedom and 
“autonomy” besides the rational nature (Kant 4:435-436). For Kant, therefore, just like in Oruka, 
‘personhood’ includes those qualities of an individual that go beyond the mere fact of having 
“rational nature” or being a member of the human species. Oruka, however, seems to dynamically 
blend the Kantian view with what has been aptly referred to as “the traditional African concept of 
person and personhood,” where each individual is diametrically seen as an important part and 
parcel of the entire community rather than an isolated autonomous entity (Mentiki 1984, 2006; 
Gyekye 1995, 85-103; Wiredu and Gyekye 1992). Thus, Oruka insists that a community or human 
society (local and global) must first ensure the demands of the human minimum to its members 
before blaming them for acting contrary to its norms (Oruka 1997, 88).   
In this context, Oruka seems to understand a human person not only as a member of human 
species (i.e., rational, sentient, and self-conscious being), but also one who is free to act and engage 
in creative activities as a responsible moral agent. For him, ‘personhood’ refers to those qualities 
that enable a human being to function as a rational, free, self-determinate, creative, and responsible 
being. But such qualities are properly actualized insofar as one enjoys at least some basic human 
needs: security, subsistence and health care. Put differently, it is the enjoyment of what the human 
minimum demands that actualizes “personhood” which in turn enables a human being to actually 
function or act as a moral agent. That in effect means there are some human beings who, for some 
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reasons, cannot strictly speaking be considered “human persons”, especially insofar as they fail to 
act or function as responsible moral agents. But that does not mean such people cease in any way 
to be humans with no value and dignity.  
To clarify his point, we see Oruka vehemently attacking such contemporary thinkers as 
Peter Singer who, following Kant, narrowly defines a human person merely as sentient, rational 
and self-conscious being (Singer 1980). Singer makes a distinction between “sentient beings” and 
“sentient beings that are rational and self-conscious”. He then claims that human beings mostly 
belong to the second category, and so they are considered ‘persons’. But he also controversially 
argues that there are some humans who just fit in the first category, whereas some non-human 
animals could fit in the second category, i.e., as persons. For Singer, then, it is only ‘human 
persons’ (i.e., human beings that are not only sentient but also rational and self-conscious) who 
have such “special value” in society as dignity, rights, and liberty. In other words, there is no 
special value in the life of a human being simply because one is a member of the human species. 
That logically means there are at least some humans (say, the unborn babies) who are less valuable, 
even less valuable than non-human animals (Singer 1980, 123-154). But this is not what Oruka is 
suggesting or implying, as he eloquently says:  
Here, I am not concerned with persons in general, but only with human persons. I do not, 
however, wish to buy Singer’s definition of ‘person’. All I am concerned with here is to 
point out those needs whose fulfilment liberates human beings from the life of sheer 
existence to that which offers a possibility for creativity. And I am also suggesting that this 
liberation is necessary condition for one to function as a person, whatever meaning we 
attach to this concept (Oruka 1997, 92 footnote no. 11). 
 
In other words, Oruka seems to be saying that potentially every human being is a human 
person by virtue of being a member of the human species. But one needs to actualize their 
personhood, and hence be able to function reasonably, creatively, freely, and responsibly as a 
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moral agent. And for him, what brings about actualization of that capacity to function as a moral 
agent is the actual enjoyment of at least the three basic human needs: physical security, subsistence 
and health care. Thus, guaranteeing these basic needs to every human being, Oruka would say, is 
the most basic prerequisite means for social and global justice. It is the basis for ensuring that “all 
human beings live in dignity, and are thus able to be part of the community of moral agents” 
(Nyarwath 2012b, 76). Fulfilling what the human minimum demands, in other words, is the basis 
for establishing socio-economic freedom, thereby ensuring possibility for establishing a more 
humanized way of life on Earth” (Oruka 1997, 85).61 
It follows, therefore, that the right to a human minimum is indeed one of the basic 
prerequisites for ensuring the possibility of realizing our human/ ethical potentialities so that a 
human being is not simply alive (having the life of sheer existence) but also able to function as a 
reasonable, creative, and responsible moral agent. Like Martha Nussbaum, Odera Oruka believed 
that it would be extremely difficult for people to function as moral agents unless the global society 
makes some effort to “create capabilities” that would enable them to enjoy their universal 
entitlements, key among them being the right to a human minimum (Nussbaum 2011, 33-34). 
For clarity’s sake, let us think of someone who has lost the entire standard guarantee for 
physical security, and has been exposed to threats against his or her life. Such an individual may 
still be human and alive, but because of the imminent danger, his or her immediate concern would 
most likely be survival at all costs. And in such a situation, we cannot justifiably expect the victim 
to act as rational, self-determinate, free, creative, and responsible moral agent. If a woman, say, 
was at the verge of rape or murder, she may decide to co-operate with the rapist or the murder; she 
                                                          
61 For Orukan concept of freedom/ liberty, see his book Oruka 1991/1996 and Nyarwath 2012b 76-82.   
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may also agree to do any possible thing to survive - however stupid, irrational or useless that action 
may appear from our own ordinary perspective (Oruka 1997, 86). 
In the same way, people starving to death or being afflicted by terrible diseases are most 
likely prone to lose their capacity for a creative and self-determinate kind of life, even though they 
may still remain alive as humans. They may, however, adapt to a stoic way of life to survive; in 
which case they may embrace servitude, pain, and sickness as normal or as fate would dictate. But 
they may do so only to avoid trouble or perhaps gain some short-term tranquillity. They may even 
strive to function as moral agents, abiding by all the norms and laws of morality – as many of them 
do anyway. But that would by all standards of justice be unfair to them, not unless they embrace 
stoicism deliberately, which is not what we are talking about. 62    
The ancient Stoicism in around 3rd century BC is known to have advocated for a way of 
life where individuals would be “in a state of being fully free”, even when in servitude, sickness, 
torture, or whatever form of bodily suffering. For the Stoics, virtue (or the highest good) is based 
on one’s knowledge of their surrounding; which comes about when one learns to live in harmony 
with the divine reason (i.e., fate) that governs the cosmic world. Freedom and hence happiness, 
therefore, for the stoics also comes about when one tries to be indifferent toward the vicissitude of 
fortune, pleasure, and pain (cf. Epictetus, Discourses 1.15.2). Oruka, however, would obviously 
reject such kind of “philosophy”.63  
                                                          
62 I am not insinuating that people under risk due to lack of the human minimum ought to be immoral; nor 
am I saying that their striving to be moral is unfair or undesirable on its own. My point with Oruka is that 
it seems quite unfair for global society, especially from the side of those living in affluence, to expect or 
demand that those deprived of their right to a human minimum should function normally as moral agents. 
The goal is really to underscore the ethical duty that we ought to have toward the wellbeing of each other. 
63 Of course, there are some even today who might be sympathetic to stoicism – perhaps for religious or 
political reasons; but in my view, it is really difficult to see how stoicism can be taken seriously. 
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Thus, as Oruka rightly suggests, it is reasonably important, necessary, and morally binding 
that people who are lacking basic needs be helped out of their misfortune (Oruka 1997, 86). And 
that is where the concept of duty - i.e., a sense of being ethically responsible towards the wellbeing 
of the ‘other’ - becomes handy. It enables us to realize that it is morally unjustifiable for us (who 
are assured of the basic needs) to expect those living below the human minimum to always act as 
responsible moral agents. It also makes us aware that it is ethically unfair if not unreasonable, 
Oruka insists, to think that people starving to death would be capable of freely negotiating a fair-
trade deal or sign business or political contracts (Oruka 1997, 86).   
To underscore that point, Oruka makes us reflect on some common practices in the world 
where affluent nations or individual billionaires tend to use their wealth and power to entice small-
starving (poor) nations with unfair deals. They may, for instance, seek to have monopoly of 
utilizing the poor people’s “resource-and-mineral-filled land” for about 99 years or so in exchange 
of food and medicine. Yes, by all reasonable and normal standards, Oruka agrees, such deals look 
grossly unfair to the poor, considering the high value of minerals and resources targeted by the 
rich and powerful party. Yet, Oruka thinks it would be unfairly cruel (if not unreasonable) to blame 
the poor governments for accepting such raw deals since their first priority would be emancipation 
from starvation and diseases (Oruka 1997, 86).   
Oruka’s example might appear too simplistic and farfetched today, but it reflects what 
happened when colonialist from Europe first came into Africa. British colonialists in Kenya, for 
instance, are known to have duped the locals (who could not read English) into signing a lease to 
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use “crown land”, i.e., prime and fertile land, for over 99 years.64 And the majority of Africans 
continue to suffer devastating effects of such frauds. One just needs to read Rodney’s book How 
Europe Underdeveloped Africa (1972) to concur with me. Oruka’s example also sadly reflects the 
socio-economic exploitation prevalent, especially in Africa today, of course, under the disguise of 
development while the reality is neo-colonialism at best.  
And in the same vein, I do not think Oruka was naive to the fact that there are some rogue 
leaders in Africa and other so-called ‘developing countries’ who continue to enrich themselves 
through such corrupt trade and mineral deals as the one highlighted above. Of course, there are 
corrupt leaders in Africa, just as they are also there in other parts of the world; and the challenge 
is always how to get rid of them. But there are also leaders in Africa who genuinely want the best 
for their people. A case in point was Mwalimu Nyerere of Tanzania, whose fight against poverty, 
greed, and exaggerated individualism (among other vices) arguably has no equal. His efforts to 
champion global justice, peace, unity and fostering equitable distribution of world resources is 
indubitably distinct. In one of his intriguing speeches in 1970s, for instance, Nyerere attacks the 
then “world economic order” that favoured the rich and the so-called “developed countries” while 
exploiting the poor. He then calls for “a new world economic order” that would deal with most 
global inequalities and injustices (Nyerere 1986, 7, 12). 
That, however, does not mean such leaders as Nyerere (if he was alive today) cannot 
sometimes be duped into raw deals that by reasonable standards appear unfair to their people. But 
the question is: do such leaders have another better option? Put differently we may ask: what is 
                                                          
64 For a devastating policies of land alienation and colonial labour in Kenya (1897-1934), see Kinoti 
2010, 43-55. These policies not only took away African’s right to use their own land but also allotted to 
them “duty” to work for Europeans, and to the latter the right to own land (p. 49). 
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the lesser evil: to let your people die of starvation and diseases, or forego their right to minerals 
and resources in exchange of some food and medicine? Any responsible leader, I believe, would 
go by the latter option even though it may look unreasonable to an outsider. And that is Oruka’s 
point! He wants to establish the priority of human minimum in terms of what ought to be realized 
first as the prerequisite for humans to act responsibly as moral agents.  
Hence, one conclusion we can draw from the analysis above is that there are some basic human 
needs - key among them being physical security, subsistence and health care - that all human 
beings ought to unconditionally enjoy so as to effectively preserve life and function as responsible 
moral agents. We can then justify the human minimum as the basic prerequisite standard necessary 
for any human being to live a decent life worthy of a human person, and hence be able to enjoy 
other rights. It is also the basis for our ethical duty toward the wellbeing of each other, our 
geographical or any other sectarian affiliation notwithstanding.   
5.3. The Right to a Human Minimum 
We have been at pains trying to establish and justify the concept of human minimum, which 
involves a fundamental expression that there are some inherently basic human needs that all human 
beings ought to enjoy so as to preserve life and effectively function as responsible moral agents. 
From one angle, the human minimum, we have seen, helps to underscore the idea of human right 
and what it involves – quest for global justice. But human minimum can also be considered as a 
human right on its own. This section aims at elaborating that point.  
The concept of human minimum, as we have established, involves striving to realize three 
basic human needs, namely, i) physical security, ii) health care, and iii) subsistence. Taken together 
as a unit, Oruka argues, the three basic needs constitute the right to a human minimum, which in 
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essence is meant to ensure preservation and sustenance of humanity. Thus, the right to a human 
minimum is not only inherent to every member of the human species but also universal, meaning 
that every human being is justifiably entitled to it. Thus, it also imposes obligations that transcend 
territorial, national or any other sectarian affiliation (Oruka 1997, 87). That means to deny 
someone the right to a human minimum is to deny them the very minimum prerequisite to not only 
be human but also function as a human person or a responsible moral agent; it is to deny them the 
right to life, dignity, liberty, creativity, and self-determination (Oruka 1997, 88).   
Here, Odera Oruka concurs with Sterba, who points out that basic needs are those human 
necessities that must be guaranteed to every human being in order not to seriously endanger one’s 
life, health, and sanity (Sterba 1991, 108). He also concurs with Shue, who defines basic needs as 
necessities that ensure the ‘right to life’ (Shue 1996, 26-27). For Oruka, therefore, the right to a 
human minimum is, in fact, analytically equivalent to the ‘right to life’, whose enjoyment is 
necessarily presupposed for the enjoyment of any other right. That also means the right to a human 
minimum (or right to life) cannot be restricted, limited, compromised or overridden by any other 
consideration; not even by the enjoyment of any other right (Oruka 1997, 88). 
Oruka pushes his argument further, claiming that since it is inherent to every human being, 
the right to a human minimum ought to be safeguarded by the law of every nation or society worth 
its name. He stresses the term ‘ought’ because laws exist primarily to ensure order, which order 
cannot be had if people are lacking the minimum means for realizing their right to life, dignity, 
liberty, and self-determination. That means ensuring the right to a human minimum to the majority 
would make it easier, say, to govern and conduct other business; it would proportionately reduce 
risks of insecurity, insurgence and upheavals.   
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Thus, Oruka concludes by saying that the right to a human minimum is both inherent and 
universal to every member of the human species. It is also “absolute” meaning there is no other 
right that can justifiably compromise its enjoyment. And as a right, it is the basis upon which every 
human being can duly demand some basic things from both local and global society without feeling 
guilty or inferior. Its fulfilment, moreover, obliges everyone both morally and socially regardless 
of their national, geographical, or any other sectarian affiliation. That means it also confers a 
necessary duty to every capable moral agent to provide for those who for some reason may find 
themselves unable to realize it without feeling sympathetic or superior.  Its fulfilment, in other 
words, is the most basic starting point for the enjoyment of any other human right. Indeed, the 
right to a human minimum seems to be the basis of both our justified demand of what in principle 
we are all entitled to as well as our ethical duty to ensure that others too enjoy their rights. Oruka 
sums up these points quite ingeniously saying: 
Thus, the right to a human minimum is the basis for a justified demand by anybody that 
the world (not just his society) has the duty to ensure that he is not denied a chance to live 
a basically healthy life. And should he find himself in a situation denying him this right, 
he will be tempted to disown himself as a moral agent. And if he does this, the world will 
have no adequate moral ground for expecting such a person to abide by anybody else’s 
right to anything (Oruka 1997, 88). 
 
 
5.3.1. A Quest for Global Justice  
There are a number of contentious practical implications that Oruka’s argument for the 
right to a human minimum elicits. That includes his proposal that the rich (individuals as well as 
nation-states) have the moral obligation to help the poor by sharing their purported wealth. For 
him, foreign aid (i.e., monetary or otherwise) should be justifiably given on the understanding that 
the affluent are simply fulfilling their global ethical obligation, and not that they are doing any 
favour to the poor (Oruka 1997, 88). His point is that everyone living above the human minimum 
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has an ethical obligation to facilitate or assist those living below the human minimum so that the 
majority (if not everyone) in the world are able to enjoy the right to a human minimum. And behind 
this rather contentious proposal is Oruka’s keen concern/ quest for global justice, which he says 
cannot be had without first reducing the gap between the few rich and majority poor.   
In one of his intriguing essays entitled “Philosophy of Foreign Aid”, Odera Oruka tries to 
establish a situation where foreign aid from affluent nations to poor ones would be morally and 
legally justified without making the donor feel superior or more important whereas the recipient 
suffers humiliation, guilt, and inferiority complex. This is an important move or condition that 
Oruka believed would make global justice realisable. For him, global justice would be realisable 
in a situation where: (i) the gap between the rich and the poor is significantly reduced (if not 
completely done away with); (ii) the wealth and world resources are equitably shared to correct 
some historical injustices, and (iii) everyone feels ethically responsible for each other despite our 
cultural, national, racial or any other sectarian affiliations (Oruka 1997, 84). Oruka’s insight seems 
to resonate with John O’Neil’s, who in his essay “Need, Humiliation and Independence” strongly 
argues for social solidarity at the global level (O’Neil 2005, 73-98). 
One might claim that Oruka’s argument was perhaps palatable only in 1990s when much 
of debate on global justice was about foreign aid. But that, in my opinion, would be an ungenerous 
way of interpreting his argument. Oruka’s point, as I see it, is not so much about foreign aid; it 
rather has more to do with creating awareness that we (humans) have ethical duty to be concerned 
with the wellbeing of each other despite our apparent differences, even as we pursue and enjoy 
what we believe to be personaly due. Thus, Oruka’s argument seems to dynamically enhance our 
natural quest for justice. It is therefore even more relevant today in matters global justice.  
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Looking at our contemporary world, we might regrettably agree with Oruka that what we 
have been having in practice as nation-states interact with each other is at best international justice, 
not global justice. As noted above, these two terms might be in use interchangeably, but they do 
not philosophically speaking mean the same. Whereas global justice takes human beings as the 
primary concern, international justice takes nation-states as its crucial entities. Hence, we properly 
talk of global justice as consisting mainly on how we humans ought to relate and treat each other 
as members of a global society on the one hand, and international justice consisting on how nations 
relate and deal with each other (say, in trade or other negotiations) on the other (Oruka 1997, 84).  
I am therefore tempted to think that if Oruka was alive today, he would be even much 
concerned about issues of inequitable distribution of resources and opportunities more than he was 
in 1990s. He would, in other words, be concerned about global injustices that tend to hamper the 
actual realization and enjoyment of the right to a human minimum in the world. Like most global 
ethicists, Oruka would abhor the ever-growing gap between the rich and the poor. He would also, 
I believe, challenge us to strive for “a more humanised global society” (Oruka 1987, 84), where 
everyone feels not only cared for but also ethically responsible towards the well being of all, and 
especially those living below the human minimum in America, Europe, Asia, or in Africa.  
In sum, Odera Oruka would no doubt advocate for a global society that is more egalitarian, 
inclusive, and hence dynamically transformative. He would therefore advocate for global justice 
rather than mere international justice. This is because global justice typically considers what would 
be fair to individual humans irrespective of their citizenship. And perhaps the most important 
question in our quest for justice has to do with what we owe one another and how we responsibly 
try to realize that obligation. Indeed, one advantage of searching for global justice is that we are 
not forced to take nation-states as fixed constraints, meaning we can consider a wider range of 
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relevant relationships, capacities, obligations, etc., thereby being able to structure our interactions 
in a way that might foster a more elaborate concept of global responsibilities (Gillian 2015).  
The point we are trying to make here with Gillian and Oruka is that asking about what 
individuals owe each other as moral agents may well have wider implications of justice not only 
for nations and their respective obligations but also for individual agents themselves and other 
global institutions. That, I believe, is precisely what Oruka’s argument for the right to a human 
minimum aims at establishing – global justice, and not international justice. 
5.3.2. Principles of International Justice: A Critique 
We have tried to establish that what has been in play as nations interact with each other is 
at best international justice, even though we aspire to establish global justice. I this section, we 
critically examine at least three principles that have apparently been in use to legitimize or forge 
international relations, pointing out why they all have failed to achieve anything akin to global 
justice. These principles according to Oruka are: (1) the principle of international trade; (2) the 
principle of historical rectification; and (3) the principle of international charity (Oruka 1997, 85). 
While they may prima facie look attractive, they, nonetheless, harbour some shortfalls in that none 
of them, not even all of them taken together, would form an adequate ethical rationale for ensuring 
global justice in our time. None them, in other words, would make it morally obligatory for affluent 
nations or wealthy individuals, for instance, to aid the global poor purely from what Oruka calls 
the “unqualified moral duty for humanity” (Oruka 1997, 84).   
To put it differently, the three principles of international relations that justify foreign aid to 
the so-called developing countries, for instance, cannot help the donors from psychologically 
feeling superior out of their “charitable” actions, nor can they make the recipient receive and 
 152 
actually enjoy such aid honourably without feeling self-pity, guilty and humiliated. Hence, Oruka 
contends for another principle that would form the basis for an ethics that will help ensure the 
practice of justice among all the inhabitants of the world regardless of their cultural, national, 
geographical, racial or any other sectarian affiliation. That principle, he says, is the right to a 
human minimum. And before we can establish how it qualifies for that noble task, let us consider 
first how the other three principles fail.   
Now according to Oruka, the first principle of international trade aims at establishing trade 
relations between nation-states in equal terms. But that is not always the case, given that poor 
developing countries are often left at disadvantaged positions, thereby hampering genuine growth 
(development) and fair practice of justice. It is true that the necessity and intricacy of modern 
international trade might bring about economic growth and socio-cultural exchange between 
nations. But when that relation is between rich and poor countries, it often comes along with what 
Oruka calls “the reality of unequal exchange,” which results in “unequal development within the 
monolithic systems of world trade” (Oruka 1997, 83). It comes, in other words, with some 
disguised expensive prices that mostly the poor countries have to pay.  
As Oruka further observes, the rich (developed) nations may give aid to poor developing 
nations, but they quite often do so not purely from “unqualified moral duty for humanity”, but 
because they have some other ulteria motives. The donor might, for instance, be highly targeting 
recipient’s raw materials, human resource, markets, etc. Affluent nations may also donate a 
substantial amount to poor developing nations either as means to securing “ideological alignment” 
and agreements from recipients, or they may do so as a disguised form of price or bribe that the 
donor has to pay in order to remain the dominant player at the expense of recipients (Oruka 1997, 
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83). That, as most political analysts observe, was indeed the case during the cold war era; it is also 
very common trend today, albeit in a different version (Gaddis 1997; and Lölke 1997). 
One may object that perhaps human beings and hence nation-states are self-interested 
actors by design, which means we should not expect any other sort of behaviour other than each 
one of them pursuing their self-interest regardless of who gets injured or unfairly treated in the 
process. That extreme “conservative” view might have sympathisers from the so-called 
“nationalists” who have a particularistic approach to international relations. But it has recently 
been fairly challenged by another view: the cosmopolitan approach. In the next chapter, we shall 
try to situate Oruka’s philosophy within that debate, where we shall try to argue that he seems to 
embrace what has now become the “moderate cosmopolitan approach” to matters global justice 
(Mandle 2006, 42). But for now, it suffices to say that the principle of international trade, as it 
stands, cannot be the basis for justifying foreign aid, equitability and egalitarian common good 
purely from “a global ethical obligation to humanity” (Oruka 1997, 85). It cannot, in other words, 
ensure possibility of enhancing a genuine quest for global justice.  
Likewise, the second principle of historical rectification fails to establish global justice, 
for it advances the argument that the gap between the rich and the poor can only be reduced if and 
when the past historical injustices are settled and rectified accordingly. It is true that the gap 
between the rich and the poor (or under-developed) countries in the world is to a larger extent due 
to past and present forms of such unjust policies as slavery, colonialism, and imperialism. One 
may therefore reason following the principle of historical rectification that affluent former colonial 
or slave masters are ethically obliged to assist their former subjects to develop if we are to have 
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anything akin to global justice.65 Great Britain, for instance, would by this principle be ethically 
obliged to help rebuild or rehabilitate such countries like Kenya, which was (and perhaps still is) 
one of its strategic colonies or neo-colonies. 
Oruka, however, contends that while such an argument may sound attractive, it does not 
really meet the threshold to ethically justify foreign aid from affluent nations for three compelling 
reasons. First, rectification, he says, cannot and should not be made based on a universal policy 
for all kinds of aid. Second, if at all foreign aid were indeed a form of rectification for historical 
injustice, he argues, then it should not come with “humiliating conditions for repayments”, as it 
often does. Third, pegging justification of foreign aid on the principle of historical rectification, 
Oruka says, would imply that any affluent nation that can prove not to have been party to past 
historical injustices would have no moral obligation to offer foreign aid (Oruka 1997, 85). Affluent 
countries like USA or China, then, would use that reason to exonerate itself from aiding most poor 
countries like Kenya for they were not directly involved in the latter’s colonial menace. Oruka 
therefore insists that we need another principle that for the sake of global justice would justify the 
rich to assist the poor purely from “a global ethical obligation to humanity” (Oruka 1997, 85).   
In the same vein, Oruka dismisses the principle of international charity, arguing that even 
though charity is generally treated as one of the basic ethical values or principles in the practice of 
foreign aid, it nonetheless only attracts the acceptance and recognition of donors, but not the 
recipients (Oruka 1997, 83). And in this way, he says, we lose the very essence of charity, which 
requires that the act be performed purely from moral obligation to humanity rather than from some 
other ulterior motives like recognition. Oruka, therefore, envisions another principle that would 
                                                          
65 These rather polemical arguments can implicitly be found in Rodney (1972), and in various works of 
Africa’s leading nationalist such as Kenyatta (1953), Nkuruma (2009) and Nyerere (1974). 
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vindicate the position of the recipient and their right to receive such aid without feeling inferior, 
guilty, or that they are receiving a favour.  He says, 
Aid from affluent nations (or individuals) to those countries (or individuals) suffering 
abject poverty, should be given on the understanding that people from the affluent nations 
are fulfilling the global ethical obligation of enforcing the latter’s right to a human 
minimum (Oruka 1997, 88). 
And to further discredit the principle of international charity as incapable of bridging 
genuine practice of justice at the global level, Oruka observes that it takes us back to a situation 
where donors are protected by what he calls “national supererogation”. This is a principle that 
tends to protect a nation-state from blame if it remains indifferent to the needs of those outside its 
borders, however needy and desperate such people may be (Oruka 1997, 82).  
Interestingly, though, the principle of “national supererogation”, Oruka keenly observes, 
also tends to “inspire” affluent nations to demand “showers of praise” should they decide to offer 
foreign aid to poor nations. In other words, the principle claims that nation-states are not ethically 
or otherwise obliged to aid each other; yet, should one of them decide to help another, “then the 
donor has an absolute right” to not only demand recognition and praise but also decide the terms, 
conditions, and the timing when such a donation would be appropriate (Oruka 1997, 82). Hence, 
the principle of “national supererogation” might inevitably lead to a form of neo-colonialism.   
5.3.3. Alternative Ethical Principle 
The three principles of international justice, then, seem to fail insofar as our quest for global 
justice is concerned. Hence, as Oruka claims, there is need for a fourth principle, one that will be 
the basis for the justification of foreign aid and equitable sharing of world resources purely as a 
global ethical obligation to humanity (Oruka 1997, 82). Such a principle would not only promote 
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mutual co-operation but would also invalidate or minimise the use of “national supererogation” in 
international relations, without, of course, discrediting the concept of national sovereignty and 
equality among individual nations. Most importantly, the principle should also ensure preservation 
of the existence and the rights of all human beings, as much as it also seeks to preserve the 
existence and the rights of every nation-state. He says: 
We need a principle which would make it ethically obligatory for affluent nations to aid 
poor ones as an unqualified moral duty for humanity, and for the latter to receive such aid 
without feeling a sense of self-pity. Such a principle should also help to invalidate the use 
of “national supererogation” … without thereby discrediting the principle of national 
sovereignty and the equality of nations. It should also be a principle from which any nation 
(however independent) that treats its citizens as “sub-humans” would legitimately call for 
humane external interference in her internal affairs (Oruka 1997, 84). 
 
Now according to Oruka, the principle that meets the aforementioned threshold is the right 
to a human minimum. It provides some adequate basis or rationale for our ethical responsibility 
toward the wellbeing of each other, just as it also enhances mutual relation and egalitarian fairness, 
thereby ensuring a possibility of achieving genuine practice of justice at the global level.  
A question may, however, arise as to how that would prevent nations from oppressing each 
other given the current “world order”. As long as the oppressor gave the oppressed nation ‘the 
minimum conditions for life’, thus the charge might go, the former would seem to have a license 
to do anything else it wanted with the oppressed. And the same could be said about individual 
people dealing with each, say, in trade. Now while that may sound a valid critique, it nonetheless 
seems to miss the “spirit” or the rationale behind the ethical principle of human minimum. Thus, it 
is not so much about meeting some sort of static threshold or particular measurement as ‘the 
minimum conditions for life’ that matters most, but rather ensuring fairness in all our human 
undertakings, especially when it comes to distribution or sharing of wealth and world resources.  
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Furthermore, the quality of the human minimum, as we said earlier, ought to be dynamically 
revised, most preferably upward, depending on how the society (local or global) can afford. Now 
it might be true that ideally we should aim at flourishing the human condition for all rather than 
just striving to meet the bare minimum. But faced with the “reality” on the ground – the prevalent 
cases of poverty among other human perils – justice, I think, would require us to first strive to 
meet the right to a human minimum for all as a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for 
realizing anything akin to global justice. And that seems to be Oruka’s point too.  
As he rightly points out, the right to a human minimum makes it morally obligatory 
especially for the affluent nations and individuals to assist the global poor (i.e., those living below 
the human minimum) “purely from an unqualified ethical duty to humanity” such that donors do 
not feel superior or special while recipients feel guilty or humiliated (Oruka 1997, 84).  His point 
is that we should all strive to do good, fulfill our duty of helping each other enjoy the right to a 
human minimum, not for the occasional humanitarian ground based on sympathy, but in service of 
a moral norm that aims at uplifting humanity toward a common good (Masolo 2012, 48). 
Oruka’s argument seems closer to Peter Singer’s in his famous essay, “The Famine Relief 
Argument” (1997). Singer claims that when the rich people and affluent nations allow the global 
poor to suffer and die when they can prevent such suffering and death with a minimum “sacrifice”, 
they actually engage in what he calls “reckless homicide” for which they are morally blameable 
(Singer 1997, 90-91). His argument for assisting the poor (those living below the human minimum) 
runs as follows: (1) If someone can prevent something bad without sacrificing anything of greater 
or equal comparable moral significance, then one ought to do it. (2) Absolute poverty is an 
intrinsically bad thing. (3) There is some absolute poverty that can be prevented without sacrificing 
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anything of greater or equal comparable moral significance. (4) Therefore, an ethically responsible 
and capable human person ought to prevent some absolute poverty (Singer 1997, 85-9).   
To grasp Singer’s argument, let us suppose that I have a significant amount of hard-earned 
savings meant for a nice vacation, say, in Mombasa or buy a luxurious Ferrari. But before spending 
the money, someone who works with a charitable organization approaches me with a request to 
contribute towards feeding some malnourished sick children in Somalia or Haiti. In this case, I 
have the freedom to choose: either to forego my vacation or buying luxurious Ferrari to feed the 
hungry children or ignore their plight and go ahead with my plans - spend what is rightfully mine. 
It seems sort of a dilemma. According to Singer, however, as an ethically responsible and capable 
person, I ought to “sacrifice” buying the Ferrari (or going for vacation) and instead contribute 
towards saving the plight of the malnourished sick children. This is because, morally speaking, the 
latter act is “of greater comparable moral significance” than the former. 
But one may question the basis or rationale behind making that choice. Hence, whereas 
Singer’s argument might sound logically appealing, it doesn’t, on its own, appear ethically 
compelling. It seems to beg for another ethical principle as the basis for acting according to what 
it proposes purely from an unqualified ethical duty to humanity such that the donor does not feel 
superior while recipients feel guilty or humiliated. That principle, we submit following Oruka, is 
the right to a human minimum. It ethically awakens the donor to realize that it is his or her duty to 
ensure what it calls for; thereby be able to “sacrifice” luxury so that the starving children can have 
the basic human needs. It also enables the recipients to receive whatever aid from the donor, not 
as a favour but as their right; that is, without feeling guilty or humiliated.  
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Thus, the right to a human minimum provides an important ethical shift insofar as our quest 
for justice is concerned. It enables us to not only get priority right but also shift our thinking: from 
being self-centred and nation-centric to being cosmopolitan and globally minded. It therefore helps 
us shift focus from international justice to pursuing global justice.  
As a caveate, though, we should not simply disregard the three principles of international 
relation; we should rather insist with Oruka that they are inadequate, and hence in need of a solid 
base to meet the threshold for global justice. And precisely because it fulfils the threshold he sets 
for global justice - justifying equitable distribution of resources purely from an ethical duty to 
humanity, we suggest reversing the order so that the right to a human minimum comes first, given 
that it is the most basic of the other three principles of justice. 
5.4.  Practical Implications 
We have tried to establish that the right to a human minimum is the most basic human right. It 
is therefore inalienable, universal, absolute and moral; meaning it ought to be socially and legally 
grounded or “safeguarded by the law of any state worth its name” (Oruka 1997, 87). It is necessary 
(though not sufficient) not only for the survival of humanity as such, but most importantly for 
individual humans to function as they ought to, that is, to function as responsible moral agents. All 
these qualifications have some interlinked practical implications that we now seek to discuss.  
First, being universal and morally grounded, the right to a human minimum necessarily 
evokes an ethical duty on every capable moral agent to act responsibly by ensuring that this right 
is never compromised, overridden or violated. It, ipso facto, ethically obliges us to respect and 
uphold human value and dignity in the world. And that obligation, Oruka says, transcends our 
territorial, national, racial or any other sectarian affiliation (Oruka 1997, 87). We can also argue 
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that it is what fundamentally put us “in a position to understand and recognize the rights of others” 
Oruka 1997, 147). It is therefore the basis of establishing what Oruka calls “radical humanisation” 
that would get rid of all forms of injustices in the world (Oruka 1997, 132).  
Put differently, adherence to what the human minimum standsd for would make it possible 
to establish a communitarian global society governed by principles of justice, key among them 
being egalitarian fairness. My assumption with Oruka is that it is incredibly difficult to establish 
global justice in a society predominantly defined by greed or possessive individualism (Graness 
and Kresse, 1997, 119), and hence socio-economic inequality and poverty. It is also not possible 
to have global justice without first taking care of our environment from which resources come.  
In his 1993 essay entitled “Parental Earth Ethics,” Oruka makes it clear that global justice 
can only be had if we (humans) embrace an ethics that conceives the whole universe as a 
commonwealth or a common good. That ethics, he says, would make us be concerned with the 
wellbeing of the ‘other’, and so be able to share the resources therein despite our differences. For 
him, the world is “a kind of family unit in which the members have a kith and kin relationship with 
one another” (Oruka 1997, 150). That means we all have an ethical duty also to take care of our 
environment, just as we also mind about global redistribution of resources if we are to achieve 
anything akin to global justice. In other words, we need to be concerned about the wellbeing of 
the ‘other’66 even as we pursue and enjoy what we believe to be our entitlements.    
In yet another fascinating essay dubbed “Philosophy and Humanity Today”, Oruka keenly 
observes that although humanity is a part of nature, it is not itself a necessary part of nature. That 
might sound an obvious truism, but Oruka uses it “to calm the pride of those whose attitude is that 
                                                          
66 By the ‘other’ here I mean our fellow human beings and the environment or the universe at large. 
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man [i.e., human] is the vital part of nature and the centre of universe” (Oruka 1997, 126). A 
corollary of that view, he says, is to think that a given nation or an “ideological bloc” has monopoly 
of truth for all humanity (Oruka 1997, 126). Another corollary, we might add, is to think that some 
people are more important than others simply because of the privileges or possessions that 
happened to come their way. In sum, Oruka insists, we need to get rid of pride or prejudice that 
often blinds us humans from seeing the ethical duty that ought to guide our relationship with each 
other and with other non-human beings in the world.  
Elsewhere, in an interview with Kai Kresse in August 1995 (three months before his tragic 
death), Oruka pushes that idea further, calling for a kind of “global ethics” that conceives the whole 
earth as a global society, that is, a sort of “organic unity” governed by the principles of 
interdependence and ethical responsibility (Graness and Kresse 1997, 257).67 And in this “complex 
web of being” with symbiotic relation, Oruka further says, everything seems to depend on each 
other for survival; and nothing or no one is supposed to be more important than the other.  
Everything on earth is important, you see. Even some of the small insects that we might 
think are useless, if you regard the earth as organic unity, then they are not useless. Maybe 
an earth worm may not look important, less important, for instance, than the German head 
of state, but maybe there could be no German head of state without the existence of the 
earthworm (Graness and Kresse 1997, 258).  
 
Here, Oruka evidently seems to be pushing for what we might call ‘eco-centric’ rather than 
mere ‘anthropocentric’ account of global justice. He seems to be developing an ethics that 
recognizes the importance of every being, each according to its own mode of existence. But, Oruka 
                                                          
67 That seems to be the direction Oruka’s ethical thought would most likely have taken had he lived longer 
(Graness and Kresse 1997, 257). And to me, ensuring the right to a human minimum as a standard of living 
for all is the key towards establishing such an ethics, and by extension ensuring global justice. 
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also emphasizes the central role that humans (who apparently are the only rational cum ethical 
beings on earth) have to play to bring about global justice. As rational cum ethical beings, Oruka 
says, we ought to enjoy the earth and its resources responsibly; that is, as stewards not owners, 
taking good care of it as our common good (Graness and Kresse 1997, 258). That means none of 
us, for instance, has, strictly speaking, an absolute right or monopoly of ownership and enjoyment 
of the earth more than others who for some reasons might appear less privileged.  
Similar sentiments have been made by Pope Francis, who in his Encyclical “Laudato Si: 
On care for our Common Home” cautions against what he calls “the crisis and the effects of 
modern anthropocentrism”, which comes about when people tend to praise or prize the 
“technological mind” (i.e., human mind) over the rest of reality, thereby compromising the 
intrinsic value of the world. And that happens, he says, when humans see nature merely as “an 
insensate order, as a cold body of facts, as a mere ‘given,’ as an object of utility, as raw material 
to be hammered into useful shape…with complete indifference” (Francis 2015, 78). In this culture 
of exaggerated “technical thought” as the Pope further laments, human beings paradoxically “fail 
to find their true place in this world” as they fail to take themselves as stewards rather than masters, 
perhaps because of pride, arrogance, and ignorance We then misunderstand ourselves to be the 
most important beings in the world, and so end up acting in a way that is detrimental to the common 
good of the whole world (Francis 2015, 78). 
And that is evident especially today, the Pope observes, when we fail to monitor the harm 
done to nature and ignore the environmental impact caused by our techno-minded decisions. It is 
also evident when we fail to acknowledge as part of reality the worth of the poor, the disabled, and 
the most vulnerable among us. Put differently, it is evident as we fail “to hear the cry of nature 
itself; everything is connected” (Francis 2015, 79). The fact of the matter is: once we declare our 
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pseudo-independence from the rest of reality and start to treat nature with absolute dominion, then 
the very foundation of our human life begins to crumble.  
Thus, Like Oruka, Pope Francis advocates for an ecological approach to the issues affecting 
global society where humans are the key players. He propagates for what we might call an ethics 
of inclusivity and mutual respect as we listen to “the message of each creature in the harmony of 
creation” (Francis 2015, 58). In other words, he calls for an ethics that requires us (humans) to use 
world resources responsibly as good stewards, taking care of the wellbeing of the ‘other’ (i.e., 
other humans and the environment) even as we pursue and enjoy what we think is rightfully due. 
This is an ethics that also gives preferential option to the poor and the most vulnerable in our global 
society. But such an ethics would necessarily call for, among other things, egalitarian fairness in 
terms of equitable redistribution or sharing of world resources. It would require, as the Pope further 
says, to “integrate questions of justice in debates on the environment, so as to hear both the cry of 
the earth and the cry of the poor” (Francis 2015, 35). Our submission with Oruka is that the right 
to a human minimum is the basic principle or rationale behind embracing such an ethics.  
We have also said that the right to a human minimum is not only inherent but also absolute 
and necessary; meaning nothing (not even another right) can morally, legally or otherwise 
justifiably compromise its fulfilment. That means it is the basis upon which any human being in 
the world can make a justifiable demand to both local and global society for the fulfilment of at 
least some minimum basic necessities. That in effect means both local and global societies have 
an ethical responsibility to ensure that no member of the human species gets denied a chance to 
live a basically secure, healthy, and subsistent life; otherwise the society would not be morally or 
otherwise justified to exist and to blame any member who fails to function as a responsible moral 
agent when their right to a human minimum has been compromised (Oruka 1997, 88, 130, 147). 
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That conclusion might sound outrageous, but it philosophically makes sense, for to deny people 
the right to a human minimum is tantamount to denying them the right to live. It is also tantamount 
to denying them ‘personhood’ - the capacity to function as responsible moral agents. 
5.5.  Possible Critique and Way Forward 
There are a number of possible critiques that may arise from Oruka’s argument for the right 
to a human minimum. To conclude this chapter, I wish to highlight a few of them; and I believe 
Oruka was aware of them, only that he unfortunately did not live long to thoroughly address. First, 
we may rightly ask whether denying someone the right to a human minimum necessarily makes 
her/ him lose capacity to lead a rational, creative, free and morally responsible lifestyle, as Oruka 
seems to suggest (Oruka 1997, 88, 147). Put differently: do those who for some reasons get denied 
the right to a human minimum have any ethical obligation to function as moral agents?  
To answer these questions, it is important to point out that Oruka’s argument should not be 
taken to imply that those deprived of the right to a human minimum and hence their “personhood” 
cease to be human beings at all. Thus, it doesn’t mean those living below the human minimum are 
incapable of being responsible moral agents either. The fact is: they remain human beings with the 
value, dignity, and respect they deserve only that their ability to fully function as human persons 
(i.e., function as creative, free and responsible moral beings) may be adversely affected. In other 
words, their potentiality to act as moral agents remains intact only that they may fail to always 
actualize that potentiality since denying someone of the right to a human minimum amounts to 
denying her/ him of the most basic prerequisite to function as a moral agent. Oruka’s language, 
moreover, suggests that even those living below the human minimum ought to act as moral agents. 
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Thus, he observes that majority of them actually struggle to negotiate through the world as 
responsible agents; his problem is that perhaps that is grossly unfair to them (Oruka 1997, 86-87).  
Second, some might be tempted to accuse Oruka of narrowing down the issues to do with 
morality and human functionality to material/ economic wellbeing. Hence, another question may 
arise: does material/ economic wellbeing alone really affect people’s rationality, and by extension 
their ethical obligation to function as responsible moral agents rather than moral patients or 
irresponsible agents? Again this, in my view, is a question about what really makes one function 
as as a responsible moral agent. Indeed, there are other factors such as cultural, social, political 
and religious background that adversely contribute to or determine how human beings function. 
And I believe Oruka was not naive to them, only that he wanted to emphasize the economic 
wellbeing, which arguably is one of the key factors, but certainly not the only one that determine 
morality and human functionality.  
But a third contentious issue may follow: if enjoying the right to a human minimum is one 
of the key factors determining our morality, would it be ethically correct and therefore reasonably 
fair for those who are economically affluent to treat those who are apparently deprived of such 
basic needs as subsistence, security, and health care as though they are equal moral agents capable 
of freely and willingly engaging in fair deals, say, in trade? In other words, what could be the fair 
way to proceed given the apparent forms of inequality in the world?  
Now one way in which Oruka would have answered that question, I think, would be to 
encourage the critic to read his ethics keenly and try to implement what he proposes, and hence 
run “from conjecture to practice” (Oruka 1997, 91). Oruka’s ethics, as we have said, challenges us 
to be ethically concerned about the wellbeing of the ‘other’ despite our differences, even as we 
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enjoy what we think is rightfully due. He, for instance, suggests revising “the world order” so that 
we might have new global arrangements that would see the wasted consumption in affluent nations 
being saved and transferred to alleviate poverty in other poor nations (Oruka 1997, 91).  
Elsewhere in his essay entitled “The Ethics of Consumerism”, Oruka suggests creating 
national and international laws to protect consumer’s rights and ensure priority insofar as rationale 
for consumption is concerned. Such laws, he says, should also ensure an ethical framework, 
thereby restore ethical duty and harmony between “super-consumers” (the rich) and the “under-
consumers” (the poor). And such laws, Oruka further argues, should “ethically remain part of 
human attempts to eradicate hunger and poverty,” which is arguably the number one priority of 
human consumption (Oruka 1997, 265).68 Here Oruka seems to be attacking, just like Pope 
Francis, a culture of over-consumerism, wastage, and “throwaway” syndrome (Francis 2015, 18-
19); a culture that appears prevalent today in some regions.    
Finally, there are those who might ask whether the world, given its wealth and resources 
vis-à-vis human population, can economically afford a life above the human minimum for all the 
human inhabitants (Hardin 1980). This is a question Oruka anticipated, of which he suggests 
seeking an honest answer from the experts in “positive economics,” which refers to a systematized 
knowledge about people’s economy, i.e., wealth and resources. He contrasts this with normative 
economics, or welfare economics, which “presupposes the existence and findings of positive 
economic but strives to utilize such findings for recommending ethically appropriate actions and 
the rational reorganization and redistribution of resources” (Oruka 1997, 81). But even as we wait 
                                                          
68 Oruka thought there are basically three reasons for human consumption: (i) alleviation of hunger, hence 
basic consumption; (ii) the enrichment of life, hence, social consumption, and (iii) aesthetic enjoyment, 
hence, luxurious consumption. And for him, alleviation of hunger and poverty ought to take priority if we 
are to achieve a harmonious and more humanised world (Oruka 1997, 264-65).   
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for that honest response, Oruka suggests that nations of the world should significantly cut the 
current waste in military affairs and domestic consumption and then turn such savings to “rational 
redistribution among the global poor” (Oruka 1997, 91).69  
And even in the unlikely event that the experts in positive economics prove that the world 
cannot afford to raise the welfare of everybody above the human minimum, Oruka still believes 
that “everybody and every nation which can afford the human minimum for some people is 
ethically obliged to do so” (Oruka 1997, 92). The real issue, therefore, is not so much about 
whether the world has enough resources or not; the real issue, in my view, is about how we use (or 
misuse) whatever resources available. The real issue, in other words, is about whether we humans 
are ethically responsible toward the wellbeing of other fellow human beings and the environment 
or not, even as we pursue what we think is rightfully due. 
5.6. Conclusion 
This chapter was meant to critically examine Oruka’s argument for the right to a human 
minimum, an ethical principle he believes to be the foundational basis of the actual enjoyment of 
all other human rights, just as it also has the most compelling ethical duty to every capable moral 
agent. It is therefore crucial in our quest for global justice. We started off by assuming that: (i) 
human rights, at least the inalienable ones, are or ought to be morally, socially, and hence legally 
grounded to protect all human beings from various forms of injustice based on our common 
                                                          
69 There are credible researches indicating that the world has sufficient resources to meet the cost of 
satisfying at least the basic needs of every existing human being; the problem, however, is that priority 
seems to be given where it is not due (see Sterba 1991, 114-115 and Singer 1997, 86-87). That, to me, 
seems to be Oruka’s stance as well. For him, the reason why people tend to think the world has limited 
resources is mainly because of: (i) fear among nations, hence lack of political goodwill help each other, (ii) 
greed (camouflaged as ambition) hence lack of moral fairness, and (iii) irrational pride (Oruka 1997, 134). 
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humanity; (ii) human rights attain their relevance or “moral worth” if and when their substantive 
element associated with them is realised and actually enjoyed; (iii) human rights imply or elicit 
correlative ethical duty to realize or facilitate their enjoyment, though that duty does not bind with 
the same impetus; and hence (iv) there are some human rights that are inherent to the very human 
nature, meaning they are so basic and necessary to preserve human life, dignity, and ability to 
function as moral agents. The last assumption is what this chapter was aimed at expounding.  
This we have done by delving into the concept human minimum, which Oruka sets up as 
the standard of living below which it would be extremely difficult for any human being to survive 
decently as she or he should, let alone function as a reasonable, creative, free, and responsible 
moral agent. Oruka’s subsequent argument has been thoroughly analysed.  First, we discovered 
that it acknowledges some basic human rights that are universal, necessary and indispensable. His 
argument also presupposes there is no greater right of a human being than ‘right to life’, the object 
of which is self-preservation, which is what the concept of human minimum aims at establishing.   
The concept of human minimum, we then said, involves enjoyment of three most basic 
human necessities, namely, (i) physical security; (ii) health care; and (iii) subsistence. Taken 
together as a unit, they constitute what Oruka dubs the right to a human minimum, which right is 
universal, necessary, inalienable, and hence the most basic prerequisite for any human being to 
survive decently as well as function as a creative, free and responsible moral agent. That means 
every human being is, by virtue of being human, inherently entitled to this right, meaning its 
enjoyment ought to be socially and where possible legally guaranteed. It is therefore the rational 
basis for our justified demand of what we as humans are entitled to, the denial of which no self-
respecting person could reasonably be expected to accept willingly.  
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Similarly, we have discovered that by virtue of being the most basic, necessary and 
inalienable right, the human minimum also implies a correlative necessary duty on us. As an ethical 
principle, it by design or default imposes ethical duty upon every human person, especially those 
who are economically stable, to ensure that no human being goes without enjoying the right to a 
human minimum. Put differently, the right to a human minimum is the basis for our necessary duty 
toward the wellbeing of each other as rational beings striving to establish a more humanised life 
on earth. It is crucial to the establishment an egalitarian-communitarian global society governed 
by principles of justice, key among them being egalitarian fairness and ethical responsibility. 
 Consequently, we have established that the right to a human minimum is also the minimum 
prerequisite for us to have anything akin to global justice. It is, in other words, the minimum 
necessity that must be met for everyone in the world regardless of our racial, national, geographical 
or any other sectarian affiliations. Its fulfilment, as Oruka insists, is not only the starting point for 
the fulfilment and actual enjoyment of any other human right, but also guarantee for other liberties 
to dynamically pursue what is good for all. This, however, does not mean that the human minimum 
is the end of our quest for global justice; it is rather the mere foundational means to it. 
Finally, we have looked at some practical implications that the right to a human minimum 
as an ethical principle presents with regards to our quest for global justice. We were able, for 
instance, to develop a rational defence as to why affluent nation-states and individuals should aid 
the global poor purely from their ethical responsibility for humanity’s sake. In the next chapter, 
we shall see how Oruka’s insight, particularly his concept of the human minimum might enhance 
the current talk on our quest for global justice. We shall especially see how Oruka’s “humanism” 
and “eco-philosophy” dialectically lead to what he calls “parental earth ethics” that he proposes as 
an ethical framework to help inspire in us a genuine practice of justice at the global level.   
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CHAPTER 6 
PARENTAL EARTH ETHICS: TOWARDS GLOBAL JUSTICE 
The earth or the world is a kind of family unit in which the members have a kith and kin relationship with 
one another, and the earth is a commonwealth to all humanity (Oruka 1997, 150).   
 
6.1. Introduction 
This chapter aims at advancing a discourse that would help ensure a genuine practice of 
justice at the global level. A good number of practical thinkers have been concerned with the issue 
of justice, that is, with the human effort to give and receive what is fairly due. Thus, such issues 
as human rights abuse, socio-economic inequality, poverty, etc. have always been raised and talked 
about. Most of these talks, however, tend to be confined within national or territorial boundaries. 
They tend, in other words, to “territorialize” the concept of justice, yet, one would expect that such 
ideal principles of justice as ‘egalitarian fairness’ would be applicable everywhere for everyone. 
The rise in globalization, moreover, despite some of its positive aspects has nonetheless exposed 
the reality of global injustice. The gap between the rich and the poor, for instance, seems to be 
escalating day by day.70 But to some of us, this is a worrying trend; it is a real threat to posterity 
and security of both humanity and the entire universe; it not only jeopardizes the dignity of human 
life but also threatens global security. The situation inevitably begs for a genuine concept and 
practice of justice at the global level. We seek in this chapter to establish what that might entail.  
At the centre of global justice talk, then, is a question that, I think, needs to be addressed 
with urgency to help us transition more effectively towards a less unjust and more “globalised” 
world. In a world as interconnected and interdependent as ours, one may ask: is it justified that 
                                                          
70According to Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the richest 10% of 
world population earn 9.6 times the income of the poorest 10%. Such inequality, the OECD warns, is a 
threat to economic growth; it is a grave form of injustice (Reuben 2015). 
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some few people have so much affluence while the majority languish in abject poverty? To put the 
question differently, is it fair for some people to exuberantly exploit world resources at the expense 
of the survival of others? What responsibility, if any, do we (humans) have toward establishing a 
more genuine practice of justice at the global level? Furthermore, how ought we to treat other non-
human beings in the world? These are some of the questions we seek to address in this chapter. 
We want to try and establish some ideal ethical principles that ought to guide our engagements 
and endeavours as humans, thereby making the world fairer enough for everyone.  
Thus, the chapter attempts to apply Oruka’s insight to advance a critical discourse on global 
justice, a sensitive but crucial topic that, I think, has not been substantially considered. We shall 
see how, for instance, Oruka’s eco-philosophy, and hence his parental earth ethics leads us to a 
different kind of humanism (or humanness) that Oruka believes would motivate both: (a) global 
environmental concern, and (b) global distribution or sharing of wealth and world resources for 
the common good (Graness Kresse 1997, 130; Oruka 1997, 150). His parental earth ethics, we 
shall see, helps us understand what it really means to be human in relation to our environment. It 
calls for an integral approach to ecosystem, even as we humans strive to meet our needs and resolve 
our contemporaneous problems, thereby seeing the world as a global society, a sort of “organic 
unity” or a family governed by principles of interdependence and ethical responsibility. 
Oruka’s parental earth ethics also helps us conceive the earth both as a home and a 
commonwealth or heritage for all of us – including non-human beings. It advocates for a 
“stewardship model”, thereby stressing our ethical duty as humans (who presumably are the only 
rational beings on earth) to take good care of the earth by responsibly using and equitably 
distributing (or sharing) resources therein. Parental earth ethics, therefore, helps us recognize and 
uphold human dignity as well as appreciate the unique role (or obligation) that we humans have to 
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play in making this world more habitable for all. But that would require us to be more stewards 
rather than owners or exploiters of the earth, thereby fostering our relationship to and with the 
environment – i.e., the natural world. 
Some recent important philosophical thoughts seem to rekindle or resonate with Oruka’s 
proposal, and we seek to engage them critically. In his Laudato Si, Pope Francis, for instance, 
appeals to all people of the world to take a “swift and unified global action”, particularly in relation 
to environmental degradation (Francis 2015). His proposal requires taking good care of Nature, 
i.e., the whole of creation, which call also implies equitable distribution or sharing of wealth and 
resources with the poor. It also requires people coming together as rational cum ethical beings to 
initiate integral and sustainable developments throughout the world, which developments would 
ensure a more secured and habitable life on earth for all without jeopardizing the ecological system.  
Oruka’s appeal, likewise, is for global society to ensure a more secured and humanized life 
on earth (Oruka 1997, 85), that is, a life above the human minimum to all members of the human 
species. This is a kind of life in which one is assured of enjoying at least such basic human needs 
as physical security, subsistence, and health care. Oruka believed that that is the basic prerequisite 
for establishing anything akin to global justice. But that would require not only equitable sharing 
or distribution of wealth and resources but also taking good care of our environment. Thus, we 
seek in this chapter to establish what global justice at minimum level entails. And our contention 
with Oruka is that a genuine account and practice of global justice, one that aims at curbing socio-
economic injustices while promoting “ecological fairness” in the world ought to be grounded on 
parental earth ethics, whose driving principle is the right to a human minimum.   
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We start off by critically analysing the idea of justice understood as ‘egalitarian fairness’. 
We then show why and how justice as so defined - in terms of egalitarian fairness - ought to be 
practiced at the global level, before establishing what global justice would really entail at the 
minimum level. We shall then discuss Oruka’s eco-philosophy, particularly his parental earth 
ethics. Here, we shall critically engage Hardin’s Lifeboat Ethics (1980) as a classical account that 
tends to “territorialize” or limit the practice of justice. Finally, we shall look at Oruka’s humanism 
and his unrelenting quest for justice at the global level. This will hopefully help us define global 
justice not merely in terms of ensuring “egalitarian fairness” but also “ecological fairness”. The 
former, we shall argue, cannot effectively be had without the latter.   
6.2. Justice Defined as ‘Egalitarian Fairness’ 
The concept of justice is, no doubt, one of the central ideals in human relations, though it 
is difficult to precisely define. It therefore seems to be one of those concepts Oruka would call 
honorific, meaning it is something universally desirable to have even though its actual meaning 
seems to be “vague, obscure, and pervasive” (Oruka 1991b, 49). Nonetheless, in almost every 
culture or human society, justice is often understood not only as a virtue (i.e., human disposition 
toward moral good and excellence) but also a sort of contractual concept that facilitates every other 
human relation and interaction - social, political, economic, religious, etc.  
The idea of justice, then, is essentially meant to ensure ‘egalitarian fairness’ in our human 
endeavor, which prima facie implies equitability, impartiality and reciprocity. Under the principle 
of ‘egalitarian fairness’, it is often assumed that people are and hence ought to be treated as equal 
members of a particular society regardless of their apparent differences. That, however, does not 
mean everybody should get the same amount or necessarily be treated exactly in the same way. A 
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horrible violinist does not have to be admitted in an orchestra anyway for justice to be had. The 
principle of ‘egalitarian fairness’, then, is meant to ensures that everyone is impartially given their 
due. It also implies reciprocity so that one does not only receive what in principle everyone is 
fairly entitled to, but that one also fairly gives or facilitates what others are duly entitled to.  
Now the phrase ‘egalitarian fairness’ may sound attractive to define justice, but the idea in 
itself does not guarantee the actual enjoyment of justice. Thus, from a practical point of view, I 
think, we need to ask a more fundamental question, namely: how far should the demand of justice 
stretch or oblige? This is a question about the scope of justice, a question that Oruka sought to 
address, as he adopted the idea of justice as ‘egalitarian fairness’ from a global perspective. 
Of course, there are several theories of justice that tend to explicitly push for the principle 
of ‘egalitarian fairness’, but most of these theories do so only for a particular region or nation; 
they, in other words, tend to limit the demands of justice (equitability, impartiality and reciprocity) 
within a particular territory. Under such accounts, then, one is expected to be more committed to 
the demands of justice only to the extent that one shares a common territorial establishment. It is 
such accounts that tend to inform what is now popularly known as “political realism” characterized 
by extreme nationalistic rhetoric and divisive politics (Mandle 2006, 28).  
One may, for instance, recall the 2016 presidential elections in U.S.A., where Mr. Trump 
(now president) run a campaign with a slogan “make America great again!” The rhetoric that 
followed that slogan was to portray the urgency of ensuring “justice” to the American people first 
by dumping the rest of the world. That, to me, is a classic example of political realism where 
politicians are driven by the urge to pursue national (perhaps personal) self-interest and security 
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through power struggle. One may argue that that’s how the “world” has always operated - pursuing 
self-interests first; but that view is no doubt misleading if we are to seek justice at the global level.  
Thus, perhaps the question we should focus on is how we can possibly “de-territorialize” 
the practice of justice so that there can be egalitarian fairness for all people in the world. This was 
one of Oruka’s major concerns when he sought to establish the foundational rationale of the idea 
of global justice using the ethical principle of human minimum. He believed that we cannot claim 
to practically have justice in the world unless we first ensure that no human being goes without 
enjoying the right to a human minimum (Oruka 1997, 84). The idea of justice, Oruka argues, ought 
to be practically de-territorialized if it is to achieve its desired egalitarian dimension. And for him, 
the right to a human minimum is the driving principle towards that end.  
Oruka’s argument can be structured as follows. First, he adopts the definition of justice as 
egalitarian fairness, which implies equality, equitability, and impartiality. Second, he claims that 
‘egalitarian fairness’ also implies reciprocity, that is, not only receiving what in principle every 
human being is fairly entitled to, but also giving or facilitating realization of what others are also 
duly entitled to insofar as they are human. Third, he establishes the right to a human minimum 
(whose substantive elements entails enjoyment of such basic human needs as security, subsistence, 
and health care) as one basic “thing” that every human being is entitled to. Thus, he concludes that 
ensuring the enjoyment of the right to a human minimum is the basic necessary (though not 
sufficient) prerequisite to having justice at the global level (Oruka 1997, 85, 88).  
The next question that Oruka seems interested to answer is how justice could be de-
territorialized or made “global” in practice. This is no doubt a difficult if important question. As 
mentioned earlier, the idea of justice as egalitarian fairness is crucial because it influences how 
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well people live or ought to live in any given society. It is related to almost every important aspect 
of human existential wellbeing. Yet, as Amartya Sen rightly argues, what animates our thinking 
about justice is the ability to arrest such “redressable injustices” as human rights abuse, socio-
economic inequality, poverty, etc. (Sen 2009, vii). Such really dilapidating phenomena, according 
to Sen, must be addressed urgently at global level if we are to establish anything akin to global 
justice. His proposal seems to recount Oruka’s call for “a radical humanization” of the world 
(Oruka 1997, 132), which would require not only striving to eradicate socio-economic inequalities, 
but also coming up with viable plans and action for the abolition of most of human degradation.  
6.2.1. What is Justice for X in S? 
One important point, in my view, that Sen and Oruka seem to be making above is that there 
is need to urgently shift our focus from the mere theoretical/ intellectual conception of justice to 
the actual practical exercise of justice at the global level. Hence, our major concern, in other words, 
should not be with the mere question: what is justice? Rather, we ought to ask ourselves: “what is 
justice for X in S?” where X stands for individual person (or a group), and S for global society. I 
borrow this analysis from Oruka’s similar treatment of the idea of liberty, which he says ought to 
be understood as “liberty for X in S” rather than merely “what is liberty”. This is what would 
render liberty its desireble “moral worth” (Oruka 1991b, 53-55). In the same way, I think, justice 
would have its moral worth or practical value only if it stands to defend against what we are calling 
with Sen “global redressable injustices”. To put it differently, it is not enough to define justice 
merely as egalitarian fairness, but it is more important to ensure egalitarian fairness to all people.   
The question “what is justice for X in S?” is crucial for several reasons. First, it enables us 
see justice not merely as an ideal concept for the sake of it but rather as “something” that is either 
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necessary for maintaining human life or for enriching it. In other words, it underscores what Oruka 
would call the “practical moral worth” of the idea of justice. Second, the question enables us grasp 
the necessary duty (both positive and negative) that global society has, where every other human 
being is a legitimate member. Put differently, it helps us see the value and the need for each other, 
and hence our duty toward the wellbeing of each other as members of one global society.  
Third, the question “what is justice for X in S?” resonates well with the principle of 
egalitarian fairness, which is essentially meant for establishing equitability, impartiality and 
reciprocity. Thus, it points to the idea of global justice, which as we have said, is meant to address 
what we owe to each other as humans at global level. This might lead to yet another good question: 
“how does Y in S contribute to justice for X in S?” Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the question 
“what is justice for X in S?” also points to what we humans owe to our environment, even as we 
pursue what we think is justifiably due. It leads, in other words, to an “ecological fairness”, another 
dimension of justice that we shall consider shortly.  
6.2.2. Defining Global Justice 
Following our discussion so far, we can define global justice as the totality of demands of 
justice that can be practically applied to human relations with each other everywhere, thereby being 
able to establish a global society that guarantees an egalitarian/ communitarian co-existence (Elke 
et al 2009, 107). That means if we are to establish anything akin to global justice, then the principle 
of egalitarian fairness ought to guide our engagements as humans despite our territorial or any 
other sectarian affiliation. That seems to be what would make justice achieve its desirable universal 
or global stature. The challenge, of course, is always on how to practically do that.  
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That is one problem Oruka sought to address when he wrote the essay “Philosophy of Foreign 
Aid”. In that essay, Oruka was, among other things, trying to establish an ethical principle that 
would justify stronger ties and relations between different people of different nations. He wanted 
also, as a result, to justify the basis of global responsibility that we humans have or ought to have 
toward each other as moral agents, thereby enhancing what seems to be our natural quest for justice 
from a global perspective. That ethical principle, as we said in chapter four, is the right to a human 
minimum. It primarily aims at ensuring a minimum standard of living for all members of the human 
species irrespective of their territorial or any other sectarian affiliation. As an ethical principle, the 
right to a human minimum, therefore, aims at indiscriminately ensuring a more secured, subsistent 
and healthier life for all. It seeks, in other words, to de-territorialize the idea of justice, thereby 
creating a more humanized global society on earth (Oruka 1997, 85).   
Oruka was also concerned about cases of human rights abuse. And being critical to the current 
human rights discourse, he abhorred what purports to be a universalistic conception of human 
rights that, nonetheless, neither has a strong foundation in nor give priority to the most basic human 
needs. For him, any human rights discourse worthy its name ought to have a strong commitment 
to oblige the global society to first provide every member of the human species with at least a 
minimum standard of living that includes physical security, subsistence, and health care. Thus, he 
argues that the right to a human minimum is the basic prerequisite for enjoying other human rights, 
and hence for establishing anything akin to global justice.71   
One important insight worth noting is the distinction Oruka draws between global justice 
and international justice. The two are not synonymous, he says, even though they are related. Thus, 
                                                          
71 This is what we tried to establish in chapter three.   
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while international justice (which seems prevalent in practice) mainly has nation-states and 
regional territories as its crucial entities, global justice, which remains sort of an ideal to be 
realized, has human beings as its primary “entities” (Oruka 1997, 84). Thus, after considering three 
principles of international justice - international trade, international charity, and historical 
rectification – which principles, nevertheless, fail to establish egalitarian fairness at the global 
level, Oruka proposes the right to a human minimum as the fourth principle that we would need 
first to establish global justice. This is because the latter proceeds purely from what he calls 
“unqualified moral duty for humanity” (Oruka 1997, 83-84).  
For Oruka, then, global justice consists mainly on how we humans, who are presumably 
rational, ethical and hence social beings, ought to relate and treat each other as equal members of 
one global society irrespective of our territorial affiliation. It has to do with, say, how we equitably 
distribute or share the resources available. It would also involve how we relate to and responsibly 
use other non-human beings who are also legitimate members of the world. Hence, global justice, 
the way Oruka sees it, is more relational, inclusive, dynamic, and progressive than international 
justice. It is concerned primarily with what is good and fair to every individual human being, i.e., 
what ensures their general wellbeing, their citizenship notwithstanding (Oruka 1997, 84). It also 
involves what is good and “fair” to other non-human beings, i.e., our environment. 
6.2.3. Global Justice as ‘Ecological Fairness’ 
As hinted earlier, Oruka envisioned a situation where socio-economic injustice against 
humanity would be dealt with at a global level while at the same time ensuring what we might call 
“ecological fairness”. This is a situation where we humans would be more concerned about the 
environment even as we strive to meet our own human needs. This is another credible contribution 
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toward a possibility of establishing global justice. It resonates with an adage that says power (i.e., 
human capacity) without ethics is profane and destructive (Rolston 1988, xii). Indeed, while many 
have come to appreciate power or human capacity, say, in science and industrial technology, few 
are yet to see how irresponsible exploitation of the natural world unchecked by any genuine ethics 
can ruin not only human dignity and security but also deter us from appreciating the earth as our 
common home - together with other non-human beings.  
Thus, in his eco-philosophy,72 Oruka suggests a new “epistemological outlook” that would 
challenge the current dominant Western ethical thought. He critically questions “traditional ethics” 
(Judeo-Christian ethics that has permeated most Western philosophical thought) for territorializing 
the idea and practice of justice. That ethics, Oruka observes, tend to elevate humanity above nature 
(i.e., natural world), thereby promoting possessive individualism characterized by greed, pride, 
and prejudice (Graness and Kresse, 1997, 119). Ironically, though, ‘traditional ethics’ is known to 
have excluded some sections of humanity (e.g., slaves and some races) from the domain of ethics.  
Oruka, therefore, proposes a new kind of humanism, a new Menschenbild (Lölke 1997, 
222) based on what he dubs “parental earth ethics” where humanity would be viewed as part and 
parcel of a complex and systematic totality of nature73 (Graness and Kresse 1997, 119). In such a 
setting, Oruka says, modernity and development will not be seen merely as continuous domination, 
utilization and exploitation of world resources (as evidenced during industrial revolution, for 
                                                          
72 This is a philosophical approach that looks at Nature (i.e., natural world inclusive of human beings) as 
interrelated in its complexity and interdependent in its totality; cf. Graness & Kresse 1997, 120-121.  
73 By “nature” we mean the natural world and whatever can be found therein, including humans. Thus, for 
clarity sake, I will capitalize ‘N’ whenever I use the term in that sense to distinguish it from “nature” as 
‘that which constitutes a particular being’, say, human nature. 
 181 
instance) to benefit humankind alone (Oruka 1997, 246). Instead, modernity and development will 
be seen also in terms of how we (humans) take care of Nature for a common good.  
It is important to note, however, that in viewing humanity as part and parcel of Nature, 
Oruka does not wish to demean human dignity or disregard the unique role that humans play or 
ought to play therein. Neither is he sinking into “philosophical naturalism” - a view that everything 
in the world has a natural cause, and that organic life, including human life, is solely a product of 
random forces guided by no one (Keller 2008, 86). Instead, Oruka wants to underscore the ethical 
duty that we ought to have toward the wellbeing of other humans and non-human beings in the 
world. Here, he challenges us to appreciate and value Nature, in which we are part (Rolston 1988).  
To take care of Nature, Oruka says, means caring for our own prosperity and posterity, 
which is what justice aims at. His point is that we must handle Nature carefully and respectfully, 
“for it seems as if almost everything in it has value not just for itself but for the reality of the 
survival of the rest” (Graness and Kresse 1997, 121). One of the ways in which we can take care 
of Nature would be exploring technological possibilities that can help reduce toxic gasses – carbon 
dioxide, methane, etc., which are arguably responsible for global warming.  
This is the argument Oruka tries to advance in one of his intriguing essays entitled “Eco-
philosophy” where he argues for “parental earth ethics”. This essay first published in 1994 (cf. 
Oruka 1994, 115-129) before appearing again in memoriam (cf. Graness and Kresse 1997, 119-
131) is perhaps one of the most philosophically engaging essays that Oruka wrote before his tragic 
death. It seems to define the direction his ethical thought would most likely have taken had he 
lived longer. Part IV of his book Practical Philosophy (1997) entitled “Philosophy, Ethics and the 
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Environment” attests to this.74 The expression “parental earth ethics”, however, first appeared in 
another essay Oruka wrote in 1993 as a reaction to Hardin’s “Life-Boat Ethics” (1991).75  
Now in all these essays (which I will critically engage shortly), Oruka basically argues for 
a new ethics that would prompt us to have a holistic eco-philosophical approach to such human 
issues as socio-economic inequality, poverty, environmental degradation, etc. This is an ethics that 
seems to appropriately “follow” Nature, thereby optimizing “human fitness on Earth” (Rolston 
1988, xi).  It is an ethics that would help us recognize the totality of spatial, temporal, spiritual and 
other inter-linkages in Nature (Graness and Kresse 1997, 119). It would help curb possessive 
individualism, greed, and prejudice; it would also help “calm the pride of those whose attitude is 
that man [humanity] is the vital part of Nature and the centre of the universe” (Oruka 1997, 126). 
It would, therefore, help us establish a global society that is not only egalitarian oriented but also 
ecologically concerned and fair to or appreciative of all its members. This ecologically-oriented 
way of thinking based on, but no doubt, going beyond the concept of human minimum is essential 
towards building a much better version of global justice, one that is relational and accomodative. 
In what follows now, I try to critically evaluate what parental earth ethics entails, before 
analysing how Oruka comes to establish and defend it. The question ‘what is justice for X in S?’ 
will be an important guide in this endeavour, given that it points to a possibility of ascertaining not 
only what we owe each other as humans but also what we possibly owe to other non-human beings 
at the global level. Hopefully this will help us de-territorialize the idea of justice so that we do not 
only emphasize egalitarian fairness (which properly applies to human relations) but also ensure 
ecological fairness with Nature (which applies to other non-human beings).   
                                                          
74 See especially chapter 24, “Eco-philosophy: Environmental Ethics” in Oruka 1997, 243-254.   
75 A revised version appears in Oruka 1997, 146-151.  
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6.3. On Parental Earth Ethics  
Parental earth ethics is an important ethics that Odera Oruka proposes to offer motivation 
for a possibility of global justice in terms of ensuring: (i) global environmental concern, and (ii) 
global use and distribution (or sharing) of wealth and world resources (Oruka 1997, 150; Graness 
and Kresse 1997, 130). It is meant to promote justice at the global level for the common good, that 
is, for the good of both humans and the environment. It is basically driven by the ethical principle 
of human minimum, which principle ought to inspire us humans to be more ethically responsible 
insofar as the use and distribution of world resources is concerned for the good and security of all. 
The point here is that if we don’t take care of the earth on which we depend, then we endanger not 
only our own survival but also that of other creatures. More specifically, parental earth ethics is 
meant to advance a new kind of humanism that would ensure the right to a human minimum, which 
right involves actual enjoyment of the most basic human necessities, thereby enabling majority (if 
not all) to live a life worthy of a human person. I come back to this point later.  
Oruka’s argument for parental earth ethics rests on one fundamental conviction: the earth 
is or ought to be a commonwealth for a common good. Now the idea of common good traditionally 
means the sum-total of living conditions (social, economic, political, etc.) that enable human 
beings to realize their natural fulfilment more fully and easily (cf. John XXIII Pacem in Terris, 
39). As an ethical principle, it envisions a society that is dedicated to justice, peace, and security 
of humanity. Here, the primary goal is the good of all people, which goal is informed by the fact 
that humans are social-ethical beings, meaning they co-exist with and for each other. 
But the idea of ‘common good’ also necessarily incorporates the security and the wellbeing 
of other creatures - the environment. This is an important insight that unfortunately seems to be 
ignored by most ethics. It is what Oruka sets to underscore. His parental earth ethics, then, wants 
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to reiterate both dimensions of the idea of ‘common good’. And that, he believes, would lead us 
to a genuine practice of justice at the global level. For him, everything in the world is somehow 
interconnected and interdependent with each other as a “family unit” for survival. He says: 
It is now clear, I hope, that I make the claim that the earth or the world is a kind of family 
unit in which the members have a kith and kin relationship with one another and the earth 
is a commonwealth to all humanity (Oruka 1997, 150).  
 
Thus, according to Oruka, there is one undeniable fact: everything in the world is somehow 
interconnected and interdependent. And that is arguably the basic principle upon which any 
environmental concern and discourse at the global level would make sense. It is also a basic fact 
upon which human beings, who presumably are the only rational cum moral agents, would feel 
ethically obliged to responsibly use and equitably distribute world resources. It overrides not only 
the individual’s claim for the so-called ‘right to private property’ or personal achievement, but also 
the nation’s claim for territorial rights or “right by first occupation” (Oruka 1997, 150).   
Consequently, Oruka pushes for an eco-centric rather than mere anthropocentric account 
of global justice. He develops an ethics that recognizes the value and importance of every being in 
the world, each according to their rightful mode of existence.76 But Oruka also emphasizes the 
unique role that humans play or ought to play to bring about what we might call ecological fairness. 
As rational cum ethical beings, Oruka says, we humans ought to enjoy the earth and resources 
therein more responsibly; meaning we need to use world resources as stewards rather than owners/ 
exploiters, taking care of the earth as our common heritage (Graness and Kresse 1997, 258).   
                                                          
76 Similar appeals have been made by Francis E. Abbot (1836-1903), who argues for the “organic theory 
of realistic evolution” as opposed to mechanical theory of evolution, (Abbot 1888, xii, 160-199). 
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The idea of the earth as a commonwealth and common heritage also means none of us has, 
strictly speaking, a monopoly of ownership and enjoyment of the earth more than others who for 
some reasons might appear less privileged. The earth, as Oruka further says, is our home for all. 
As moral agents, therefore, we humans have the ethical duty to not only take good care of it, but 
also use and distribute (or share) the resources therein more responsibly despite our apparent 
territorial or any other sectarian affiliations. That means we need to acknowledge and uphold the 
unique dignity and place that humanity occupies in this world; hence the need to equitably share 
wealth and resources so as to secure and maintain humane standard of living. But we need also to 
respect, value, and foster our interconnectedness to and with our environment; hence, the need to 
use the world resources more responsibly.  
In sum, parental earth ethics is meant to motivate us to be more ethically responsible 
toward the wellbeing of the ‘other’ – i.e., fellow humans and the environment - even as we explore, 
use and enjoy whatever we think is rightfully due. It helps us, in other words, understand what it 
really means to be human in relation to other non-human beings in the world. It calls for an integral 
approach to the ecosystem, even as we try to address our human needs, thereby seeing the world 
as a global society, a sort of organic or family unit governed by the principles of interdependence 
and ethical responsibility. It is the basis upon which we can enjoy justice at the global level.   
6.3.1. Parental Earth Ethics and other Philosophies 
Some important ethical thoughts seem to rekindle or resonate with Oruka’s proposal. In his 
recent Encyclical – Laudato Si, Pope Francis, for instance, appeals to all people of the world 
together to take a swift and unified global action in relation to environmental issues. He calls for 
“ethics of international relation” (Francis 2015, 30) or simply global ethics, as a framework to help 
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ensure: (i) a more responsible use of world resources; and (ii) an equitable distribution (or sharing) 
of wealth and resources for a common good. The Pope also cautions especially the “industrialized 
world” on wastage and pollution that has led to global warming among other environmental 
hazards. These hazards, the Pope observes, mostly affect the poor - such as farmers and fishermen 
who directly depend on “natural world” for their livelihood. Thus, his proposal is that we not only 
take good care of Nature (the entire creation, humans included), but also initiate integral and 
sustainable development throughout the world, which development would ensure a more habitable 
life on earth for all without jeopardizing the ecological system.  
Oruka’s parental earth ethics, likewise, calls for an integral ecology (that is, a holistic 
economy of Nature), which in its diverse dimension comprehends the unique place, dignity, and 
hence the ethical duty that humans have in this world, thereby fostering a relationship to and with 
the environment. The aim is to enhance debates on such pressing issues as climate change, global 
warming, global inequality, etc; which debates will have impact on socio-economic wellbeing 
especially of the marginalized. Oruka’s parental earth ethics, therefore, leads to and demands for 
a highly de-territorialized concept of justice – understood as egalitarian and ecological fairness - 
based on a complex interrelatedness and interdependence of all beings in the world (Graness and 
Kresse 1997, 224). Put differently, it leads us to and demands for a different kind of humanism, a 
new Menschenbild (Lölke 1997, 222) that would take human beings as stewards (rather than 
owners and/or exploiters) who are also part and parcel of stewardship (or Nature) itself.   
Thus, parental earth ethics is, no doubt, also a critique of most popular ethics under modern 
Western liberalism that tend to territorialize or limit the concept and the practice of justice. It 
challenges to the core what Oruka following Worster (1985) refers to as “imperial ideology of 
Nature” (Graness and Kresse 1997, 121). This is a false belief or teaching that the natural world is 
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made for humans, and that humans are not made for the world (cf. Bacon 1603), meaning humanity 
somehow has a license to own, subdue, and exploit the natural world unchecked. 
6.3.2. Hardin and “Life-Boat Ethics” 
To develop parental earth ethics, Oruka sought first to engage Garret Hardin, who in his 
fascinating essay “Lifeboat Ethics” (1980) tries to defend a territorial bounded responsibility to 
justice (Lölke 1997, 222), claiming that the affluent can save themselves and the environment 
while letting the poor people die. According to Hardin, it would be senseless and even suicidal in 
the modern world for the rich individuals and nation-states to offer humanitarian aid to the poor. 
He gives two reasons. First, he alleges that there are not enough resources in the world to support 
large population. And second, he claims that the global poor do not share “our” (his) territory.  
Hardin begins his essay by attacking global environmentalists who, using the metaphor of 
“spaceship earth” propose measures to prevent further pollution, which pollution largely affects 
the poor under-developed nations. While Hardin acknowledges such arguments as attractive, he 
nonetheless regrets that the metaphor of ‘spaceship’ is also often used to advance such senseless 
and suicidal moves as “generous immigration policy”, which often lead to “the tragedy of the 
commons” (Hardin 1980, 171, 174). This is a situation where countless number of people end up 
clamouring for equal basic rights without first fulfilling some responsibilities, thereby leading to 
what Hardin calls “mutual ruin” (174). For Hardin, then, the metaphor of ‘spaceship’ would make 
sense only if the world had a sovereign to enforce responsibilities, which it doesn’t. The spaceship 
metaphor, he says, “is used only to justify spaceship demands on common resources” without first 
acknowledging “corresponding spaceship responsibilities”. But that should not be the case, Hardin 
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charges adding, “where human survival is at stake, the acceptance of responsibilities is a 
precondition to the acceptance of rights” (172).  
To further discredit “the ethics of sharing” and possible distribution of world resources, 
Hardin attacks those inclined to eradication of poverty in the world purely from humanitarian 
ground. Thus, considering the reality of an ever-widening gap between the few rich and majority 
poor of the world, Hardin makes us think of a fairly-crowded lifeboat carrying just a few well-to-
do (affluent) nations on the one hand, and another much crowded lifeboat occupied by majority 
poor of the world on the other. And in due course, he says, some poor people would inevitably fall 
out of their over-crowded lifeboat and haplessly swim for a while in the waters, hoping to either 
be admitted to the rich-man’s lifeboat or somehow benefit from the “goodies” therein. The 
question, according to Hardin is this: “What should the passengers on a rich lifeboat do?” This, he 
says, is the central problem of “lifeboat ethics” (172).  
And to further compound the problem, Hardin lets us assume the rich lifeboat having 50 
people on board, with a possibility of admitting 10 more, although that would contravene their 
“safety factor”. He then indifferently asks: “The 50 of us in the lifeboat see 100 others swimming 
in the water outside, asking for admission to the boat, or for handouts. How shall we respond to 
their calls?” (172). Hardin’s dilemma is in threefold. First, if the 50 choose “the Christian maxim” 
(i.e., to be charitable) or the Marxist’s socialist way and admit all the 100 poor swimmers, then the 
lifeboat will be swamped and everyone on board drown: “complete justice, complete catastrophe”, 
he says. The second scenario is that the 50 people on board might choose to admit just 10, in which 
case besides contravening the safety factor, thereby risking their future, it will also be extremely 
difficult, and perhaps against “justice”, to decide how to discriminate. It would make them feel 
guilty for admitting just 10 poor people and leaving the other 90 out.  
 189 
The third option, the one Hardin certainly prefers, is to “admit no more into the boat and 
preserve the little safety factor” (173). That would make it possible for the 50 in the lifeboat to 
survive, he says, even though they will have to be on guard against intruders. For him, although 
this might be abhorrent and unjust especially to some few “conscience-stricken” and “guilt-addict” 
on board (those who might be tempted to sacrifice their position for the poor to come in), yet, the 
third option, Hardin insists, is the best. It is what defines the lifeboat ethics.  
Eventually, he says, everyone will want to preserve their luck if they happen to be on board, 
and it doesn’t matter who gets into the lifeboat first. Hence, following lifeboat ethics, the best way 
out the dilemma, Hardin says, is to eliminate “conscience” from the lifeboat, purify people’s guilt 
(of being lucky and unable to help) and then move on in pursuit of what is best for me unconcerned 
about how the ‘other’ is going through – in this case those who for some reasons find themselves 
unlucky and hence haplessly swimming in poverty outside the “lifeboat”. 
In sum, Hardin dismisses not only the urgency for global environmental concern, but also 
the ethics of possible global sharing of wealth and world resources. Foreign aid (monetary or 
otherwise) from rich to poor nations, he says, is absurd leading to an “unsolvable dilemma” 
because while the former control their population, the latter breed exponentially and often in direct 
proportion to the aid they receive from outside (178). But without foreign aid, Hardin thinks, the 
poor would sooner be “checked in their growth by pestilence, wars and earthquakes, among other 
factors” (177). Thus, sharing wealth and resources, the way Hardin sees it, only serves to postpone 
the “doomsday”, which nonetheless will come and destroy not only the receiver but also the 
generous donor as well; hence, “mutual ruin” in the name of justice (177). 
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6.3.3. Critique of Hardin’s “Lifeboat Ethics”  
Hardin’s lifeboat ethics, as Oruka says, no doubt captures the “realistic truth” that seems 
prevalent in the modern world (Oruka 1997, 147). It seems to describe a world driven by extreme 
“political realism” where only the strong, the fittest, and the lucky survive; a situation where at 
best, justice as ‘egalitarian fairness’ is territorialized if not thrown out of the window. It defines a 
society where possessive individualism, greed, exploitation, pride, and indifference toward the 
wellbeing of the ‘other’ seems valuable tools for pursuing what one deems right and best. Here, 
“any social system [would be] stable only if it is insensitive to errors” (Hardin 1980, 174). In other 
words, socialism (not communism), which calls people to restrain some of their selfish pursuits 
for the common good is always seen as counterproductive.  
The lifeboat ethics, of course, may sound attractive especially today where extreme liberal 
capitalism appears fashionable, but it is no doubt contrary to a basic sagacity that implicitly calls 
us to cultivate such humane ideals as generosity, kindness, care, and hence ethical duty toward the 
wellbeing of the ‘other’. And the ‘other’ here means anyone living below the human minimum, 
territorial boundaries notwithstanding.  
Thus, Oruka sought to critically challenge such lifeboat-ethics-mentality with his rather 
communitarian-oriented parental earth ethics. Armed with such a basic ethical principle as the 
right to a human minimum, Oruka is able to critique Hardin’s stance to the core. Hardin, in my 
view, seems to take it as impossible or most unlikely that everyone on earth would enjoy the right 
to a human minimum; at least not possible while the developed countries maintain their current 
way of life. But he was, of course, factually wrong as I will shortly demonstrate. The indifference 
and pessimism with Hardin may have to do less with principles than with factual possibilities.  
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 To begin with, it is important to remember that Hardin is writing in the 1970s, and it seems 
possible that many nations are economically in better shape now than they were then. One major 
problem, however, remains in that resources and wealth are still predominantly in the hands of 
few. Secondly, Hardin seems much more pessimistic about the world and its resources than he is 
justified in being indifferent. For him, world resources are too meagre to sustain a large population. 
But studies have shown the opposite is the case.  
According to Worldwatch Institute the major “global problem” is not about overpopulation 
but gross inequality in the use of world resources. A country like the United States, for instance, 
with less than 5 % of the global population uses about a quarter of the world’s fossil fuel resources; 
burning up nearly 25 % of the coal, 26 % of the oil, and 27 % of the world’s natural gas.77 It is 
also known, moreover, that Nature has its way of balancing itself. Of course, it is still possible that 
some natural catastrophe could one day put us in the situation as Hardin conceives it. But in the 
meantime, I think, it is possible to responsibly use world resources in a way that would ensure 
equitable sharing or resources for a common good. In other words, it is possible for all of us to 
enjoy the right to a human minimum if we were to curb possessive individualism and greed. 
As we established in chapter four, the right to a human minimum being the most basic 
human right and the foundation of other rights aims at ensuring a dignified life of a human person 
to everyone. It is therefore the minimum necessity for a standard of living that the world (i.e., 
global society) owes to every human being as its legitimate member. It is, in other words, the very 
minimum any human being would reasonably demand from the global society. Thus, it imposes a 
necessary correlative duty on every capable moral agent in the world to help ensure that no human 
                                                          
77 Worldwatch Institute: http://www.worldwatch.org/node/810#4 accessed Nov. 14, 2017. 
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being, regardless of their domicile or any other affiliation, lacks in the means to realize and enjoy 
the most basic human necessities. Oruka sums up these points well when he says:  
It then follows …., that those affluent individuals who are able to, but refrain from helping 
to alleviate poverty from any region of the world, are partly responsible for the 
consequences arising from such poverty (Oruka 1997, 147).  
 
Now one way of ensuring the means to realize the right to a human minimum to everyone 
in the world is by trying to be ethically responsible, especially with regards to the use of world 
resources and accumulation of wealth. To be ethically responsible also entails willingness to share 
or distribute some of my fortune with those who for some reasons are deprived of such basic human 
needs as food, housing, medicine, etc. Thus, if I have a considerable fortune more than I need to 
live on, then I should feel ethically inspired to help, say, a family member or even a stranger who 
is living below the human minimum. 
To be ethically responsible would also involve making viable efforts to curb other inhuman 
treatments – for instance, taking advantage of the situation to control minimum wage and market 
prices of essential commodities – all of which tend to exploit and marginalize the poor.  
Another way in which we can be ethically responsible to the ‘other’ is by being cautious 
about wastage and pollution (which lead to environmental degradation) even as we explore and 
use world resources for our own survival and enjoyment as humans. This we can do by reducing 
industrial waste and agro-chemical products: from construction and demolition sites; from mining, 
clinical and electronic plants. As Pope Francis notes, it is quite tragic that while just a few people 
greedily clamour for more profit through industrial and technical advancement, we all end up with 
bi-products and waste that are often “non-biodegradable, highly toxic and radioactive” (Francis 
2015, 19); all of which have irreversible side effects on people’s health, especially the poor who 
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cannot afford expensive medication. And that, to me, seems to properly capture Oruka’s argument 
for the right to a human minimum and by extension his parental earth ethics.  
The point is that we all ought to be ethically responsible as humans to the wellbeing of 
each other, part of which means equitably distributing or sharing wealth and resources. We need 
also to diligently take care of our environment, even as we pursue what we think to be rightfully 
due. Oruka’s argument, however, as said above, presupposes that the earth is a commonwealth and 
a heritage for all. It also presupposes what he calls “parental debt” that we all share in common. 
This, I think, is an important insight lacking in Hardin’s argument. Also lacking in Hardin but 
crucially present in Oruka is the undeniable fact that human existence and posterity is fairly 
interdependent because every existence on earth is symbiotically related as a kind of “organic unit” 
or “a complex web of being” (Oruka 1997, 150; Graness and Kresse 1997, 219, 258). 
Thus, while Hardin talks about “industrialized world” (i.e., the West) as one ‘lifeboat’ 
comfortably sailing on the sea but surrounded by tons of poverty-stricken hopeless swimmers, 
Oruka instead claims there are, in fact, a number of ‘lifeboats’ (nations) in the world; a few of 
them indeed are affluent (though not everyone aboard is rich), while the majority of them are really 
poor or underdeveloped (though not everyone therein is poor). But all of these ‘lifeboats’, Oruka 
observes, are inter-connected by pipes that are fairly a result of historical dependencies (read 
injustices) so that “part of the little wealth and safety gadgets that are in the poor boats do find 
their way for use in the rich boats” (Oruka 1997, 148).   
To underscore the idea of “parental debt”, that is, what we most likely owe to each other 
as humans, Oruka observes that it is possible that in the beginning all the ‘lifeboats’ in the world 
were poor, that is, undeveloped or unindustrialized (which is true of every nation-state), before 
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some sailors of the now rich lifeboats sailed to the now poor lifeboats, he says, “and by all means 
possible plundered the wealth of many of those [unindustrialized] boats and used the gain to cause 
economic and safety disparity between the boats” (Oruka 1997, 148). And that is exactly what 
happened when, for instance, Europe invaded Africa in the name of civilization.  
One needs to carefully read Walter Rodney’s book How Europe Underdeveloped Africa 
(1972) to concur with me; to understand the dynamics of power, dominance, and socio-economic 
exploitation and inequality, and hence the negative effects of colonialism, imperialism, and 
slavery. It would also perhaps make one agree with Oruka that indeed “the now rich boats owe 
part of their current self-preservation to the gains brought to them by the inter-boat pipes”, and 
that if all the poor boats (i.e., poor people) in the world were to sink, “eventually the rich boats 
would also sink” (Oruka 1997, 148). Here, I see Oruka trying to underscore the fact that we all 
desperately need each other for survival, prosperity and posterity. Hence, it defeats basic sagacity 
when some people tend to inculcate possessive individualism, greed, pride, prejudice and hate.  
Oruka also wants to make us realize that Nature (and not just humanity) is interconnected 
and interdependent as a complex web of beings for mutual benefit. The rest of life in the world, 
Oruka says, is no less important than human life (Oruka 1997, 244). The term “important” is 
carefully employed here to underscore the value of every living being. Thus, it does not mean all 
sentient beings are the same or that they relate in the same way. The way humans relate with, say, 
a dog is not the same they would with a worm; but that does not mean the worm in itself is less 
important.  Oruka’s argument, then, does not demean human dignity; rather, it is meant to inspire 
us humans, who presumably are rational cum moral beings, to not only be ethically responsible 
toward the wellbeing of each other but also take care of our environment. But that would require 
us having a different kind of ethics - the parental earth ethics - that Oruka proposes.  
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6.4. The Earth as a Family Unit 
Thus, having dismissed Hardin’s lifeboat ethics, Oruka embarks on advancing his parental 
earth ethics using the metaphor of a family. He makes us image the world as a sort of family unit, 
with members having a close relationship; a common origin, for instance, through their parents 
and a common education (Graness and Kresse 1997, 128, 258). But the members, Oruka says, also 
have some difference in terms of their socio-economic welfare. He attributes that difference to 
three factors, namely, (i) family history, (ii) personal luck and (ii) individual talents. The success 
or failure of each member is also determined by how each one of the members applies the common 
education they receive (Oruka 1997, 148; Graness and Kresse 1997, 125).  
The family unit, Oruka further says, is also bound by some unwritten ethical laws that guide 
people’s lives and relations. He sums up these laws into two major principles: 1) the parental debt 
principle (PP); and 2) the individual luck principle (IP). And starting with the parental debt 
principle (PP), Oruka says it consists of “four related shared assumptions or rules” (Oruka 1997, 
148) that deal with family security and dignity, parental debt, and individual and family survival 
(Graness and Kresse 1997, 126). Oruka formulates these rules as follows:  
First, we have the Family Security Rule stipulating that the fate and security (physical or 
welfare) of each of the members is ultimately bound up with the existential reality of the family as 
a whole. That means however arrogant, self-sufficient or independent one member may think of 
him or herself now, eventually one or their progeny may experience a turn of events that could 
make them desperately in need of protection from the family. In other words, individual’s 
“existential reality” in a family unit may change so that the one who is poor and dependent now 
might become the donor in future and vice versa (Oruka 1997, 149). 
 196 
Second, he talks about the Kinship-shame Rule, which states that “the life conditions of 
any one member of the family affect all of them, both materially and emotionally” (Oruka 1997, 
149); thus, none of the members can reasonably be proud of their current situation, however happy 
or satisfied one may be, if any one member of the family tree lives in squalor.  
Third, Oruka gives us the Parental Debt Rule, which explains the organic relationship, and 
hence parental debt between members. This precept assumes that “whoever in the family is affluent 
or destitute partly owes that fortune or misfortune to the parental and historical factors inherent in 
the development of the family” (Oruka 1997, 149). That means no one member of a family could 
be held exclusively responsible for their affluent or deprived situation. There is always a parental 
debt attached our apparent situations. And that, indeed, is a matter of fact; although some 
entrepreneurs like to suppose that they made it completely on their own, forgetting that that they 
are not really the inventors or creators of what they managed to turn into thriving enterprises. And 
in any case, they are also dependent on consumers, political situation and other factors to succeed. 
Finally, Oruka talks about Individual and Family Survival Rule, which he derives from the 
previous three rules above. According to this precept, no one member of the family has any moral 
obligation “to refrain from interfering with the possessions of any other affluent or destitute brother 
or sister who ignores the obligation to abide by the rules of the family ethics” (Oruka 1997, 149). 
This, in my view, is the most interesting rule; it not only allows the disadvantaged member(s) to 
demand assistance from the affluent member(s), but it also allows “the creative and hardworking 
members of the family to repossess underdeveloped possessions of the idle relatives and develop 
them for use and posterity” (Oruka 1997, 149). It therefore captures the spirit of the ‘parental debt 
principle’ (PP), which basically accounts for the specific duties each individual member owes to 
the family, i.e., global society (Lölke 1997, 225). Whereas it propagates equitable distribution of 
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wealth and world resources - thereby checking possessive individualism, pride and prejudice - it 
does not entertain laziness and idleness in the name of communal life.  
Next, turning to the individual luck principle (IP) mentioned above, Oruka says it consists 
of three decrees that essentially seek to protect individual property and the right to use whatever 
one thinks he/ she duly owns in whichever way one may chose or deem fit.  
First, he talks about the personal achievement rule, which states that “what a member 
possesses is due mainly to his or her special talent and work” (Oruka 1997, 149). And as Oruka 
points out, this rule expresses “a kind of family individualism which disregards historical 
experience and the organic constitution of the family” (Graness and Kresse 1997, 127). It basically 
seeks to protect the right to individual property that seems “fashionable” within liberal capitalism.  
The second precept is the personal supererogation rule, according to which every member 
has the right to do whatever she or he wishes with their own possession. It parallels what Oruka 
elsewhere calls national supererogation, a corollary of the principle of “territorial sovereignty”, 
which says that a people organized into a nation-state with a given geographical region, and hence 
having territorial sovereignty has the right to utilize or do whatever it wishes with its possessions 
(Oruka 1997, 90, 130). And finally, Oruka talks about the rule of public law, which states that any 
member who contravenes the rights of another member, especially the personal supererogation 
rule will be subject to punishment and reparation to restore justice (Oruka 1997, 149). 
6.4.1. Priority Order 
Oruka then appeals to the “ethics of common sense” or simply basic sagacity to conclude 
that principle number (1), i.e., parental debt principle (PP) is or ought to be always prior to the 
individual luck principle (IP). And that priority order, he says, ought to guide our human relations. 
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Thus, should any of the rules in (PP) come into conflict with any of the rules in (IP), the former, 
Oruka insists, must always take priority. This is because (IP) is basically supported by what he 
calls “the veil of fate” (Graness and Kresse 1997, 127), which includes right of first occupation, 
personal luck, and personal achievement. Parental debt principle (PP), however, springs forth from 
the “organic unity”, that is, a common origin/ heritage that exists between family members, their 
socio-economic differences notwithstanding. It is also grounded on the need to have a common 
security, thus the reason why it should always take priority.   
Oruka would therefore say that “matters of commonwealth and security” must always 
prevail over “matters of personal possession, luck or achievement” (Oruka 1997, 150). That means 
“personal supererogation” – i.e., the individual right to own, use or dispose of wealth - cannot 
prevail upon matters common good. Likewise, no individual or institution would be spared if it 
endangers the security and/ or economy of a community. Thus, Oruka concludes by saying: 
There is no country in which, for example, one would accept a wish or a will from one of 
its citizens which stipulates that upon death all his achievements, however dear to the 
country, should be exterminated or kept from use by anybody… The objection to this will 
can be supported by invoking issues of common origin, common security and common 
wealth of the community of which the person is a member (Oruka 1997, 149-150). 
 
6.4.2. Practical Implications 
There are several implications upon which Oruka’s argument for parental earth ethics 
depends. First, we note that Oruka wants to underscore a basic if important sagacity that many, 
unfortunately, tend to forget or ignore as they desperately pursue the ‘right to private property’ or 
the so-called ‘personal supererogation’. His ethics reminds us that the earth and resources therein 
is for the common good of all; not in the sense that it is an open field for the survival of the fittest, 
but only in the sense of sharing whatever we might gain from it (Graness and Kresse 1997, 128).  
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That means the wealth and property that may come my way as I mix labour with the earth 
is mine only in the strict sense of the word. It is simply given for my use. But the gift also obliges 
me with a duty to be more reasonable and responsible toward the wellbeing of the ‘other’ – fellow 
humans and the environment. This is because the earth from where we get wealth, strictly speaking, 
has no sovereign, nor does it have real owners except God, the first principle of being. We humans 
are only stewards, and that means the earth is a commonwealth or heritage for all of us. The earth 
is also a home and heritage for other sentient non-human beings (Graness and Kresse 1997, 125). 
Thus, it seems contrary to basic sagacity when some tend to amass for themselves even what they 
actually don’t need either to sustain their life or enrich it. Needless to say, it seems utter vanity or 
stupendous to accumulate luxurious wealth (quite often through dubious means) while others 
languish in abject poverty; yet, no one takes with them such wealth when they die.   
In the same vein, it is important to note that Oruka is in no way discouraging hard work, 
innovation, industrialization; nor is he despising wealth and prosperity as such. Rather, he is only 
against possessive individualism, greed and pride that often lead to dubious means of acquiring 
wealth, most of which means tend to exploit the poor. For him, “subservient ends”, i.e., personal 
and national gains, are for the most part a result of “historical factors”, meaning they are outcome 
of our common past that only tend to favour some people or nations at one given time (Lölke 1997, 
226). But that does not change the fact that the earth is a common heritage for all. In fact, trends 
may change (as history attests) so that those successful now may not necessarily be as successful 
in future, and vice versa. Thus, it is always sagacious when one is successful and capable now to 
consider sharing some of the purported personal wealth with those who for some reason happened 
to be deprived. This is what Oruka calls “parental earth insurance policy”, which calls on affluent 
and powerful nations and individuals on earth “to invest in the pool of service to the rest of the 
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world so that when their historical turn or shift to oblivion comes, others may remember them with 
compassion” (Graness and Kresse 1997, 129). 
Oruka’s insight also reminds us that the earth is also a habitat to other non-human beings. 
It properly underscores the value, the interconnectivity and hence interdependence of all beings as 
members of one global organic unit, albeit in different ways and levels. It particularly enables us 
humans to understand how much we depend on our environment for survival. But it also reaffirms 
our dignity and unique role we play or ought to play within the ecosystem. It therefore re-awakens 
our consciousness to realize that it is we who, by virtue of being rational cum ethical, have to take 
care of the entire ecosystem for the common good. Oruka’s insight no doubt rekindles that of Carl 
von Linnaeus – often refered to as the father of modern taxonomy - who in The Economy of Nature 
taught that we understand “the wisdom of creator” better when we relate to natural things by which 
everything is “fitted to produce general ends and the reciprocal uses” (Worster 1985, 37-38).  
In sum, Odera Oruka’s eco-philosophy, and particularly his parental earth ethics leads us 
into a different kind of “humanism” that is capable of establishing the possibility of a genuine 
quest for justice at the global level. This point will be advanced further in the next chapter. Here, 
it suffices to say that parental earth ethics enables us to practically de-territorialize the idea of 
justice so that it does not only refer to ‘egalitarian fairness’ (which applies to human relations) but 
also ‘ecological fairness’ that acknowledges, appreciates and values the entire natural world.  
 
6.5. Conclusion 
This chapter was intended to advance a critical discourse that would possibly ensure a 
genuine practice of justice at global level. We started off by analysing the idea of justice as 
‘egalitarian fairness’ - arguably the conventional understanding of what justice is or ought to be. 
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Justice as ‘egalitarian fairness’, we said, implies equitability, impartiality and reciprocity insofar 
as distribution of resources is concerned. Thus, we emphasized the importance of having that idea 
of justice being practically de-territorialized so that the majority (if not all) human beings could 
actually enjoy egalitarian fairness. That would make justice acquire moral cum practical worth.  
We then established that global justice at minimum level would entail actual enjoyment of 
the right to a human minimum. Thus, we defined global justice as ‘the totality of demands of justice 
that can reasonably be applied to local and international relations, thereby establishing a global 
society that is both egalitarian and communitarian oriented’. But in order to fully de-territorialize 
the concept of justice, that is, for us to make it “global” in practice, we said it is imperative to have 
a different world view, a new ethics that would not only motivate a spirit of equitable distribution 
or sharing of world resources but also take into account the natural world (our environment) as a 
valuable member in our quest for global justice.  
Thus, in contrast to Hardin’s lifeboat ethics mentality (which limits the enjoyment of 
justice, thereby promoting possessive individualism, pride, and prejudice), we have considered 
Oruka’s parental earth ethics, which takes an eco-centric rather than anthropocentric approach to 
issues of global justice, thereby ensuring “ecological fairness”. Parental earth ethics, we have 
seen, emphasizes the stewardship model rather than possessive/ exploitative model, thereby 
challenging us humans to be more ethically responsible in terms of how we use and distribute our 
wealth and world resources. Parental earth ethics, we have said, is based on one important fact: 
the earth is a commonwealth and a common heritage for the common good. Part of what that 
undeniable fact means is that we humans have to: (i) responsibly use world resources, and hence 
take good care of the environment upon which we depend for survival; and (ii) equitably distribute 
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or share wealth and resources so that no one member of human species goes without enjoying the 
right to a human minimum. 
Parental earth ethics is, no doubt, a milestone, a legacy to reckon with Odera Oruka. It 
seems to define the direction in which he would have wished his practical philosophy to take. It 
leads us into a different kind of “humanism” that recognizes humans as rational cum moral agents 
and the rest of natural world, especially sentient non-human beings, as valuable moral patients that 
require moral consideration and care. It helps us realize that humanity is not the master but just a 
privileged member of the ecological system.  
That privilege, however, comes with a price: not to leave the world worse off than we found 
it. Thus, Oruka’s eco-philosophy as espoused by his parental earth ethics underscores the ethical 
duty that we humans have to protect Nature. His ethical thought is capable of establishing a viable 
concept of global justice, cognizant of the fact that every being on earth is interrelated and 
interconnected for the common good. It takes the concept of justice not only as that which helps 
us establish ‘egalitarian fairness’ (which properly applies to human relations), but also as that 
which brings about ‘ecological fairness’ with Nature. The latter (ecological fairness), we can now 
submit, would necessarily and effectively lead to the former (egalitarian fairness). 
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CHAPTER 7 
GENERAL CONCLUSION 
7.1. On Humanism, Ecology and Global Justice 
I would like to conclude this project by reiterating Oruka’s commitment to humanism (or 
humanness as he would sometimes call it), by which he means an endeavour to uphold the quality 
and security of human life. Oruka’s humanism seems well captured in his essay Parental Earth 
Ethics (1994), but it is also evident in other works that talk about justice, human rights, politics, 
environment, etc. In fact, one would rightly argue that Oruka’s entire practical philosophy is 
humanistic in nature - both in its approach and methodology (Graness and Kresse 1997, 14). This 
is the point I tried to argue out in chapter two. His philosophy is primarily geared towards 
upholding human survival, dignity, and security. His ethical commitment and thought, particularly 
the concept of human minimum attests to that fact.  
But Oruka’s humanism is unusual given that it also involves the natural world, that is, other 
non-human beings as crucial (though not necessarily equal) members. Oruka was not wholly 
satisfied with anthropocentric motivations for environmental preservation. He concurs with those 
who consider animals and plants as moral patients, but he insists that they nonetheless deserve 
moral concern since they can be recipients of cruelty and unjust treatment (Presbey 2000, 525). In 
one of his essays on environmental ethics entitled Eco-philosophy, Oruka envisions a situation that 
would liberate, appreciate and value the entire biotic and natural community. He writes: 
As slaves and some races were once excluded from ethical consideration but were later 
ethically liberated, so the time has come for the ethical liberation of soils, plants, trees, 
waters, mountains and all beings of a biotic community. We are … to live as equals in a 
community of biodiversity. Each member of this community, whether a human king or a 
… tadpole, has an intrinsic value (Oruka 1997, 244).   
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That quotation, however, should be read in its proper context. It is meant to underscore the 
intrinsic or the ontological goodness, value, and hence importance of every being on earth, each 
according to its own mode of existence. As Aquinas would argue, every being, insofar as it is (i.e., 
exists), is ontologically good and hence valuable and important in itself. This is because goodness 
and being are really the same; they only differ in idea (ST I Q.5 art. 1). That means every being is 
intrinsically equal in goodness insofar as it participates in existence. The difference comes, of 
course, in the mode or in the form of participation. The difference comes, in other words, in the 
essence or the nature of a being in question. This is because “every being, as being, has actuality” 
according to how it participates in existence. But every being, as being, “is in some way perfect; 
since every act implies some sort of perfection; and perfection implies desirability and goodness” 
(ST 1 Q. 5, art. 3). Hence, every being is intrinsically good in itself.  
Likewise, Oruka would argue that every being insofar as it exists is intrinsically equal in 
goodness. Thus, a mosquito or a viper is intrinsically as good, and hence valuable and important 
as, say, a dog or a horse is. The same can be said (ontologically speaking) of a human king and a 
tadpole. It is that intrinsic value, in my view, that Oruka wanted to underscore when he says all 
beings in the world are “to live as equals in a community of biodiversity” (Oruka 1997, 244). 
But we can also, of course, talk about other things being extrinsically good in relation to 
us. Here, we see different things as “good” with regard to the scale of valuation and importance 
that we humans often attach to them, depending on how they practically affect or benefit us. Thus, 
in relation to our human life, a mosquito or a viper is extrinsically harmful and bad, and therefore 
less valuable and important than, say, a dog or a horse. But this is simply because of the benefits 
we often attach to the latter category. Cultures and religious inclinations, moreover, also tend to 
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determine the scale of valuation and importance we attach to things. A pig to a Muslim or a Jew, 
for instance, is less valuable and un-important because majority of them believe it is not suitable 
for human consumption; yet, pork is often considered a delicacy by most Catholics. The question, 
therefore, is: how ought we to determine the value and the importance of things in the world? 
That question, in my view, could be unravelled using Oruka’s insight, which points to the 
fact that every being in Nature is intrinsically good in itself. We may not easily recognize or 
appreciate the intrinsic goodness, and hence the value and importance of some things that do not 
directly benefit us as humans, but that should not be a reason to demean or to deny their goodness, 
their value and importance. Oruka’s insight therefore arguably seems to challenge us to transcend 
our human (i.e., socio-cultural, religious, political and perhaps even intellectual) cocoons so as to 
see the intrinsic value and importance of every being in the world.  
In any case, even those things that we tend to think as less valuable and un-important (such 
as mosquitoes, vipers and tadpoles) are, nonetheless, good because they are part and parcel of 
Nature; and Nature, as Aristotle argues, ultimately works for a good course (Aristotle Physics II.8). 
That means every being in Nature is ipso facto good or moving towards “the good” (whatever that 
might be). Hence, by virtue of being part of Nature as we humans are, even that which seems less 
beneficial to us is good, meaning it might as well be valuable and important even to us now or in 
the future, although perhaps in ways that we may never understand or appreciate. That, to me, 
seems to be what inspired Odera Oruka’s “eco-philosophy” and hence his new kind of humanism. 
Oruka’s humanism, and particularly his concern for environmental ethics appears holistic 
and “liberative”. As he describes it, it does not follow the popular humanistic approach in the West 
often shaped by “capitalist science and technology”; nor does it take the form of “socialist-cum-
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Marxist critique” (Oruka 1997, 246). Instead, Oruka’s humanism is firmly grounded on a basic 
sagacity that gives high regard to both human and non-human beings, albeit in different levels. 
That sagacity, which is prevalent in most pre-colonial African societies, is characterized by such 
humane values as solidarity, generosity, care, etc. It is part of what his philosophy aims at. I come 
back to this point, but first, let me clarify how Oruka understands and applies the term humanism. 
7.2. Defining the term Humanism  
The term ‘humanism’ etymologically derives from Latin word humanitas, which denotes 
such human values as benevolence, kindness and care. It is related to a Greek word φιλανθρωπία 
(philanthropia) - from where we derive the English term philanthropy, which signifies human 
kindness, generosity, care or a “friendly spirit” and “goodwill” (cf. Gellius, Attic Nights, XIII: 17). 
Hence, ‘humanism’ denotes a commitment to being benevolent, kind, and caring; which all imply 
a sense of being ethically responsible toward the wellbeing of other humans, especially the less 
fortunate in society. This is one sense in which Oruka applies the term humanism in his philosophy.  
But humanism can also be defined as a way of thinking and acting based on some set of 
ethical principles and values that tend to give priority to human existence. And that priority, as 
Oruka says, is measured by the quality and security of both individual and collective human 
existential well-being (Oruka 1997, 138-139). Thus, humanism in this sense tends to promote not 
only the good of humanity in general but also the good of individuals as the ultimate goal of human 
actions; it means taking the quality and security of individual human life and general wellbeing 
seriously. That is why Oruka would say humanism is or ought to be the ultimate standard of moral 
good and moral action in every human society (Oruka 1997, 139). 
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Humanism can also be understood as a kind of practical reasoning, i.e., a philosophy that 
aims at finding the “existential purpose and meaning in human life” (Azenabor 2010, 123). In this 
sense, it entails an active ethical commitment to socio-economic welfare of humanity, regardless 
of their national, geographical, racial, or any other sectarian affiliation. As a sagacious normative 
or practical dimension of philosophy, humanism then leads to humanness; it leads to an ethical 
commitment that emphasizes centrality of human life and its non-negotiable dignity and unique 
place in the world. Thus, genuine humanism, Oruka says, refers to that ethical commitment often 
manifested in someone’s actions (e.g., philosophizing or writting), and is always directed towards 
the betterment of the overall living conditions of people in the name of building a more humanized 
global society (cf. Oruka 1997, 130; Kresse 2013, 31; and Nyarwath 2009, 248-50).  
Now as we have tried to argue in this dissertation, Oruka’s philosophy clearly demonstrates 
such a commitment. Matters pertaining to justice, human rights, liberty, politics, etc., are very 
central to his philosophy. But even more important (though perhaps less known) is the fact that 
ecological issues like pollution, consumerism, global warming, etc., form part of his philosophical 
inquiry. Oruka considered human beings not as owners cum exploiters of the natural world but as 
stewards to administer and hence take care of the earth and resources therein for a common good. 
This is no doubt an important dimension that defines Oruka’s humanism.  
Just like most humanists in Africa, therefore, Oruka insists that “humankind must be made 
the central focus” (Azenabor 2010, 112), thereby upholding human dignity and security. However, 
that should not be construed to mean giving license to exploit world resources unchecked - as most 
modern liberalism inspired by Lockean philosophy, for instance, seems to do. Instead, it means 
that human beings have a special mandate to use world resources more responsibly. They also 
have an ethical duty to distribute or share resources more generously, thereby building a better life 
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that is safe and secure for all. And that duty, Oruka says, flows from the fact that it is only humans 
who presumably are rational, ethical, hence socio-political beings on earth (Oruka 1997, 126).78  
In his endeavour to develop a philosophy that is humanistic in nature, Odera Oruka seems 
convinced that human beings are by nature rational, ethical, and hence socio-political, besides their 
being creative and conscientious. He was convinced that we have a natural tendency to relate and 
“socialize” with each other despite our differences. That means we have a natural tendency to be 
humane; to be ethically responsible: caring, loving, generous and kind to each other. And this is 
what, I think, basic sagacity calls for. Of course, that natural tendency might sometimes or quite 
often be overshadowed by some vicious inclination to greed or possessive individualism, pride, 
prejudice and hate. But that does not mean the latter aspects should define the human nature.  
7.3. Humanism in Pre-colonial Africa 
I mentioned earlier that Oruka’s humanism is grounded on traditional value systems that 
tend to give high regard to both humans and non-human beings, albeit in different ways and levels. 
His humanism, in other words, seems to be guided by a simple but important maxim prevalent in 
most pre-colonial Africa: “each for all and all for each.”79 It is such a sagacity that properly defines 
what he we might call traditional African humanism or communalism (not communism): a way of 
life that made every member feel “at home” with other members. It also made one feel fairly 
treated – despite there being elaborate normative measures like taboos, customs and precepts - 
because of such humanistic values as solidarity, generosity, respect, care, tolerance, etc.80 
                                                          
78 I do not mean that it is only humans who are social beings in the world; most animals and birds tend to 
be social, but their “socialism” can hardly be due to their being rational, ethical and self-conscious. 
79 See Graness and Kresse 1997, 124, where Oruka is quoting Peden 1994. 
80 For details, see Gade 2011, Egunu 2014, 2012; Ikenga-Metuh 1990; Menkiti 1984; and Wiredu 1994.  
 209 
 Now Odera Oruka can be seen as applying such values to construct a kind of humanism 
that would ensure possibility of enjoying justice at the global level. First, it is important to note 
that in most pre-colonial African societies, resources were equitably distributed, each according to 
their needs so that nobody would have exuberantly too much while another lacks in the basis of 
sustaining  life. Among the Akan in Ghana, for instance, just like among the Agikuyu in Kenya, 
land (which is the most vital means of livelihood) traditionally belongs not to individuals but the 
clan; and the clan consists of the living, the ancestors, and the unborn - all of whom have a socio-
psychological reality that knits them together as community.81 Here, the driving principle, was 
communalism properly defined in terms of striving to equitably share resources for the common 
good, however meagre these resources were. And it is that spirit of communalism, informed by 
the intuitive consciousness that human beings are interrelated and interdependent, that made the 
majority in traditional African societies to be ethically responsible towards the wellbeing of each 
other. It also led to a sort of “reciprocal justice”, which Oruka says is the basic “social ideal” for 
establishing a more globally humanized society (Graness and Kresse 1997, 124).   
Oruka’s humanism, furthermore, alludes to a traditional African wisdom on ecology, which 
he says can offer “an eco-philosophy that throws some light on the problems that confront modern 
civilization” (Oruka 1997, 251). Now according to that traditional African wisdom on ecology, the 
world is conceived as divided into two related parts: the visible realm comprising of humans, trees, 
soils, waters, animals, plants, etc., on the one hand and the invisible realm having the ancestors, 
the unborn, the heavenly bodies, the spirits, etc., on the other. The two realms together form what 
Oruka calls “the totality of environment or simply the reality of existence” (Oruka 1997, 252).  
                                                          
81 See Wiredu “Philosophy, Humankind and Environment” in Oruka 1994, 301-305.  
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Thus, while human beings might appear more privileged than any other member of the 
visible realm (given that they can think and talk), that privilege, Oruka says, was nonetheless 
understood simply as a matter of being lucky; it was a gratuitous gift from the invisible reality, 
meaning they (humans) have no real right to hold absolute power, ownership or control over other 
members of the visible world. Hence, plants and animals could not be carelessly destroyed at will. 
In fact, some plants and animals couldn’t be touched or destroyed at all because of their 
relationship to the invisible reality – the other part of the entire environment (Oruka 1997, 252). 
Indeed, among the Agikuyu in Kenya where I belong, it was anathema to cut the Mugumo 
(fig) tree, for instance. Of course, the folk sagacity given then was that Mugumo tree is sacred 
because it is where sacrifices to Ngai (or God) were offered (Kenyatta 1953, 4). But the philosophic 
sagacity behind this was really to preserve the environment. It must be remembered that the 
Mugumo tree is so enormous, with widespread strong roots (to avoid soil erosion) and wide 
supportive branches (to shelter birds and other animals). Similarly, no one was allowed to cultivate 
along river banks for the same reason: to preserve the environment, although the explanation given 
was that some Daimono (evil spirit) would make the farmer in question infertile. Other plants were 
also jealously preserved because of their beauty and medicinal value. Each clan, moreover, was 
named and associated with a specific wild animal, and it was anathema for people to kill their own 
animal, even for food. The point here is that ecological conservation was highly regarded in most 
traditional African cultures even when that did not offer direct material benefit to the people; they 
understood that every being is intrinsically good and invaluable. Oruka explains why: 
The belief is that the environment is a community whose members are both human beings 
and non-human [beings]; and that although the humans have privileges, they have no right 
to destroy any of the other visibles except on consultation with the members of the invisible 
[reality] (Oruka 1997, 252 emphasis mine). 
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Such “ecological wisdom” was based on the fact that the invisible reality has greater power 
and knowledge than the visible world (humans included); hence, the fate of the latter was directly 
dependent upon the prerogative of the former. That seems to explain why a traditional African, as 
Mbiti observes, seems “notoriously religious” (Mbiti 1990, 1). No wonder nearly every human 
activity in traditional Africa would be accompanied by prayer to invoke the divine power from the 
invisible reality. And that also points to yet another dimension of traditional African way of life: 
human existence is extended to and depends on the rest of the world. It also underscores the fact 
that ecological balance (at least in the visible realm) is not a human creation; thus, it is sheer vanity 
for humans to think or pretend to be owners or masters of the world (Oruka 1997, 252).  
Odera Oruka’s humanism, therefore, seems to recapitulate the essence of African socialism 
properly defined by the spirit of communalism.82 This is a way of life, a kind of ethics that tends 
to appeal to the welfare of the ‘other’ as a guide to every human action (Masolo 2006). And behind 
that ethics is the need to minimize socio-economic disparity between the haves and the have-nots 
as its primary goal. Thus, Oruka’s humanism, which seems firmly grounded on (although critical 
to some) traditional way of life in Africa can be seen as propagating a dynamic ethical shift: from 
our unnatural human inclination to possessive individualism, greed, pride and prejudice back to 
our natural (traditional) tendency to care for one another in an egalitarian-communal way. 
Now that egalitarian/ communal ethics, the spirit of African Socialism, has also been 
advanced by the Ubuntu philosophy that rests on a simple but philosophically rich humanistic 
principle: “I am because you are.” 83 It helps us realize that humanity is inextricably bound up; that 
                                                          
82 For details regarding his own (Luo) community’s idea of communalism (as espoused by Paul M. 
Akoko, one of the sages Oruka interviewed in his Sage philosophy project) see Oruka 1991a, 140-141.  
83 See the “Foreword” to I am Because You are (Lief and Thompson 2015) by Desmond Tutu. 
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I am human to the extent that I belong to a community in which I ought to participate in building 
by, among other things, sharing what I have with others. Thus, as Shutte observes, the Ubuntu 
philosophy, albeit in its diverse interpretation, has recently become popular given that it basically 
aims at socio-economic and political liberation, human rights defence, and hence the quest for 
global justice (Shutte 1995, preface). It is also concerned about ecology and biodiversity.84 
7.4. Humanism at the Heart of Philosophy 
It is my hope that we can now understand how Oruka’s philosophy is humanistic in nature. It 
seems primarily geared toward human existential wellbeing in their relations to each other and 
with the natural world at the global level. As we tried to argue in chapters two and three, Oruka’s 
practical philosophy was largely informed by some grave historical socio-economic injustice in 
the world that he sought to address first. How could such human perils as poverty, war, hunger 
and disease be reduced, if not eliminated in the world? This was one question that prompted Oruka 
to develop a philosophy in search for a human minimum. As a philosopher of practical ilk, Oruka 
sought to pursue the ultimate and most basic standard of moral good, which for him is or ought to 
be humanism. He believed it is humanism that would lead to practice of justice at the global level.  
Oruka saw humanism as the epicentre of philosophizing toward global justice. Apart from 
adopting the etymological definition of philosophy as love of wisdom, he also defined philosophy 
strictly as an “art of reasoning” that “provides a critical intellectual weapon and methodology for 
analysing and synthesizing the basic problems of man (i.e., human) and society” (Oruka 1997, 
140). For him, that is what qualifies to be moral philosophy, whose nature and mandate is to 
                                                          
84The scope of this project will not allow me to interrogate these issues in depth. For a detailed account on 
Ubuntu see Battle 2009; Gade 2011; Metz 2011; Metz & Gaie 2010; Ramose 1998, 1999; Tutu 2000.  
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discern, analyse, safeguard and promote humanism, moral good and social order, thereby leading 
to a possibility of establishing justice at the global level. He says:  
The main function of moral philosophy is to apply rigorous analytic and synthetic reason 
to the basic moral and social problems and help explain or define moral good, moral evil 
and the requirements of a humanistic social order (Oruka 1997, 140). 
 
It appears, then, that for Oruka, humanism (by which he means commitment to enhance 
and improve the quality and security of human life) ought to be one of the inescapable functions 
of philosophy. It is within its “natural mandate”, he says, for philosophy to call and search for 
remedy where humanism seems to be in danger or in decline (Oruka 1997, 138). But as a caveat, 
Oruka quickly point out that in saying that philosophy ultimately concerns or ought to concern 
itself with humanism, he does not mean to confuse philosophy with other disciplines (religion, 
politics, ideology, etc.) that also in a way concern themselves with humanism.85 It doesn’t mean 
every philosophy is about searching for humanism and global justice either. What it means is that 
humanism is one of the central and perhaps most important aspect of philosophizing.  
Oruka’s philosophy, being humanistic in nature, therefore, aims at establishing some 
ethical principles that would help ensure a genuine humanism, which in turn would see possibility 
of establishing justice at the global level. Key among these ethical principles, we have said, is the 
right to a human minimum. As chapter five tried to show, Oruka’s philosophy aims at upholding 
the dignity of life in every human being by seeking the minimum egalitarian fairness with regards 
to the enjoyment of at least some basic human needs: physical security, subsistence and health 
care. It underscores the humanistic values of solidarity, generosity, care, and above all, the ethical 
                                                          
85 For ways in which philosophy not only relates but also differs from these disciplines, see “Philosophy 
and Humanism in Africa” in Oruka 1997, 140-141. This point was also discussed in chapter one.  
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duty that helps ensure a more genuine concern for the wellbeing of those who for some reasons 
find their right to a human minimum denied or inaccessible.  
Oruka’s philosophy might sound to be an exaggerated advocacy for the plights of the global 
poor, clamouring for their rights without really challenging them to fulfil their civic duty. In other 
words, the right to a human minimum seems to be working for the benefit of the poor; yet, moral 
or philosophical principles ought to be universal. Oruka might also remotely be accused of inciting 
violence as means to agitate for people’s rights. But that, I think, would be missing Oruka’s point. 
In proposing the right to a human minimum as a normative principle towards global justice, Oruka 
intends it to be universally biding: challenging both the rich and the poor for a common good.  
As we tried to argue in chapter five, the human minimum is an ethical minimum and a universal 
right; it is the minimum that any human being, by virtue of being human, can reasonably demand 
from fellow human beings. But that does not amount to giving licence to the poor to forcefully 
grab from others what they think is justifiably due, even though their natural inclination to survival 
might force them to do so. Here, Oruka is cautioning the global society, especially the affluent, 
that denying some members the right to a human minimum is not only ethically unfair but is also 
a threat to global security. Similarly, even though he argues that denying someone the right to a 
human minimum might adversely affect their capacity to function as a moral agent, Oruka is not 
advocating for those below the human minimum to simply act as moral patients. Like everyone 
else, they (the poor) ought to strive and abide by the ethical rules and legal precepts, though this 
might be unfair to them. But on the other hand, the society ought to strive to ensure that no one 
goes without their right to a human minimum fulfilled. The intention really is to enhance a global 
responsibility towards the wellbeing of each other. 
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We can therefore say that the fulfilment of what the right to a human minimum demands is 
universally biding. It has a correlative necessary duty that bides everyone. It would be desirable to 
have everyone in the world meet at least the basic needs through their own effort. But apparently 
that seems not to be the case mainly due to some historical social, political and economic injustices, 
among other factors. Thus, Oruka’s ethical thought seems to be challenging all those who have the 
means, those who somehow have benefited from the current world order, to ensure that those who 
have not or who cannot meet what the human minimum demands are assisted to do so.  
That, however, does not mean that it is only the rich who have a duty towards the right to a 
human minimum; neither is the argument meant to make the rich feel guilty of their genuine earning 
or make them less industrious. The factt is: every human being in the world has a duty first to 
oneself and, second to others. That means one ought to make reasonable demands on others only 
after one has tried and failed to fulfil duty to oneself. The global poor, for instance, have a duty to 
first try and improve their existential conditions; they must critically examine the possible causes 
of their deprivation and work towards the removal of such causes as corruption, laziness and 
complacency. They cannot sit back and simply put that duty upon the shoulders of the rich. Just as 
much as the affluent have the duty to ensure that no one dies from starvation, disease or physical 
violence in the world, so too the poor have equal duty to ensure not only their own survival but 
also a much more dignified lifestyle for all, at least to the best their ability.  
Perhaps it is important to reiterate, as I conclude, that by advancing the argument for the right 
to a human minimum, Oruka was basicaly attempting to “humanize” or make better the world that 
seems increasingly becoming de-humanized. He was trying, for instance, to reduce abject poverty 
and other threate to humanity in the world. But that would involve, among other things, ensuring 
responsible use of and equitable sharing of world resources. A question may, however, arise as to 
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whether the world has got enough resources to sustain the right to a human minimum for every 
person on earth. This is a question that requires further studies from other disciplines.  
Nonetheless, considering the advances already made globally especially in science, technology 
and economy, one can hope that it is practical possibility to make the world better, to reduce 
poverty and other physical threats to human survival. What we need is proper ethics to regulate 
our politics, trade and other human interactions. Paradoxically, though, the effort already made in 
science, technology and economy seems to have led to yet another severe global challenge in terms 
of environmental degradation. Issues of global warming due to carbon emissions and other toxic 
industrial waste are threatening to cause more global havoc than before.  
Now this is where Oruka’s eco-philosophy and humanism becomes handy. As chapter six tried 
to argue, parental earth ethics is able to achieve what the ethical principle of human minimum 
demands of us in two ways. First, it motivates in all of us (humans) the “spirit” of equitable sharing 
of wealth and world resources irrespective of our sectarian affiliations, thereby underscoring the 
concept of justice as egalitarian fairness. Second, it propagates a global environmental concern, 
thereby advancing the idea of justice in terms of ensuring ecological fairness. Put differently, 
parental earth ethics is a noble ethics that seeks to connect Nature as one organic or family unit. 
It enables us see the world as a complex web of beings that are symbiotically related. It offers 
possibilities of creating a global society that is not only egalitarian/ communitarian oriented but 
also ecologically fair, thereby pointing to a possibility of establishing justice at the global level.  
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